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Abstract 
 
This thesis endeavours to address an identified gap in literature on the European Union’s (EU) 
scientific and political engagement in the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). The examination of this 
engagement begins from the initiation of the EU’s formal participation in the ATS in 1983 as a Party 
to the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) mechanism, 
through to the EU’s contemporary role in 2011, for the facilitation of European collaborative 
scientific research on the Antarctic continent  that remains under negotiation pending decisions on 
funding allocations for polar research under the EU Commission’s Horizon 2020 Framework 
Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020). 
 
Particular focus is placed on analysis into the EU’s role in global environmental discourse, for 
contextualised examination on the hypothesis of this research, which posits that the EU could 
upgrade its role in the Antarctic to further legitimise a strategic agenda for recognition as a global 
political actor in international relations. As most of the EU’s participation in the process of Antarctic 
political deliberation was afforded as an observer to the series of Special Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings (SATCM XI-1 to XI-IV) which developed the Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991), a significant amount of analysis will focus on EU and 
Member State involvement in the development of this Protocol. There is also a supplementary 
exploration of Europeanisation of French foreign policy over this period.  
 
In addition to contributing to the academic literature, recommendations concerning the future of 
the EU’s scientific and political Antarctic engagement could be used as informative and topical 
research for a mixed audience of European Union (EU) strategists, policy-makers and officials who 
are tasked with furthering the development of the EU into a global political actor. It could also be of 
interest to those people in the Antarctic community who might opportunistically seek to maximise 
the benefits of an increase in direct and indirect EU participation in the Antarctic, particularly the 
availability of EU funding for Antarctic scientific research.   
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Chapter One:  
Introduction 
 
The primary goal of this thesis research is to contribute to academic literature on the EU’s role as a 
global political actor, by examining its scientific and political engagement in the Antarctic Treaty 
System (ATS) to date. It operates under assumption that the European Union (EU) will continue to 
seek legitimacy as a political actor in the international community. Difficulties in its attempts to 
achieve this through changing its participation in the United Nations (UN) and Arctic Council, may 
lead it to seek political legitimacy in other international organisations or treaty regimes.  
 
This research analyses the hypothesis that the EU could gain further legitimacy as a global political 
actor if it sought to increase its participation in the politics of the ATS. More specifically, if it actively 
sought to convince Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties that it could accede to the Antarctic Treaty 
and its Environmental Protocol for state-like engagement in the political deliberation of the Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM).  
 
 In doing so, the EU could utilise an upgraded role in the ATS as a means to strengthen future bids for 
upgrading EU participation where it has been previously unsuccessful, in effect utilising increased 
participation in the ATS as a gateway into some of the more elusive mechanisms of global and 
regional governance. The key to this increased interaction lies in the inherent ability of each of these 
regional governance mechanisms to evolve their functional requirements, for the promotion of 
international cooperation that seeks to address emerging regional and global challenges.    
 
 
1.1 Research Contribution, Key Question, and Research Themes  
 
 
Despite the unique characteristics of the ATS and the EU, both regional governance mechanisms 
were born of the notion that cooperation between states over a specified geographical area, would 
lead to peace and political stability for that region and beyond. Both mechanisms are also highly 
evolutionary. The ATS has evolved from a single Treaty designed to demilitarise the region and 
freeze territorial claims to the continent, into a system which facilitates international cooperation 
for science research and environmental protection during activities within the Treaty Area. The EU 
has evolved from a regional economic integration project into a burgeoning global actor, as 
European integration deepened and spilled-over into political cooperation for external 
representation.  
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While the current legal and institutional personalities of both systems have so far only allowed 
limited direct EU participation within the ATS, recent functional amendments from the Lisbon Treaty 
(2009) designed to make the EU a more coherent political actor on the international stage, could 
facilitate an increase in the EU’s active engagement in the ATS. Therefore, it has only recently been 
apparent that each of these regional governance mechanisms are at a point in their evolution where 
it is possible that there can be a significant change in how they interact with each other.  
 
Because the EU’s formal participation in the ATS has been limited to its active engagement as a Party 
to the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR 1980), and a 
brief Invited Observer role during the development of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to 
the Antarctic Treaty (1991), there is very little academic literature on the EU’s scientific and political 
engagement in the ATS. Analysis of the ATS has typically focused on the institutional mechanisms of 
the system, the subsequent engagement of state actors within these institutions, and geopolitics on 
the competing and converging interests of these state actors. By default, this left a significant gap on 
any critical analysis into the EU’s direct and indirect influence in the process and substance of 
Antarctic political deliberation.    
 
This thesis research attempts to contribute to academic literature on the EU’s role as a global 
political actor, by analysing its scientific and political engagement in the ATS within a Constructivist 
theoretical framework formed through the fusion of the academic specialties of International 
Relations, European Studies, and Antarctic Studies. This framework was designed to illustrate how 
the EU can be conceptualised as a global political actor that challenges structural assumptions of 
actorness in international relations, in order to examine the key research question:  
 
 How can the European Union upgrade its role in the Antarctic Treaty System to further 
legitimise a strategic agenda for recognition as a global political actor?  
 
The following seven sub-questions are intended to provide contextualised analytical support for the 
central hypothesis, and they therefore form the broader research themes of this thesis: 
 
 Why are institutional changes within the European Union changing the way that it 
participates in the international relations?  
 How can the European Union be conceptualised as a global political actor?  
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 How has the European Union exhibited qualities of ‘actorness’ in global environmental 
discourse?  
 What has characterised the European Union’s scientific and political engagement in the 
Antarctic Treaty System to date?  
 How has the EU exhibited qualities of ‘actorness’ in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting?  
 What evidence is there of Europeanisation in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting?  
 How have the European Union and Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties sought to utilise 
opportunity structures afforded by Antarctic scientific and political engagement for their 
own strategic agendas?   
 
The broader literature themes of this research have been largely pursued with a purpose to 
conceptualise the EU as a global political actor that behaves in a state-like manner for its external 
activities, which traditional conceptions of International Relations theory cannot explain. 
Accordingly, this thesis initially set out to solely establish a Constructivist framework to determine 
what qualities of actor capacity (‘actorness’) the EU possessed in relation to the Antarctic. This 
approach establishes an argument for the EU to increase its direct participation in the politics of the 
ATS by becoming a Non-Consultative Party to the Antarctic Treaty (ATNCP), justified by its normative 
role in global environmental politics and its influence over structural perceptions of the international 
system.  
 
However, over the course of this research it became obvious from interviews and personal 
communications that the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) (as the formal political 
arena within the ATS) remained highly politicised along national lines. While the EU has gained for 
itself a single legal personality and potential actor capacity in the form of a new type of EU 
diplomacy from the Lisbon Treaty (2009), there is a consensus of opinion that the EU could only 
hope to challenge the Westphalian nature of the ATS in the future. Specifically, after it had already 
been successful at upgrading its permanent roles in the UNGA and Arctic Council. Current structural 
perceptions of this system indicate the EU would not be likely to garner enough support necessary 
for accession to the Antarctic Treaty or its Environmental Protocol, and the EU lacks an active will to 
construct for itself actor capacity necessary to increase its direct participation in the politics of the 
ATS. Meaning that any upgraded role for the EU in the ATS, is likely to remain limited to a deepened 
level of scientific engagement, and an indirect normative influence in the politics of the ATS.   
 
 11 | P a g e  
 
Accordingly, this thesis adopts a Constructivist theoretical framework which in the first instance 
maintains the original research direction that seeks to argue for ways the EU could justify an 
increase in its direct participation in the politics of the ATS. And in the second instance, seeks to 
examine to what extent the EU’s ‘presence’ in the politics of the ATS might only served to be 
advanced by an indirect institutional influence of the EU, through the Europeanisation of its 
member-states foreign policies with respect to the Antarctic. This phenomenon has been observed 
during this research, as the Europeanisation of French foreign policy during its leadership role in the 
development of the Environmental Protocol (1991).     
 
      
1.2 Research Design and Methodology  
 
 
This thesis partially follows the research methodology of Olav Schram Stokke and Davor Vidas’s work 
on the analysis of the normative and structural nature of the ATS, in the period prior to their 1996 
publication Governing the Antarctic. They purport that there is a causal relationship between the 
system’s two component categories: the a) normative component, which consists of the norms that 
subjects (actors) of international law are being regulated by in a particular way; and b) structural 
components, referring to the subjects (actors) themselves, whose relations and procedures are 
being regulated. Vidas aptly notes that “the operation of the ATS as a system, accordingly, cannot be 
explained solely by interpreting its norms. These norms are being implemented as well as adapted, 
changed or amended through certain procedures. And, finally, these norms are produced by certain 
subjects, to which – in turn – they are applied”.1   
 
This research attempts to address how the EU could rationalise and strengthen its collective 
diplomacy in the Antarctic, to actively construct for itself actor capability for a permanent role in 
Antarctic political deliberation. As any upgraded political engagement would need to be based on an 
active scientific presence in the Antarctic, collaborative science research is a significant area of 
empirical data.    
 
The research design first establishes the EU and its current actorness in international relations within 
an appropriate theoretical framework, before moving on to explain how and why the EU has 
developed actor capacity for its external relations. The EU’s ‘actorness’ in global environmental 
                                                          
1
 Davor Vidas, “The Antarctic Treaty System and the international community: an overview,” in Governing the 
Antarctic: the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, edited by Olav Schram Stokke and 
Davor Vidas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 40.  
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discourse is examined, including an overview of the EU’s active engagement in the global climate 
change regime.  The EU’s utilisation of its positive normative contribution to global environmental 
discourse is used to shape the EU’s international identity, which the EU has utilised in turn for 
perusing an increase in its active engagement in the Arctic Council, prescribed by its Arctic strategic 
interests. This actorness is later compared to the EU’s active engagement in Antarctic political 
deliberation of the ATCM, particularly in the development of the Environmental Protocol.  
 
Next, empirical analysis on the structure, function and operational aspects of the ATS are outlined, 
providing a comprehensive overview of the system. This provides an important base for 
contextualised examination of the EU’s engagement in the wider ATS system, including a brief 
overview of its executive competence in the CCAMLR fisheries mechanism, and the EU’s potential 
strategic interests in Antarctica. The observation of an indirect presence of the EU in the ATCM is 
analysed, through the investigation of the Europeanisation of French foreign policy during its 
leadership role in the development of the Environmental Protocol (1991).     
 
 National engagement of several EU members that maintain active National Antarctic Programmes 
(NAPs) are examined, specifically their collaborative logistics operations and scientific research 
programmes. The EU’s role for European collaborative Antarctic research is investigated, including 
the key role of European science institutions that EU ATCP’s participate in to opportunistically seek 
EU research funding support to their national programmes. Finally, the EU’s opportunity for 
increased scientific and political engagement in the Antarctic is explored, including its potential actor 
capability necessary to support an upgraded role in the ATCM, are analysed to gauge to what extend 
the EU can challenge structural conceptions of actors in this system.  
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 
The dominate method of research undertaken for examining the EU’s scientific and political 
engagement in the Antarctic has come from the analysis of qualitative data. This approach was 
deemed the most appropriate given the significant literature gap on analysis into the EU’s Antarctic 
engagement to date.  Considering this gap, and the contemporary nature of this topic, a majority of 
the information for this research has been collected from primary resources as units of analysis.  
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Primary resources used to contribute to empirical analysis have largely come from official policy 
documents, including texts of the Antarctic Treaty (1959), the Single European Act (1987), the 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991) and the Lisbon Treaty (2009). 
Official publications from the European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament, 
relevant to this research have also been included, alongside national statements of strategic 
interests, and information from official institutional websites of the Secretariat of the Antarctic 
Treaty and the European Union. A small number of online periodicals have also been included. 
 
Another significant contribution to the empirical data came from the texts of interviews, conducted 
in a semi-structured manner across a two-year period from 2009 to 2011. Many of these interviews 
and personal communications were conducted while the interviewer was working within various ATS 
elements. First in 2009, at the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty in Buenos Aires, Argentina; second, 
at the 2010 Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programmes (COMNAP) Annual General 
Meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina; and third at the 2011 XXXIV Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting/Committee on Environmental Protection Meeting (ATCM-CEP) in Buenos Aires, Argentina.   
 
This interaction provided an exceptional opportunity to observe the actual workings of the ATS, 
which ultimately served to influence the research direction of this thesis and increase the validity of 
research conclusions. This method was pursued with the intention of incorporating actual practice as 
much as possible, rather than limit this research to purely academic perceptions on the process and 
substance of Antarctic political deliberation and international collaboration. Moreover, this method 
allowed for feedback from delegates on their perceptions of EU engagement to date, including 
if/where/how an upgrade for EU participation in the ATS, in their opinion, might occur in the future.  
 
Interviewees included Yves Frenot (Manager, Institut Polaire Français Paule Emile Victor (IPEV - 
French National Antarctic Programme)), Dick van de Kroef (Manager, National Polar Programme 
(NPP), Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO)), Giuseppe De Rossi (Head of 
Logistics, National Antarctic Programme of Italy (PNRA)), Heinrich Miller (Deputy Director –Research, 
Alfred-Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research (AWI - German National Antarctic 
Programme) and incoming COMNAP Chair), Roberto Cesari (current EU Commission Representative 
to CCAMLR), Johannes Huber (first Executive Secretary of the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty), 
Denzil Millar (former Executive Secretary of CCAMLR).  
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Interviews were pre-approved as low-risk through the University of Canterbury’s Ethics Committee 
(see appendices I & II). These were conducted in a semi-structured manner, consisting of a set of 
open-ended questions that were sent to interviewees in advance, and audio recorded where 
possible. Interviews were transcribed and made available to participants for their review if they 
deemed necessary. Supplementary contributions and supporting information were also provided 
through personal communications with other key-informants that are in regular attendance at 
various meetings of the ATS institutions. These include Michelle Rogan-Finnemore (current Executive 
Director, COMNAP), David Walton (Emeritus Fellow, British Antarctic Survey), Maaike 
Vancauwenberghe (Belgian Antarctic Programme Manager), and several other European national 
delegates.  
 
Interview candidates were selected based on their respective states active engagement as EU-
ATCPs, typically the larger European programmes that undertake significant levels of national 
Antarctic scientific and political engagement. Managers of National Antarctic Programmes (MNAP’s) 
were initially approached due to their availability at the 2010 COMNAP AGM. However, in 
retrospect, had government representatives in attendance at the 2011 ATCM of the EU ATCP’s also 
been interviewed in addition to the MNAPs, this thesis could have included a comprehensive 
overview of European competing and converging strategic interests in the Antarctic.  
 
Secondary resources were also heavily drawn upon, specifically academic literature such as peer 
reviewed journals, books, and the texts of conference presentations.  
 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure  
 
 
Chapter Two literature review and theoretical framework introduces the concept of the EU as a 
global political actor, and draws on empirical and theoretical examples on why institutional changes 
within the EU are changing the way that it participates in international relations. This chapter 
establishes the theoretical framework of analysis for this research by predominantly drawing on 
International Relations and European Studies literature focused on explaining how European 
integration has created an entity that continues to challenge structural conceptions of actors in 
international relations.  
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This Constructivist framework introduces the concept of ‘actorness’2, which analyses the EU’s ‘global 
presence’3, ‘international identity’4, and ‘actor capability’5 for engagement, in order to conceptualise 
the EU as a state-like actor in international relations. ‘Europeanisation’ theory is also introduced to 
complement empirical analysis in Chapter Four. This has been included as a supplementary analysis 
which explains how the EU and Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties can utilise opportunity 
structures resulting from their Antarctic engagement for the benefit of their strategic agendas, as 
illustrated in Chapter Four.       
 
Chapter Three moves past theoretical examination and explores the EU’s actorness in the Polar 
Regions. It begins by contextualising the conception of the EU as a global actor by exploring 
empirical information regarding the EU’s actorness in global environmental discourse. Specifically, its 
leadership role in the climate change regime. The EU’s external engagement in this area is under 
active construction, and has provided the EU a basis to apply for an upgraded role in the Arctic 
Council. The EU’s efforts to strengthen this pending application are briefly reviewed, including the 
introduction of the broader research theme of this thesis, which is to examine how the EU could 
upgrade its actorness in the ATS to further an agenda for recognition as a global actor. This includes 
upgrading the EU’s political engagement in the Antarctic to further strengthen and complement the 
EU’s efforts at achieving a permanent role in the Arctic Council.    
 
Chapter Three also examines what the Antarctic Treaty System is and how it operates, as a basis for 
contextualisation of the key question analysis in Chapter Four. Participating signatories, legal 
instruments, permanent observers, and invited experts are examined alongside key functional 
requirements for participation in Antarctic political deliberation, including the necessity for physical 
presence in Antarctica based on scientific research. This chapter illustrates what characterises the 
EU’s direct political engagement in the Antarctic to date, including a brief overview of its direct 
engagement as an Invited Observer during the development of the Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991), and its permanent formal participatory role in the 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Fisheries Resources (CCAMLR) mechanism. This 
                                                          
2
 Bretherton, Charlotte, and Vogler, John. The European Union as a Global Actor. 2
nd
 Edition (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2006).  
3
 Allen, David and Smith, Michael. "Western Europe's Presence in the Contemporary International Arena". 
Review of International Studies 16, no 1 (1990): 19-37. 
4 Manners, Ian and Whitman, Richard. "Towards Identifying the International Identity of the European Union: 
A Framework of Analysis of the EU's Network of Relationships". Journal of European Integration 21, no 3 
(1998): 231-249. 
5
 Bretherton, C, and Vogler, J. (2006).  
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chapter also examines how the EU’s engagement in the CCAMLR forum is perceived, including both 
negative and positive aspects.   
 
Chapter Four is the final analytical chapter of this thesis and it explores upgrading the EU’s Antarctic 
scientific and political engagement. As the EU’s only formal participatory role in the central arena for 
Antarctic political deliberation occurred during the development of the Environmental Protocol, this 
chapter introduces evidence of ‘Europeanisation’ phenomenon uncovered during the research 
process. This supplementary analysis focuses on the observation of Europeanisation of French 
foreign policy towards the Antarctic during its leadership role in the development of the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991), which in effect acted as an indirect and 
normative EU influence in Antarctic political deliberation at that time. Furthermore, this analysis 
exemplifies how the EU and ATCPs have sought to utilise opportunity structures afforded by 
Antarctic engagement to further their own strategic agendas.  
 
This analysis is further supported by the introduction of a number of completed and proposed 
European collaborative research projects in Antarctica. The structure of key European science 
institutions, the European Science Foundation and its European Polar Board are examined, as critical 
supporting evidence on the dynamic nature of national and common strategic interests in the 
Antarctic. This segment also includes analysis into why three large EU-supported Antarctic research 
projects have failed to enough garner support to move beyond their preparatory phases. Finally, the 
key research question of this thesis is examined, which explores how the EU can upgrade its role in 
the ATS to further legitimise a strategic agenda for recognition as a global political actor, including 
potential advantages and disadvantages to upgraded EU Antarctic engagement .  
 
Chapter Five concludes the research presented throughout this dissertation. It reviews the key 
research question and sub questions which form the broader research themes of this research in 
preparation for a summation of findings that contribute to academic literature on the EU as a global 
actor, and on the EU’s Antarctic engagement. Finally, limitations of this research comment on the 
adequacy of the theoretical framework of analysis, and allows for recommendations for future 
research which can contribute to academic literature. 
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1.5 Delimitations and Validity Concerns 
 
 
This thesis research has utilised Stokke and Vidas’s normative and structural terminology 
interchangeably between institutional and participatory components; noting that in this instance the 
participant, or actor, that will be analysed with the most depth in this research is that of the EU. It is 
also important to note that normative and structural analysis is also a method of analysis that aptly 
applies to the functionality of the EU, and is mirrored within the European Studies theoretical 
framework outlined in Chapter Two. 
 
A vital delimitation for this thesis is to note that the use of the term system in the context of the ATS 
has also been adopted following the methods of Stokke and Vidas. The use of the term ‘system’ in 
this thesis does not refer to the widely used distinction often made between an ‘international 
system’ and related concepts like ‘international society’ and ‘international community’. To avoid 
confusion, the ‘global political system’ will be referred to in this thesis as either the ‘international 
community’, ‘global politics’, ‘international relations’.6  
 
Use of the term system in this study is based on the systemic analysis of the ATS; where its unique 
characteristics can be compared with other forms of regional governance, and where its component 
parts are mutually related rather than loosely associated institutions.7 Similarly, the use of the term 
treaty system will also be used interchangeable with the term treaty regime (when referring to the 
ATS) and does not at all assume a likeness to the typically negative use of a government regime in 
popular political reporting, such as the recent media on the violent protests against the Libyan 
regime. 
 
For the purpose of this study, direct and indirect participation of the EU in both the wider Antarctic 
region and its governance mechanism, the ATS, requires delimitation. Participation of the European 
Commission within the ATCM and CEP meetings, in addition to its already permanent membership in 
CCAMLR, will constitute direct EU participation in the ATS and therefore the governance of the 
Antarctic region. The EU’s direct investment into large scale European collaborative scientific 
research on the Antarctic continent is considered a direct EU presence in the Antarctic, which in the 
future might lead to direct participation in the ATS in a state-like manner.  
                                                          
6 Vidas, Davor. "The Antarctic Treaty System in the international community: An overview". In Governing the 
Antarctic: The effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, edited by Olav Schram Stokke and 
Davor Vidas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pg39.  
7
 Ibid.    
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Europe’s extensive history of collaborative polar exploration and Antarctic scientific research is too 
large to be covered within the scope of this research. Therefore, there are only a select few 
collaborative infrastructural arrangements and research projects are introduced. It is also essential 
to note that this thesis research is not intended to be a comprehensive review of EU policy or legal 
instruments relating to the Antarctic.   
 
 
 Validity Concerns 
 
 
As noted previously, data collected from the text of interviews forms a significant part of the primary 
information analysed in this research. While it adds considerably to this dissertations strength of 
research and contribution to academic literature, there are a number of validity concerns that arise 
from this method of data collection. A typical concern regarding interview by author process, is that 
the data provided is vulnerable to subjective interpretation bias on the part of participants and the 
author, including selective recall of information specifically mentioned as it was considered relevant 
to the research project.  The limited availability of interviewees also inhibited the data collection 
process, and restricted collection of a wider field of information relevant to this research and its 
subsequent contribution to academic literature. With reference to case studies regarding European 
collaborative research projects in Antarctica, most interviewees firmly had their ‘national’ hats on 
and did not favour deeper EU engagement, while France (as the proponent of EUROPOLAR ERA-NET) 
tended to pro- European integration and open to deeper EU involvement. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that the contemporary nature of this research topic is a validity concern for this research, as 
there is little academic literature available on the EU’s scientific and political engagement in the 
Antarctica.   
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Chapter Two:  
Conceptualising the European Union as a Global Actor  
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
 
As this thesis is grounded on the premise that the EU’s active pursuit for recognition as a global 
political actor could be strengthened by upgrading its participation in Antarctic political deliberation, 
it is essential to first establish why institutional changes within the EU are changing the way that it 
participates in international relations. The circumstances leading to the level of European integration 
seen today are introduced in this chapter, including key provisions of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) 
created to allow for increased institutional coherence for the EU’s external representation in 
international relations.  
Furthermore, this chapter forms the theoretical framework of analysis for subsequent chapters by 
reviewing empirical and theoretical literature designed to establish how the EU can be 
conceptualised as a global political actor. Accordingly, a Constructivist framework is formulated by 
predominantly drawing on International Relations and European Studies literature, focused on 
explaining how European integration has created a sui generis8 entity that continues to challenge 
structural conceptions of actors in international relations. 
This approach examines literature that has been fundamental in moving the analysis of the EU in 
international relations beyond the Positivist institutional scrutiny of the 1970s and 1980s, towards a 
more contemporary approach which examines the EU’s pursuit of a normative role in global politics. 
Literature on identity, values and norms projected by the EU have been drawn upon , particularly 
the research of David Allen and Michael Smith on ‘Global Presence’; Charlotte Bretherton and John 
Vogler’s ‘Actorness’; and Ian Manners and Richard Whitman’s ‘International Identity’.  
 
‘Europeanisation’ theory is also introduced to complement empirical analysis in Chapter Four. This is 
included as a supplementary strain of analysis to explain how the EU and Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties have utilised opportunity structures resulting from their Antarctic engagement 
in the past, for the benefit of their strategic agendas (not limited to the Antarctic). This acts as a 
good indicator of how the EU could strengthen its future engagement in the Antarctic, through a 
                                                          
8
 Rosamond, Ben. “Conceptualising the EU model of governance in World Politics”, European Foreign Affairs 
Review. 10:4. (2005) 463-478.  
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normative and indirect influence in Antarctic political deliberation, visible as the Europeanisation of 
EU-ATCP’s foreign policy towards the Antarctic.         
 
 
 
2.2 The European Union  
 
 
The European Union (EU) encompasses a land area of approximately 4 million square-kilometres, 
and comprises of 27 sovereign states with combined population of 500 million people. It is the 
world’s strongest commercial power and the biggest aid donor to the developing world.9 For 
centuries Europeans have been plagued by wars fought by sovereign rulers hungry for territory and 
resources, and as its geographical proximity to the Arctic would suggest, the EU’s polar interests 
have been typically focused to the North.  
 
Like the Antarctic, the EU itself is also considered to be a unique form of regional governance; a 
“hybrid intergovernmental and supranational organisation”.10  However, much like the basis for the 
formation of the Antarctic Treaty, the earliest form of European integration outlined in the Schuman 
Declaration (1950), was also designed to encourage cooperation and peace by removing the 
competition over territory and resources.11  
 
To recognise this, France and Germany entered into an international agreement that bound their 
production of coal and steel under a common High Authority, eliminating the possibility of conflict 
by entangling industries of war. This European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was open to 
participation by other states of Europe as a means to stem the aggressive xenophobia that had 
plagued the continent, and act “as a first step in the federation of Europe” for a true foundation of 
economic unification.12   
 
Since this initial step, European integration has evolved far beyond the original scope outlined at the 
end of World War II, increasingly unifying the nations and peoples of Europe in both the economic 
and political spheres, and creating the series of institutions that we now recognise as the EU.  
                                                          
9
 "Welcome to the European Parliament" European Parliament Website. Last accessed, February 12, 2011. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do?id=146&language=en.  
10 “Central Intelligence Agency – World Factbook: Antarctica”. Central Intelligence Agency Website. Last 
accessed February 15, 2012.  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ay.html 
11
 "Schuman Declaration" European Union Website. Last accessed, 10 January 2011 
http://europa.eu.int.abc.symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm 
12
 Ibid.  
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Membership to the EU is open to any European state that fulfils three basic conditions for 
membership:  
 
1) Stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities;  
2) A functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union; and 
3) The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including support for the aims of the 
Union, with administration capable of applying and managing EU laws in practice.13  
 
In order to uphold these criteria, EU member-states must also be UN members. There are currently 
27 EU member-states, consisting of:  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom.14   
 
 
Phases of integration  
 
 
A number of treaties have usurped and amended the original Community model, resulting in a 
varied progression of European institutions. The EU itself formally came into existence with the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU, Maastricht Treaty 1991), but it was in fact the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (TEC, Rome Treaty 1957) which laid the foundation for 
European integration to significantly challenge the limits of state sovereignty in international law.15 
Interestingly, it was almost ten years after the fact that states began to fully comprehend the extent 
to which they had signed a Treaty that was “more than an agreement which merely creates mutual 
obligations between contracting states”.16   
 
                                                          
13 „"Enlargement" European Union Website. Last accessed January 13, 2011. 
http://europa.eu/pol/enlarg/index_en.htm 
14
 „The "The Member Countries of the European Union" European Union Website. Last accessed February 12, 
2011. ; http://europa.eu/about-eu/member-countries/index_en.htm .  
15
 The Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC, 1957). Last accesses February 01, 2012,  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm 
16
 Craig, Paul. P and de Búrca, Gráinne. “The Nature and Effect of EU Law: The Direct Effect of Treaty 
Provisions,” in EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials Fourth Edition (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 
272-274.    
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In 1964, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) presided over a legal case between chemicals company 
Van Gend en Loos and the Netherlands Inland Revenue Department, which ruled that legal 
Community created under the Rome Treaty “constitutes a new legal order of international law for 
the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
the subjects of which comprise of not only Member States but also their nationals”.17 While this 
concept of ‘direct effect’ means little for the EU’s participation in the ATS, it is often cited as a key 
example of how the legal personality of European Community was moving beyond what its member 
states thought they had committed. This case immortalised the evolutionary nature of European 
integration, and forged a path for further treaties to gradually assume more of the sovereign rights 
and obligations of its member-states.   
 
As its formal title indicates, the Rome Treaty established the European Community as the legal 
personality of the then European Economic Community (EEC), with external representation and 
negotiation being undertaken by the European Commission.18  Today the European Commission still 
represents the EU in a number of international agreements and institutions, but under the latest 
treaty amendments, the EU itself has recently replaced and succeeded the European Community as 
the legal personality of European integration. This change gives the EU a legal basis in international 
law to strengthen its negotiating power, “making it more effective on the world stage, and a more 
visible partner for third countries and international organisations”.19 
 
 
The Lisbon Treaty 
 
 
These amendments are a consequence of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European 
Union (1991) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (1957), entering into force in 
December 2009. In addition to adding several new Protocols and Declarations to the existing legal 
                                                          
1717
 Van Gend en Loos was the first example of the concept of „direct effect‟ of Treaty provisions within the 
European Community, specifically focusing on the negative obligations of the legal relationship between 
Member States and their nationals. The case ruling dictated that the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (Rome Treaty, 1957) was different from a standard international treaty, as it not only conferred 
obligations on individuals, but also created new individual rights that national courts must protect. Craig, P.P 
and de Búrca, G.“Direct Effect” (2008), 273.  
18
 Bretherton, C and Vogler, J. (2006), 4.  
19
 Bretherton, C and Vogler, J (2006), 21. And,  
Full Consolidated versions of The Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (the Treaty of Lisbon). Official Journal of the European Union, C83, Vol. 83, 30 March 2010. 
Available on  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:FULL:EN:PDF 
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instruments of the EU, the Lisbon Treaty renames the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).20 
 
The purpose of the Lisbon Treaty is to streamline the institutional structure of the EU as a means to 
legitimise its rise as a global political power in addition to economic strength. It would have been 
impossible for the EU to maintain executive competence in areas of common economic interest, 
such as agriculture or fisheries, without these policies encroaching upon the foreign policy of 
member-states; so a common approach to foreign policy in certain areas is an inevitable spill-over to 
integration.21  
 
The Lisbon Treaty was created to shape the future of European diplomacy and the EU as a whole. It 
gives the EU an international face by creating a new High Representative for the Union in Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy (who is also the Vice-President of the European Commission), to increase 
the impact, the coherence, and the visibility of the EU’s external action.22 The European External 
Action Service (EEAS) has been created to provide support to the High Representative, which 
empowers new EU Delegations to represent the EU across the entire landscape of political, 
economic, foreign and security issues.23 Comparatively, in the pre-Lisbon era EU flagged embassies 
could only represent the EU Commission. Most importantly, “the Lisbon Treaty enhances the EU’s 
legal capacity to participate in international institutions of all types”,24 meaning that now the EU 
itself can be party to international agreements and institutions in policy areas that have been 
conferred upon it by its member states.25   
 
However, to what extent the Lisbon Treaty will actually change how the EU participates in the 
international political sphere is still widely debated. We are already familiar with how European 
integration has created new international legal norms, and it is still forging these new paths. Just like 
the Rome Treaty and the Van Gend en Loos Case, it could be almost a decade before we begin to see 
                                                          
20
 Treaty of Lisbon (2009).  
21
 Rosamond, B (2005). 
22
 Emerson, Michael; Balfour, Rosa;  Corthaut, Tim; Wouters, Jan;; Maciej Kaczyński, Piotr; Renard, Thomas;  
Upgrading the EU’s Role as a Global Actor: Institutions, Law, and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy, 
(Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011). Available on http://www.ceps.eu/book/upgrading-eus-
role-global-actor-institutions-law-and-restructuring-european-diplomacy 
23
 Upgrading the EU’s Role as a Global Actor, 10.  
24
 Ibid, 13. 
25
 Ibid, 29, And,  
 “Your Guide to the Lisbon Treaty”; Europa Treaty of Lisbon Website. Last Accessed April 2009. 
http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/others/84/en.pdf And,  
“Coalition for the Reform Treaty briefing on the Reform Treaty – EU Institutions”, European Movement 
Website. Last accessed on 12 February 2012, 
http://www.euromove.org.uk/fileadmin/files_euromove/downloads/CRT_Briefing_on_EU_institutions.pdf  
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the real impact of the Lisbon Treaty, because despite granting the EU a legal personality to enhance 
its status in various international organisations and institutions, it achieves few automatic changes to 
this effect.26  
 
 
2.3 The EU’s place in International Relations  
 
 
As the Lisbon Treaty signals the start of an integrated legal regime for the EU, there is considerable 
debate around its significance in practical terms for the EU’s participation in international relations.27 
The objectives of the EU’s external policy under the Lisbon Treaty summarised under Article 21 
provides a long list of value-based normative objectives for the EU (see Figure 1). The EU’s repetitive 
rhetoric on the promotion of effective multilateralism through an increasingly structured multilateral 
order has been the prime objective of EU foreign policy even prior to the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty.28   
 
While scholars illustrate that the EU’s value-based international role to date has largely developed as 
a counter to a hegemonic order dominated by US foreign policy that under the Bush Administration 
became increasingly unilateral, militarised, critical of the UN system, withdrawn of its environmental 
leadership role, and active in its opposition to human rights issues and international judicial 
concerns29; the emerging multi-polar global order presents its own dramatic challenges to the EU’s 
normative international role.  
 
As globalisation shifts power towards Asia, giving rise to the influence of the BRICS states (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) in global politics, new questions have been posed as to the 
nature of normative principles (if any) this emerging multi-polarity will have.30  As evident from 
recent UN Security Council debates and the substantive failure of the 2009 Copenhagen Climate 
Change Summit, the BRICS have shown different ideas for participation in global politics, supporting 
                                                          
26
 Upgrading the EU’s role as a Global Actor, 22.  
27 Sutton, Alastair and Smales, David. "Lisbon signals the start of an integration legal regime". Legal Week 12, 
no 3 (Jan 28, 2010): 13. 
28
 Upgrading the EU’s Role as a Global Actor, 2.  
29
 Bretherton, C and Vogler, J. (2006) „Conclusion‟, pg216 and pp26 -27.  
30
 Upgrading the EU’s Role as a Global Actor, 2. And,   
Keukeleire, Stephan and Bruyninckx, Hans. "The European Union, the BRICs, and the Emerging New World 
Order" in, International Relations and the European Union, edited by Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, 397-
399. 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 25 | P a g e  
 
realist notions of hard state sovereignty through the promotion of non-interference and non-binding 
international agreements.31 
 
Particularly relevant to this thesis is the impact of this changing global order on the EU’s external 
environmental policy and its subsequent normative role in global environmental politics, for which it 
also seeks to actively promote binding multilateralism. However, the EU’s representative incohesion 
at the Copenhagen Summit led it to be sidelined during the final stages of negotiations, as the weak 
effectiveness of the EU troika representation and the multiplicity of voices from too many European 
leaders, left US President Obama to negotiate out of a diplomatic stalemate with China, India and 
Brazil alone.32  
 
EU ineffectiveness at Copenhagen further served to highlight the need for the EU to rationalise and 
strengthen its collective diplomacy through institutional cohesiveness, in order to provide a 
framework for action to face new global challenges of the emerging multipolar order.33   
 
 
New EU diplomacy  
 
 
According to the recent 2011 report Upgrading the EU’s Role as a Global Actor from the 
independent policy research institute the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), the EU must 
lobby for stronger representation as a political actor in the international arena because 
“globalisation and the rise of new great powers, the changing nature of diplomacy with declining 
relative weight of bilateral inter-state affairs and the increasing demands to work out mechanisms of 
global governance”, will force the EU and its member-states to adapt if they wish to remain relevant 
in global affairs.34   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 Upgrading the EU’s Role as a Global Actor pg19. And,  
  Keukeleire, S and Bruyninckx, H. “The European Union, the BRICs, and the Emerging New World Order”, 
pp397-399.   
32
 “Upgrading the EU’s Role as a Global Actor”; pp 2-19.  
33
 Ibid, pg3. And,  
Hill, Christopher and Smith, Michael. “Acting for Europe: reassessing the European Union's place in 
international relations” in, International Relations and the European Union, edited by Christopher Hill and 
Michael Smith. 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 460. 
34
 Upgrading the EU’s Role as a Global Actor, 14.  
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Bilateral diplomacy on the part of member-states acting independently and with inconsistent 
discourse, is not only ineffective at a level of strategic significance, it is also an inefficient use of 
scarce talent and budgetary resources. Additionally, globalising trends in the international 
community have given rise to global regulatory policies that have in turn blurred the boundaries 
between traditionally national and international policy issues.35 Since the EU is already well 
accustomed to dealing with the realities of competing and converging national and European 
                                                          
35
 Ibid, 19.  
Figure 1. Lisbon Treaty – Objectives of the EU’s external policy.  
1. The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles that have 
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in 
the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.  
The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and 
international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first 
subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the 
framework of the United Nations.  
2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and action, and shall work for a high 
degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: 
 
(a) Safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; 
(b) Consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of 
international law; 
(c) Preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance 
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to 
external boarders; 
(d) Foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing 
countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;  
(e) Encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; 
(f) Help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the 
environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to 
ensure sustainable development; 
(g) Assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; 
and 
(h) Promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good 
governance.  
Source: Upgrading the EU’s Role as a Global Actor, 17. Article 21, Treaty of Lisbon (2009).  
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interests with a complex system of exclusive, shared, and national competences, it has a 
comparative advantage as a global actor in a multi-polar world order that is increasingly multilateral 
in its approach to contemporary security paradigms such as humanitarian assistance, environmental 
protection, and efforts to mitigate the impact of climate change.36 
 
While the EU’s system of shared competences for foreign policy matters are complex, and there are 
still unresolved tensions on who may negotiate for the EU and member-states in certain types of 
situations, the CEPS report is confident that the EU’s new diplomacy will retain a hybrid character 
indefinitely, even with the substantial restructuring of the EU’s internal composition and external 
representation from the Lisbon Treaty. This is because shared competences that inevitably spill over 
into the international affairs which dictate EU foreign policy, in essence require two sources of 
power – with the EU and its member-states working together as a hybrid system.37                        
 
However, despite the ability of this new EU diplomacy to radically change the EU’s status in global 
institutions, the EU had little immediate success in attempts to upgrade its role in international 
organisations. This was particularly evident within the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 
where its status lagged behind its actual competence after the entrance into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty. This was because the Lisbon Treaty had little automatic effect for upgrading the EU’s status 
in many international organisations and institutions, despite the EU already being party to hundreds 
of international agreements from membership gained as a regional economic integration 
organisation (REIO) prior to the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
While the EU’s hybrid foreign policy system is complex, and member-states and the EU will need to 
remain mindful to reduce any unnecessary procedural complications and expensive duplicative 
presences, EU member-states are already well aware of the costs of this system for their effective 
representation in international fora.38 The CEPS report concludes that the EU will require two 
important prerequisites in order to realise the goal of upgrading its role as a global actor. First, “a 
sustained, systematic, and well organised push to progressively enhance the EU’s status in 
organisations where this lags behind its actual competences”, and second “the steady build-up of a 
world class diplomatic service with competence in both traditional foreign policy matters and 
extensive sectoral regulatory practices”.39  
 
                                                          
36Upgrading the EU’s Role as a Global Actor.  
37
 Ibid, pp6-9. 
38
 Ibid 9.   
39
 Ibid 13.  
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Assuming that the evolution of the multi-polar world order itself will shape how the EU can actually 
achieve upgrading its role as a global actor, the EU needs to decide on its strategic interests and 
potential as a global actor within this evolving world order.40 Proponents suggest that the EU can 
achieve greatness of influence and impact in this rapidly changing world by playing a role that 
contributes “proactively, intelligently, strategically, subtly – and successfully – to the creation of a 
more stable, secure, prosperous and harmonious world order” by forging ‘multilateral global grand 
bargains’ that foster a history of collective approaches to transnational challenges such as 
environmental degradation, climate change, regional instabilities, and acts of terrorism.41 
 
This thesis argues that if multilateralism in the international community remains weak at the political 
will of the strong state powers, and therefore the EU remains unsuccessful in its attempts for 
permanent membership in international fora or regional governance mechanisms where its 
normative influence would contribute to effective multilateralism, then it should actively begin to 
pursue membership in other political arenas. For example, those mechanisms which complement 
policy areas where the EU already has established a level of actor capacity in its own right, such as 
environmental protection. Here an upgraded EU role may have a smaller perceived threat to 
national sovereignty than institutions which deal within the realms of tradition foreign policy and 
diplomacy; in effect acting as an interim step for achieving the broader strategic goal of upgrading 
the EU’s role as a global actor.   
 
While such mechanisms would not show a visible lag in the adoption of EU competences, and would 
therefore be of supplementary interest to the EU at this point in time, they would serve to 
strengthen this broader strategic goal by further legitimising an EU presence within the international 
community along policy issues which have already begun to shape the EU’s international identity. 
The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) could be one such mechanism. By employing this tactic, the EU 
could utilise its inclusion in these mechanisms as a legitimate basis to strengthen future bids to 
upgrade its status within some of the more elusive mechanisms of global governance that delve 
further into traditional foreign policy issues. Accordingly, this thesis adopts a key theme of the CEPS 
report, as it also seeks to establish an argument for how the EU could rationalise and strengthen its 
collective diplomacy within a specific institutional arrangement. In this instance the institutional 
arrangement is that of the ATS.  
                                                          
40
 Emerson, Michael and Maciej Kaczyński, Piotr “Looking afresh at the external representation of the EU in the 
international arena, post-Lisbon”, Centre for European Studies (CEPS) Policy Brief, No.212/July 2010. 
Available from http://www.ceps.eu/book/looking-afresh-external-representation-eu-international-arena 
41
 Howorth, Jolyon. "The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain". Journal of 
Common Market Studies 48, no 3 (2010): 455-474.  
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Before this chapter establishes a clear theoretic framework for analysis on how the EU could 
upgrade its direct engagement in the ATS, more specifically for a permanent participatory role in the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), it will briefly review one instance where the EU has 
been successful in its attempts to upgrade its role as a global actor after the Lisbon Treaty has 
entered into force. This example investigates the EU’s attempts to upgrade its status within the 
United Nations, which provides an insight into a global mechanism that is largely concerned with 
issues of traditional foreign policy and security, and for which the EU’s representation visibly lagged 
behind its actual competence after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
Chapter Three introduces a second example that explores the EU’s attempts to gain a formalised 
role within the Arctic Council, which provides an insight into a regional mechanism that is largely 
concerned with foreign policy and security issues of a more contemporary nature, and for which the 
EU’s participation does not lag behind its actual competence. Both of these practical examples 
provide important comparative contextualisation for analysis on how the EU could rationalise and 
strengthen its collective diplomacy within the institutional arrangement of the ATS. 
 
  
The United Nations 
  
 
Despite the intention for the Lisbon Treaty to strengthen the EU’s negotiating position in 
international relations, ‘the law of unintended consequences’ saw the EU’s representation in the 
United National General Assembly (UNGA) actually weaken by the interaction of the Lisbon Treaty 
and the UNGA Rules of Procedure.42 This is because the EU’s position in UNGA debates is no longer 
posited by the member-state representing the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union. Instead, it is now the shared role of the High Representative and the President of the 
European Council.  As the EU itself only held ‘ordinary’ observer status at the UN until recently, the 
new EU representatives could only intervene after all 192 full UN Members had spoken.43  
 
This weakened position is what led the EU Members to table a Resolution in the UNGA in September 
2010, which was to invoke the EU’s status as a REIO in order to upgrade its participation in the 
UNGA, subsidiary working groups and UN conferences, to that of an ‘enhanced’ Observer.44  
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Unfortunately for the EU, a majority voted to defer for further “open, transparent, and inclusive 
negotiations” before decisive action could be taken on a draft resolution “that effectively would 
have created a new category of non-State observer with a unique complement of rights and 
privileges”, rather immediately pass UNGA Draft Resolution A/64/L67.45 
  
Member States revisited this debate in May 2011 and after much lobbying on the part of the EU46, 
passed UNGA Resolution A/RES/65/276, adopting a set of modalities for the enhanced participation 
of the EU.47 Days prior to the UNGA Plenary Session, the European Parliament adopted its own 
resolution, also stressing the need the need for the “comprehensive reform of the UN Security 
Council....reiterat[ing] the view that an EU seat in an enlarged UNSC remains a central, long-term 
goal of the European Union”, “stressing that the EU – by enhancing cooperation, improving 
institutions and engaging all stakeholders – should play an active and leading role in global 
governance reform to make international institutions and organisations more legitimate, effective 
and conductive to shared responsibility, while strengthening its position, pursing its objectives and 
priorities and promoting its principles, values and interests to shape this process” in a bid to further 
reinforce the EU’s role in the multilateral system.48 
 
 
 
2.4 The EU as a global actor – theoretical framework  
 
 
Attempts to define what the EU is in order to analyse its place in the process of international 
relations is a difficult task. It is not a state in the traditional sense, nor an international organisation; 
yet it is both an actor and an arena, “a system of international relations in itself”.49 Hill and Smith 
conclude in their updated 2011 publication International Relations and the European Union, that the 
EU can be thought of as a “parastatal entity”, as it exists alongside traditional nation-states to handle 
tasks that they might otherwise struggle to deal with.50 They suggest that the EU’s place in 
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International Relations (IR) literature can be examined within three lenses: first, the EU as a system 
of international relations in itself; second, the EU as a participant in the wider process of 
international relations; and third, the EU as a power.51 Other scholars prefer to keep its definition as 
sui generis, instead focusing on ways in which the EU’s actual participation and substance can be 
examined to gauge qualities of ‘actorness’ within the process of international relations, in order to 
conceptualise its role as a global actor.52  
 
Therefore, when studying the EU as a global actor there is often a cross-disciplinary trend of analysis 
which merges approaches from Political Science, International Relations, International Law, 
Economics, History, and other social sciences, to explore the EU’s integration, the internal processes 
of policy-making, and its subsequent international relations with non-members.53 This European 
Studies approach offers the necessary theoretical convergence that can be utilised to accurately 
gauge the EU’s participation and substance in the international system – and therefore its role as a 
global actor – by studying its ‘presence’54, ‘actorness’55, and ‘international identity’56 in addition to 
its participation within the realms of traditional high politics of security, defence and foreign policy, 
and low politics of the economy and society.  
 
Accordingly, this thesis adopts a key methodological assumption from the earlier 2005 research of 
Hill and Smith, which asserts that “a methodological pluralism is therefore required when seeking to 
explain and understand the EU’s role in international relations”.57 No single approach, whether as 
broad as realist, rationalist, or constructivist, or as specific as intergovernmentalism, geo-politics, or 
‘presence’, can provide for an adequate analysis of the role of the EU’s place in international 
relations.  
This chapter segment establishes a theoretical framework for the subsequent analysis of the EU’s 
participation in the ATS, by first examining literature on the EU within IR theory as a singular 
approach. The EU’s existence is explained with two classical IR theories, Federalism and Neo-
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functionalism, which examine the reasons behind and the process of European integration. A 
Constructivist approach is deemed an appropriate framework of analysis for this dissertation, as it is 
a more contemporary strain of IR theory that adds social constructs to the analysis of actors in 
international relations. This framework allows for the examination of the EU as behaving in state-like 
manner for its external activities, which challenges traditional structural conceptions of international 
relations.   
 
Secondly, this framework is enhanced by the introduction of European Studies theories which 
attempt not to define what the EU is as an actor, but to define the EU’s place and value in 
international relations by analysing its ‘presence’, ‘actorness’ and ‘international identity’. The review 
of literature creating the theoretical framework of this thesis culminates in a brief introduction of 
Europeanisation theory, which is utilised in subsequent chapters to determine to what extent the 
EU’s current influence and substance in the international arena of the ATS is enough to upgrade its 
role as an actor in its own right, or whether its new institutional coherence might only serve to 
further exert its influence through an impact on the foreign policies of its member-states with 
respect to the Antarctic.   
 
 
International Relations and the EU 
 
 
Given that the recognition of an actor in International Public Law focuses on the inter-state system, 
its formal concept of actorness is discussed in terms of the notion of legal personality; “Legal 
actorness confers a right to participate, but also to be held responsible by other actors, and to incur 
obligations”.58 In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia formerly inaugurated the modern state system by 
laying down the assumption that sovereign territorial states are the subjects of International Law, 
and therefore only a state could make treaties, join international organisations, and be held 
accountable by other states.59  
 
By the mid-twentieth century these Westphalian assumptions were being challenged, with the first 
formal recognition of international legal personality for a non-state actor emerging from a 1948 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling which recognised the UN (as an intergovernmental 
organisation) as having an international legal status. While the ruling noted that this legal 
personality was not equivalent to that of a state, it nevertheless formed the future basis for the 
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recognition of the international legal personality of other non-state actors, including the European 
Community (EC), allowing them to also be the subjects of international law in areas of legally 
established competence.60   
 
International Relations (IR) is a broader academic field of study that attempts to explain how the 
world works and what we observe of the international system, and is more apt at defining the EU’s 
place in the world aside from simple legal definitions. IR can be focused to analyse the EU’s 
participation and substance within the international arena when its competence in areas of high 
politics is typically limited in favour of retaining the political agency (read: sovereignty) of its 
member-states.61 Over the years IR scholars have attempted to use a range of theories to explain 
why European integration has occurred and still exists, and to characterise the EU’s internal and 
external relations.  
 
However, as many of these studies have focused on explaining the EU’s international relations 
within classical schools of IR that were initially created to account for the behaviour of states, they 
too often focus on comparing the activities of the EU in relation to an international system which 
bases relationships between states on the competition over military power and material resources; 
an approach which neglects to accurately account for the true extent of the EU’s international 
relations and foreign policy.62  
 
Federalism and Neo-functionalism are two IR schools that were adapted from broader theories to 
specifically account for the unique circumstances that encouraged European integration, both of 
which focused on an end point of a fully fledged Union complete with an amalgamated security 
community in mind. Federalism as a school of thought focuses on ‘high politics’ of the political order 
including security, defence and foreign policy. It is akin to the broader IR theory Realism in that it 
identifies the main problem of international relations is that it is an arena in a constant state of 
anarchy, as state actors seek to survive under conditions of mistrust, reciprocal threats, rivalry, and 
violence.63 Based on the experience of the two world wars, federalists held a deep mistrust of 
diplomacy and the balance of power as traditional remedies for an anarchical system, so they sought 
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to remove aggressive nationalism by fusing states and their instruments of violence into a secure 
union with common defence and foreign policy.64  
 
Neo-functionalism as school of thought focuses on ‘low politics’ of economics and civil society, 
including issues of citizen welfare. Like federalists, neo-functionalists believe that the motor for 
integration in this instance also focuses on security, but rather than being the security of states as 
political actors, neo-functionalists argue that the inability of nation-states to provide for the welfare 
of their citizens would lead to unification as the most efficient form of security for individuals and 
their societies.65 Full integration in this instance would stem from functional, technical, and political 
spillovers from institutions that were created to possess jurisdiction over states for the benefit of 
their citizens. As political spillovers follow economic and social integration, analysis of foreign policy 
within the neo-functionalist framework is supplementary given its traditional distaste of power 
politics.66   
 
While both schools were formulated to be general models of behaviour in world politics, they are 
criticised for being highly ‘Eurocentric’ as their emphasis focused too much on explaining events in 
Western Europe that would ultimately lead to the creation of a super-state with a political 
community that would be superimposed over existing ones. Once it became obvious that full 
integration was not inevitable, scholars shifted theoretical debate on European integration towards 
interpretation within the broader paradigms of IR literature: Realism, Liberalism, and eventually 
Constructivism. These theories give more importance to the continued existence of states in the 
international system than the schools of federalism and neo-functionalism, and their broader 
application can account for more empirical variables on the EU as a participant in wider process of 
international relations.67 
 
For the purpose of analysing the potential for the EU to upgrade its role as a global actor by 
increasing its participation in the politics of the ATS, establishing framework of analysis within the 
Post-Positivist Constructivist IR approach is preferred over mainstream Positivist Realism and 
Liberalism. Unlike Realism, Constructivism is not a theory in itself; instead it is an approach which 
encompasses a broad range of social theories under the Post-positivist English School of 
International Relations, which uses social constructs to explain the significance of shared norms and 
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values for an International Society.68 Post-positivists critique Positivists (recognised as being the 
American School of International Relations) for trying to apply an objective scientific method of 
analysis to the social world, as they end up focusing too much on analysing the notions of power and 
security as causal concepts, when the constitution of these notions should be focused on.69 
 
 Constructivism challenges the rigidity of mainstream Positivist debates by emphasising the 
importance of social constructs and cognitive factors to the behaviour of actors in the international 
system. Constructivists posit that while states may be rational actors, decisions around forming 
collective foreign policy are hindered by cognitive constraints of the decision makers, and are 
therefore based on a ‘bounded rationality’.70 These constraints include limitations to time for 
information gathering and processing, leading to decisions that are less than fully rational as they 
are made from imperfect information.71 Alexander Wendt is credited with Constructivism’s early 
development, though there are many diverging strands.  
 
While Constructivism echoes the mainstream analysis of states in international relations under 
conditions of anarchy, there is a clear break from Realism because “anarchy is what states make of 
it” as it is social construct that can be perceived in different ways depending on to what extent these 
states are obedient to the ‘political culture’ of the international system.72 Because EU’s participation 
in the international system transcends Realism’s perception of constant anarchy, as the EU seeks to 
modify this condition through the promotion of binding multilateralism, “European integration could 
represent an experiment in the construction of a different type of international order, in which 
conflict could be replaced by cooperation and suspicion by mutual trust”.73 Wendt argued that this 
happens because actors will obey the rules of the system for three reasons: coercion, interest, and 
legitimacy. Over time states can develop norms of peace and cooperation (echoing Liberal IR 
theory), leading to a shared sense of community, which in turn reinforces peaceful interactions.74 
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For the purpose of this thesis research, a Constructivist IR approach has been outlined to establish a 
framework of the EU’s ‘global presence’, ‘actorness’ and ‘international identity’75 so that the its 
place and substance in the process of international relations can be gauged to identify areas where 
the EU could seek to upgrade its role as a global actor. By utilising this Constructivist framework, this 
thesis examines the EU’s potential to become a Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty, for which 
it might construct for itself a role for political engagement in the ATCM, in areas that align with its 
perceived international role as a ‘normative power’ in global environmental politics. As the EU’s 
participation in this area is based on a conferred legal competence in policy areas which align with 
its international identity, it is also apt to analyse how identity can been constructed through the 
promotion of shared norms and values.76  
 
While this approach does not discount the interest the EU would have in the resources of the 
Antarctic (for example fisheries, bioprospecting resources, fresh water, and minerals), because this 
thesis examines how the EU could increase its actorness in the ATS to further legitimise itself as a 
global political actor, inclusion of the EU’s potential interest in securing Antarctic resources is a 
supplementary consideration of the subsequent analysis chapters. Before this empirical analysis is 
introduced in Chapter Three, the next segment introduces the concepts of presence, actorness, and 
international identity that construct the EU’s recognition as ‘normative power’ within global 
environmental politics.   
 
 
Global Presence, International Identity and Actorness 
 
In the early 1990s, when the end of the Cold War encouraged the emergence of Post-positivist 
Constructivist approaches to international relations, David Allen and Michael Smith moved beyond 
positivistic comparative political science analysis of the external capacity of the EC’s institutions, to 
develop the notion that the Western Europe’s tangible and intangible presence in the international 
arena was a means to determine its role and impact in global politics.77 This was an early attempt to 
analyse the EC through “the place it occupies in the perceptions and expectations of policy makers”, 
for which an EC presence could have a subtle influence with tangible outcomes.78   
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Richard Whitman later built on this notion by suggesting that the EU could have an ‘international 
identity’, which would characterise its presence and capabilities, in addition to its external relations 
and foreign policy. Whitman’s concept “was not a synonym for “foreign policy” or “external 
relations”, but *...+ a position from which to commence conceptualising the global role of the 
European Union as being greater than the sum of its parts”.79  
Previous to this emerging analysis, social theory had been largely absent from the analysis of the EU 
in global politics, yet the study of human action, social institutions and social identity are critical to 
understanding the international identity of the European Union (IIEU), and thus the EU’s place in 
global politics.80 Ian Manners joined Whitman to argue that “the notion of international identity is an 
attempt to think about how the EU is constituted, constructed, and represented internationally. The 
relationship between the EU and the rest of the world is therefore crucially determined by the 
nature of this international identity”.81  
This international identity is shaped by constantly evolving elements, including the EU’s constitutive 
history and principles; the way that it is perceived; and the way that the EU represents itself, and in 
turn, how others represent it. In this instance, Manners and Whitman are careful to note that this 
IIEU is not mono-dimensional (either national or European); it reflects the hybrid nature of EU 
institutions with contestations of complex, multiple and relational identities.82 Most importantly for 
this thesis, Manners and Whitman view the IIEU to be an identity that exists in contrast to the 
Westphalian norms of sovereignty and territoriality.83     
In keeping with post-Cold War Constructivist analysis of the international system, which moved 
analytical focus away from actors that justified their roles in global politics from the competition 
over power and resources, Manners introduced the concept of ‘normative power’ as one part of the 
IIEU.84 His intention was to quantify the essence of the EU’s role in global politics through its active 
promotion of nine normative principles, including peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, the 
rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance; based on the 
prominence given to these ideals within the EU’s external relations during the 1990s and beyond.85 
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In Manners’ opinion, “the concept of normative power emphasises normative justification in world 
politics”.86  
Conceptualising the EU as a normative power in world politics remains relevant in the 21st century, 
and involves understanding legitimising principles, persuasive actions, and the socialising impact of 
actors on the normative component of global politics.87 This normative component refers to the 
rules that govern the subjects of international law, which determines how actors participate in 
international relations. Because the EU can be considered both an arena and actor in itself, this 
normative institutional socialisation occurs both internally with external ramifications for the 
projection of member-states foreign policies, and externally for the EU’s projection of its own 
constructed values and norms within the wider international system.88 
 
Internally, EU member-states do not transfer ultimate foreign policy control to EU institutions, but in 
practice they do tend to adopt a “logic of appropriateness” towards EU institution rules because 
they fear being considered as untrustworthy or inappropriate partners.89 As EU institutions 
encourage the development of common platforms, national foreign policies can be influenced (only 
when there is no explicit encroachment on vital national interests), and eventually draw national 
positions closer in a process called ‘Europeanisation’.90 Externally, as internal national positions 
become socialised, a consistent bias towards a common position in certain areas creates an external 
role for the EU, in turn creating an international identity.91  
 
As the EU’s normative power encapsulates its presence, capabilities, and other parts of its 
international identity, “the EU changes the normality of international relations.... *by+ chang*ing+ the 
norms, standards, and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state-
centricity”.92 For example, the EU’s promotion of the normative principle of binding multilateralism 
has scope to influence the operation of the international system itself, and we have seen the EU 
attempt this via is role in global environmental politics, albeit somewhat unsuccessfully at the 
Copenhagen Summit.   
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It is apparent from International Relations literature that the debate over the EU’s place and 
substance in global politics relevant to this thesis, typically involves examining the creation of an 
external role for the EU in two ways, both of which are somewhat intertwined. Allen and Smith’s 
concept of ‘presence’ is used to assert that “the EU already possesses a distinctive international role 
with a distinctive substance to its policy”.93 This explanation for the EU’s external role mirrors neo-
functionalism, as it is purely as a result of spillovers from internal policy cohesion. While presence is 
an important consideration, it is rather limiting on its own, and as we have already seen many 
scholars seek to build on this concept.  
 
In the late 1990s, Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler revived Gunnar Sjöstedt’s Constructivist 
notion of ‘actor capability’, in an attempt to create a new conceptual category that could analyse to 
what extent the EU had acquired and exhibited qualities of an international actor in global politics.94 
Their concept of ‘actorness’ suggests that the EU’s external role can be actively constructed, rather 
than simply occur as a result of policy spillovers.95   
 
 Here the creation of an external role for the EU is also dependant on the internal development of 
common policy positions, but in this instance the EU’s external activities and participation in 
international relations are not an unintended consequence – they are purposefully shaped by 
examining and utilising three key elements of opportunity, presence, and capability, in order to 
construct a suitable role for the EU as a global actor.96 Bretherton and Vogler delimit these three key 
elements as follows:  
 “Opportunity denotes factors in the external environment of ideas and events which 
constrain or enable actorness. Opportunity signifies the structural context of action.   
 Presence conceptualises the ability of the EU, by virtue of its existence, to exert influence 
beyond its borders. An indication of the EU’s structural power, presence combines 
understandings about the fundamental nature, or identity of the EU and the (often 
unintended) consequences of the Union’s internal priorities and policies.  
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 Capability refers to the internal context of EU external action – the availability of policy 
instruments and understandings about the Union’s ability to utilise these instruments, in 
response to opportunity and/or to capitalise on presence”.97  
 
Bretherton and Volger are particularly interested in “the process through which such qualities [of 
actorness+ may be constructed”, as this is an approach which is not limited to examining behavioural 
patterns of the EU’s external relations.98 Instead, it allows for the consideration of many factors 
including the internal processes of the EU, and “the external environment of ideas and events that 
permit or constrain EU action”.99 The inadequacy of a behavioural approach to examining EU 
‘actorness’ is also noted by other European Studies scholars who suggest that “the EU’s international 
performance to date....could well prove to be utterly irrelevant to its future behaviour” given radical 
changes to the nature of the international system itself.100  
 
One of the biggest challenges in this respect is for the EU is to assert its place and substance within a 
developing multi-polar global order, with the rise of new global powers (the BRICS) whose influence 
threatens to undermine the EU’s promotion of stronger international law within normatively 
founded multilateralism.101 If the EU’s objective is to mitigate the risks of an “ominously dangerous 
....newly emerging multi-polarity”, its systemic influence will be dependent on its ability to organise 
coherent (between EU institutions) and cohesive (between member states) external actions across 
multiple sectors of foreign policy – which requires strategic coherence for its external 
representation.102  
 
Bretherton and Vogler note that the most important basic requirement for the concept of actorness 
is the ability to formulate external policy, which results in the capacity to respond to opportunities 
and constraints afforded by the external environment in which the EU is present.103 Actor capability 
“denotes the political will to create a European actor capable not only of responding to external 
expectations but actively contributing to the construction of understandings and practices which in 
turn shape the expectations of others, [and] can be studied at three distinct levels – shared 
commitment to a set of overarching values, the ability to provide overall strategic direction for EU 
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external activity, and the everyday requirements of policy-making and implementation, including the 
availability of policy instruments”.104  
 
The capacity for an actor to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the 
international system remains a key part of this concept of actorness.105 Since the EU has no 
statement of strategic intent with respect to the Antarctic, aside from where the EU has executive 
competence in the Antarctic fisheries mechanism through the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), it 
is difficult to gauge any current active and deliberate behaviour on the part of the EU to pursue actor 
capacity in the politics of the ATS. Furthermore, the EU’s direct participation in the ATCM to date 
was limited to an ad hoc Observer role during the development of the Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.  
 
Despite the EU’s limited direct presence in the ATCM to date, over the course of this research an EU 
normative influence on the politics of the ATS has been observed, which has afforded the EU an 
indirect presence in the ATCM in addition to its limited direct participation in the 1990s. This 
presence can be largely attributed to the Europeanisation of its member-states foreign policies with 
respect to Antarctic issues. It is not the same as a neo-functionalist spill-over to integration or policy 
convergence that result simply as part of the EU’s existence, but instead implies an active and 
purposeful effort on the part of EU elites to exert and EU influence externally, “to shape perceptions, 
expectations and behaviours of other actors in international relations”.106 Europeanisation of foreign 
policies of EU member-states with respect to the Antarctic is not at all unique to the politics of the 
ATS.  
 
Bretherton and Vogler’s concept of actorness does not reference Europeanisation in their 
recognition of internal processes which contribute to an EU ‘presence’ that contributes to the 
construction of an external role for the EU, even though it has striking similarities with their criteria 
for actor capability (as outlined in the following segment).107 This can be attributed to the fact that 
Europeanisation is a process which can be utilised to exert EU influence in areas where it cannot 
have a direct participatory role.108 For the purpose of the empirical analysis of this thesis research as 
covered in the subsequent chapters, Europeanisation theory is considered a complementary (but 
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not comparative) strain of analysis as it can be used to explain an EU influence in the politics of the 
Antarctic when its actual role as an actor remains visibly limited. Accordingly, this thesis also 
investigates to what extent changes from the Lisbon Treaty merely serve to enhance the internal 
policy coherence of the EU as an institution whose influence in the ATCM will remain mainly felt 
through the foreign policies of its member states.   
 
 
Europeanisation  
 
 
According to Kevin Featherstone, the usage of the term Europeanisation in social science literature 
has increased significantly in the past two decades, with application in four broad categories: the 
maximalist interpretation of Europeanisation as a historical process and as a matter of cultural 
diffusion, and the minimalist interpretation as a process of institutional adaptation and adaptation 
of policy and the policy process. The latter two being the most closely linked to the operation of the 
European Union.109  
 
Andrea Lenschow’s thorough investigation of Europeanisation literature has identified that the 
concept itself has caused considerable confusion and disagreement in both content and scope.110 As 
Europeanisation introduces a new element to older European Studies rather than establish a new 
school of thought, its varied application means the concept lacks a single and precise definition.111 
However, Lenschow notes that “all definitions conceive of Europeanisation as a process rather than 
a status”, and as a process it is an independent variable which leads to unspecified outcomes112 such 
as policy convergence or divergence, but they are not synonyms for this process.113 
  
In contrast to federalism and neo-functionalism, Europeanisation does not assume that a 
supranational centre will undermine the role of national capitals.114 Instead, the process of 
Europeanisation can serve to reinforce the role of the nation-state despite a key assumption that 
membership within the European Union has an important and frequent impact on the foreign 
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policies of its member-states.115 As this thesis research is only concerned with the Europeanisation 
of foreign policy, the interaction of only three of the five forces are relevant, following the analysis 
of Reuben Wong.116 Wong develops an operational theory of Europeanisation which includes the 
interaction of top-down policy convergence, bottom-up national projection, and horizontal identity 
reconstruction, in order to understand the extent of the influence, opportunities and constraints on 
the construction of EU member-state’s foreign policies.117  
 
Top-down policy convergence, or national adaptation, refers to the impact of the EU on the 
institutional structures, policies and politics of its member-states at the national level.118 Robert 
Ladrech’s 1994 assertion that “Europeanisation is an incremental process reorienting the direction 
and the shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics becomes part of the 
organisational logics of national politics and policy-making”, remains apt today.119 Here a process of 
change comes from cross-national policy convergence between member-states as they adapt 
national policies in response to demands from the supranational EU-level.120  
 
Bottom-up national projection refers to the impact member-states have on EU institutions, polices 
and politics, as ideas, preferences and models are uploaded from the national level.121  In this 
instance the EU not only puts pressures on member-states to conform, it also affords member-states 
the chance exploit new opportunity structures when there is no model to guide their activities.122 
“the Europeanisation of foreign policy thus leads to a negotiated convergence between national and 
the supranational levels”.123 Horizontal identity construction refers to broadest interpretation of the 
process of Europeanisation, for which convergence results in the development of a European 
identity and European interests that exist alongside, and begin to inform and shape national 
identities and interests.124  
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The interaction of all three of these interrelated forces of Europeanisation result in foreign policy 
which is the product of complex negotiations, where “at the domestic level, actors pressure their 
national executives to pursue policies at the European level that are favourable to their interests. At 
the European level, the Member State governments push for European policies that satisfy domestic 
pressures, while minimising their adverse consequences at the domestic level”.125  Member-states 
tend to be cost-sensitive in these negotiations as they seek to minimise the costs of compliance to 
new EU policies and regulations, and maximise benefits.126 Wong predicts that the impact of the EU 
on its member-states foreign policies is likely to increase following the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty, as EU institution staff and member-state officials become further entwined under resources 
accorded to the new EEAS.127  
 
 While there is no literature on the influence of the EU through the Europeanisation of its member 
states foreign policies with respect to the Antarctic, there is an observable connection which is 
particularly prominent in the 1990s development of a comprehensive environmental protection 
regime as a complementary Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty. Wong’s operational theory of 
Europeanisation has developed several key criteria to measure to what extent an EU-member states 
foreign policy has been Europeanised over time, appropriate to the three forces outlined above. Of 
Wong’s criteria, only three key questions are applicable in the development of the Antarctic 
environment regime, which are contextualised in Chapter Four.  
 
Accordingly, this thesis research has adopted three of Wong’s key questions in order to identify 
Europeanisation of France’s foreign policy with respect to its prominent role in the development of 
the Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty (1991), asking if “national convergence and/or 
adaptation of national policy to EU norms and directives taken place? (national convergence); Has 
the state benefited from the ‘cover’ of the EU? (national projection); what kinds of European norms 
have arisen among national officials and how do they apply to foreign policy? (identity 
reconstruction)”.128    
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2.5 Combined analytical framework 
 
 
The succeeding chapters of this thesis are analysed within a Constructivist theoretical framework in 
order to conceptualise the EU as a global political actor with state-like capacity for external relations. 
Under this framework, the EU’s constitutional processes would allow it to accede to the Antarctic 
Treaty and its Environmental Protocol should it actively decide to do so. Just as the EU’s upgraded 
role in the UNGA required significant lobbying (even in the instance where its representation lagged 
behind its actual competence), the EU would also need to actively convince ATCPs to 
reconceptualise their structural perceptions of the ATS, in order to allow for EU accede in 
accordance with its own constitutional processes.    
 
Accordingly, this thesis analyses the EU’s scientific and political engagement in the Antarctic to date 
within a Constructivist framework that examines its actorness in the ATCM, to support an argument 
for the EU to upgrade its role in Antarctic political deliberation that could be utilised to further 
legitimise its agenda for recognition as a global political actor in the wider international community. 
Before this analytical framework is employed, the EU’s direct engagement in the ATS is examined, 
specifically its permanent membership (and executive competence) in the CCAMLR fisheries 
mechanism.  
 
By analysing the potential for the EU to upgrade its political engagement in the ATS as a state-like 
actor, the Constructivist framework first allows for the examination of EU ‘actorness’ in the ATCM to 
date, to determine if any upgrade for direct political role in the ATCM is possible. EU ‘actorness’ in 
the ATCM is first examined through its ad hoc participation as an invited observer in the ATCM 
during the development of the Environmental Protocol. The opportunity and capacity for this non-
permanent direct participation (or political presence) is examined, to determine if these conditions 
still exist today and could be utilised for a more permanent EU role. Next the EU’s actorness in the 
CCAMLR fisheries mechanism is analysed, including perceptions of its actorness by other non-EU 
members. This provides some insight into issues which could be both problematic and beneficial if 
the EU was to pursue any upgraded political engagement in the ATS.  
 
Investigation into the development of the Environmental Protocol resulted in the observation of an 
additional phenomenon, not included in the original research design of this thesis. This explores the 
Europeanisation of French foreign policy towards the Antarctic over this period, as France’s 
leadership role during the development of this Protocol coincided with its particularly prominent 
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institutional role within the then EC. This in effect acted for an indirect EU institutional presence 
through a normative influence in the substance of Antarctic political deliberation at this time, and in 
turn provided the EC the opportunity for an active role construction for actor capacity and direct 
external relations in the ATCM. Accordingly, the analytical framework of this thesis includes 
examination into the process of Europeanisation with respect to the Antarctic, in order to determine 
if this EU institution influence or indirect presence is likely to characterise the limited extent of any 
attempt to upgrade the EU actorness in Antarctic politics.  
 
Finally, the EU’s scientific engagement is examined through its financial support of European 
collaborative research projects in Antarctica. In this instance, four large European collaborative 
scientific research projects in the Antarctic are examined in Chapter Three, including EPICA, 
EUROPOLAR ERA-NET, ERICON AURORA BOREALIS, and EUROANDRILL. This engagement acts as a 
physical EU ‘presence’ in Antarctica, which in turn typically affords a political ‘presence’ in Antarctic 
political deliberation. However, despite these projects being operated under an EU banner, they do 
not exist as an EU Polar Programme and therefore do not translate into a political presence for the 
EU in the ATCM. But they do in fact serve to reinforce the national physical and political presence of 
the participant EU ATCP’s.    
 
The EU actively translates its support of this polar research into a tool that legitimately reinforces its 
political engagement in global environmental discourse. Moreover, the EU has sought to utilise this 
engagement to support its bid to become permanent observer in the Arctic Council, albeit 
unsuccessfully. This research argues that this method of scientific diplomacy could also be utilised by 
the EU to construct a permanent political presence in the ATCM as a Contracting Party to the 
Antarctic Treaty, legitimised by its physical presence in Antarctic, just as state actors behave in the 
ATS.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
 
To form the Constructivist theoretical framework of analysis of this thesis, this chapter has sought to 
review empirical and theoretical academic literature on the EU’s international relations to examine 
two sub-questions. This literature review explored why institutional changes within the EU are 
changing the way that it participates in international relations, to form a broader research theme 
which outlined how the EU can be conceptualised as a global political actor. Primarily, this chapter 
has illustrated that the process of European integration is changing the way that the EU conducts its 
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external relations, and has created an entity capable acting in a state-like manner for its external 
relations. This behaviour has in turn had an effect for challenging the normative and structural 
conceptions of international relations. Furthermore, as a consequence of European integration, and 
the utilisation of opportunity structures afforded by EU membership, member states have created 
an institution which has an effect in shaping their national policy development and external 
relations. 
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Chapter Three:  
The European Union’s ‘Actorness’ in the Polar Regions 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
 
Aside from the EU’s permanent membership in the Antarctic fisheries mechanism, the EU’s direct 
engagement in the ATS to date has been limited to ad hoc participation as an Observer to the Special 
ATCM (SATCM) sessions that developed the Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty. Because 
this presence occurred as a consequence of the EU’s conferred competence for external relations on 
issues of the environment, this chapter initially takes a broader scope to examine how the EU has 
exhibited qualities of actorness in global environmental politics. The EU’s political engagement in the 
climate change regime is introduced, as the EU utilises its polar scientific research to legitimise its 
normative role as global actor in environmental discourse.  
 
As the EU actively continues to pursue an (as yet unsuccessful) permanent role in the Arctic Council 
based on its actorness in global environmental politics, this chapter queries if this approach could be 
redirected to upgrade the EU’s direct engagement in the Antarctic. In doing so this chapter poses the 
act as a route to achieve its strategic agenda in the Arctic. In order to contextualise analysis in 
Chapter Four, an empirical analysis of the structural and functional elements constituting the ATS is 
introduced.    
 
Next, this chapter examines what has characterised the EU’s political engagement in the ATS to date. 
Specifically, the EU’s its ad hoc Observer role in the ATCM during the development of the 
Environmental Protocol, and the EU’s permanent membership to the CCAMLR fisheries mechanism.   
Finally, perceptions of the EU’s actorness in CCAMLR are analysed to investigate what issues might 
hinder and complement any future upgraded role for EU political engagement in the ATCM.  
 
 
 3.2 The EU’s ‘actorness’ in global environmental politics 
 
 
As introduced in Chapter Two, the EU’s place in the process of international relations as an actor in 
its own right is the most notable in areas of ‘low politics’ of the economy and civil society, however, 
it has also already established for itself “a pre-eminent role in the global politics of the 
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environment”.129 Despite difficulties its prominence in this area has due to mixed competences, the 
EU’s role extends beyond simple participation as it actively facilitates global environmental 
diplomacy for the propagation of environmental norms, the promotion of sustainable development, 
and leadership attempts to encourage a common global approach to the problem of climate 
change.130     
 
While the Treaty of Rome (TEC, 1957) was notably absent of any reference to the environment, from 
the early 1970s the EC produced a number of environmental action plans which have developed into 
numerous legislation on wide-ranging issues such as water quality, marine pollution, waste control, 
air quality, nuclear radiation, dangerous chemicals, pesticides, noise pollution, genetic modification, 
animal welfare, forestry and energy conservation.131 The initial stimulus of these policies stemmed 
from the desire to remove trade distortions from differing national standards with complementary 
measures introduced to promote the protection of the environment.132 Additionally, a number of 
highly publicised environmental disasters and accidents encouraged European action in a process 
pushed by ‘green leader’ states Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands.133 By the Single European 
Act (SEA, 1987), environmental protection was codified into treaty text as part of the Community’s 
explicit objectives.134  
 
There were three main drivers for the externalisation of the EU’s environmental policies into the 
international arena, which still exist today. First, pressures to respond to transboundary issues (such 
as acid rain in the 1980s) and environmental problems which are within the EU’s conferred 
competence; second, the implications of EU environmental policies which clash with its trade 
markets (for example national bias towards the protection of vehicle manufacturing industries 
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threatened by emissions regulations); and third, the increasing demands of pressure groups and the 
European public for action on issues such as genetically modified food and climate change.135 
 
Deliberation over environmental legislation within the EU remains an extensive and difficult task as 
policies often encroach upon key activities of the EU particularly on agriculture, fisheries, industry, 
taxation, energy, transport, aid, and scientific research, making internal policy coherence and 
external representation challenging.136 While more than 80 percent of domestic environmental 
policy is initiated as a result of EU directives rather than by member states, external competence is 
often shared at differing proportions depending on the issue and area of activity the policy falls 
within.137   
 
EU actorness in environmental diplomacy implies that it must have the capacity to act actively and 
deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system.138 The EU has repetitively and 
expressly shown its ambition for environmental leadership by setting the pace for international 
environmental policy as a leading proponent of international action.139 While the EU was an 
‘environmental laggard’ in early global regulatory development, namely in relation to a slow 
response on ozone layer depletion, it did construct for itself an early leadership role in development 
international climate change politics.140   
 
The actual development of the European Union as a negotiating actor in environmental politics, and 
its first role within a major multilateral environmental  negotiation, also emerged in the late 1970s 
as a result of the then EC’s competence regarding atmospheric pollution. In order for the 
Commission to negotiate during the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) Convention 
(1979), as part of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the 
conceptual category of an REIO was created so that the EC could be recognised as a participant 
alongside its other member-states.141  
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Prior to the construction of the REIO concept, the EC did not have third party support necessary to 
be party to convention negotiations despite having clear external competence to do so, as 
traditional perceptions maintained that only states had international legal personalities in 
international law, and were therefore the only actors able to maintain rights and contracting 
responsibilities.142 EC participation was only granted when the Soviet Union withdrew its opposition 
based on the agreed formulation of the new REIO participant category, as it eventually hoped that 
its Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) would be afforded the same status.143  
 
The EU today remains the only existing example of an REIO, and since the LRTBP Convention, the 
acceptance of REIO provisions for participation have been repeated in a raft of varied international 
conventions, not limited to environmental issues.144 In practice it has developed it to mean that the 
EU can become a party to any international convention without any of its member states also being 
party. Under REIO provisions created in the Vienna Convention (1985) the EU also enjoys voting 
rights as any other member-state.145 
 
While third parties are often critical of EU ‘double-dipping’ in instances where the EU and its 
member states are both parties, so long as the number of votes does not exceed the number of 
states that participate in negotiations, the EU cannot exercise its voting rights on behalf of all 27 EU 
Member States in addition to those states themselves and vice versa.146 This is another example of 
how the development of the EU itself has challenged and contributed to the evolution of structural 
conceptions and acceptance of non-states actors in international relations.147  
 
The development of the REIO pattern for EU participation in multilateral negotiations provides a 
crucial example of how important external conceptions and recognition are for the development of 
EU actorness. Its external presence is not simply as a result of a spill-over of its internal processes, it 
is “the relationship between the internal development of the EU and third-party perceptions and 
expectations of the EU’s external role”.148 Additionally, the opportunity for EU actorness was 
afforded and enhanced by other events in the international system. In 1979, the development of the 
REIO status was facilitated by the détente process, and the 1990s ending of Cold War inhibitions 
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coincided with an emerged awareness of global environmental issues, providing a platform on which 
the EU could begin to construct an international identity.149   
 
Because environmental issues overlap on a wide scope of policy areas and activities, the 
Community’s external representation is based on mixed competences between the EU and its 
member states. Therefore, EU’s capability to negotiate on behalf of the Community in differing 
external fora, is developed on an ad hoc basis depending where competence for external 
representation rests. In these instances, the EU’s capability for actorness is afforded by a mandate 
authorised by the Council of the European Union, and executed by the European Commission (in 
accordance with the constitutional processes of the EU).150 
 
 
Climate Change 
 
 
In the years since, the EU has made strong claims to international leadership for sustainable 
development, and for the most part it has been considered a ‘power’ for global environmental 
diplomacy through its facilitation of the construction of the climate change regime.151 It has achieved 
this prominence by mediating between the developed and the developing worlds, and as a worthy 
opponent of US government environmental policy – particularly as US abdication of climate politics 
during Kyoto Protocol negotiations provided the opportunity for EU actorness, while also leading the 
US to become the ‘other’ in the construction of the EU’s international political identity.152  
 
The EU’s normative influence in the climate change regime is critical to the EU’s construction of its 
international identity, which has in turn reinforced the EU’s actorness in global environmental 
discourse.153 This international identity has provided the EU the opportunity and capability for 
further engagement elsewhere, as the EU’s mixed competence for environmental management and 
conservation affords further presence in the international community and representation in 
international fora, in addition to its member states.154 The EU’s climate leadership is provided for in 
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the Lisbon Treaty, with Article.191 specifically noting that Union environmental policy shall pursue 
the objective of contributing to measures at the international level to combat climate change.155   
 
In 2009, European Studies scholar John Vogler reaffirmed the concept of role construction for EU 
actor capacity by noting that “the idea that the EU has a unique leadership role in global climate 
politics is assiduously fostered by the Commission, the Council and leading Member States”.156 
Consistent with this comment, the post-Lisbon Treaty European Commission structure now has a 
dedicated Commissioner and a Directorate General (DG CLIMA) specifically responsible for climate 
change.157 However, “profound changes to the structure of the international system” have begun to 
work themselves out in the political dynamics of the climate regime.158  
 
Attempts to negotiate a binding multilateral accord for inception after the Kyoto Protocol’s 
expiration have been as yet unsuccessful, as the BRICS threaten to dilute the normative prescriptions 
of multilateral global order through a hard sovereign stance for a non-binding international accord, 
which jeopardises the EU’s progress as a global actor.159 In an attempt to curb the impact of hard 
sovereignty on binding multilateralism and ensure the EU maintains its momentum for active 
engagement as an actor in the international community, the EU actively seeks to “increase 
awareness of the significance of climate leadership as a critical aspect of the EU’s international 
identity as an actor”.160 It does so at the internal and external levels through establishing networks 
that facilitate dialogue and cooperation between the member states and third partners at a 
diplomatic level, and by investing a significant amount of funding into nonpartisan scientific research 
intended to support its normative prescriptions for the climate change regime.  
 
The EEAS’s Green Diplomacy Network (established in 2003) is an initiative that was designed to have 
an important role for increasing the EU’s coherence, consistency and effectiveness for the 
promotion of dialogue and the EU’s external actions on environment issues to its third parties across 
the globe; particularly those relating to climate change, desertification, biodiversity and renewable 
energy.161 The network consists of officials from EU institutions, national Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
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and their diplomatic missions that deal with international environment and sustainability issues.162 It 
is representative of the EU’s active pursuit for recognition as an actor in global environment politics, 
with the network’s facilitation of dialogue between the EU member states acting as a form of elite 
socialisation, as organisational meetings prior to the UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties 
(COPs) as part of the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC), gauge the positions 
and actions of the member states in preparation for projected unity on the international stage.163   
 
Vogler also posited that the negotiation of climate policy exemplifies that EU foreign policy-making 
demonstrates that “institutional factors and normative entrapment can over-ride or modify hard 
bargaining based upon national economic interests....[where] counteracting the pursuit of short-
term energy and economic gains is not only a sense of genuine alarm over the growing evidence on 
the likelihood and impact of climate change, but also increasing awareness of the significance of 
climate leadership as a critical aspect of the EU’s international identity as an actor”.164 In keeping 
with this notion, the EU maintains that the emergence of new problems from the impact of climate 
change has been the main catalyst for its interest in the Arctic region.165   
 
 
 
The EU’s strategic interest in the Arctic   
 
 
As the EU begins to assert more of its political weight in international relations, it naturally turns 
towards creating strategic policy directed at relations within in its own backyard. Given its 
geographical proximity to the Arctic, its relations towards states in this region are not by any means 
new. Three EU member states, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, and Sweden have territories in the 
Arctic, and Iceland is in the process of EU accession negotiations.166 Norway is part of the European 
Exclusive Economic Area, and Canada, Russia and the United States are strategic partners of the 
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EU.167 The EU, Norway, Russia and Iceland also equal partners in the EU’s Northern Dimension Policy 
(1999) for the promotion of cooperation in the European Arctic and sub-Arctic.168   
 
Despite these close relations, the geostrategic dynamics of the High North are changing as rapid 
melting of the Arctic ice cap is opening up new international trade routes, new fisheries, and 
potential access to the regions vast reserves of oil and gas - estimated at up to a fifth of the world’s 
untapped hydrocarbon deposits - with possible consequences for international instability over 
security interests.169 Furthermore, the EU is particularly attracted to the Arctic’s potential for energy, 
food, and transport security, citing specific benefits from the sustainable development of 
hydrocarbon extraction, fisheries resources, merchant shipping, and tourism activities, as key factors 
for its further involvement in the region.170 Despite this resource interest, the EU is explicit in its 
assertion that its main goal for the region is “to prevent and mitigate the negative effects of climate 
change as well as support adaptation to inevitable changes” in the Arctic environment, while 
supporting the vulnerable indigenous population.171  
 
In order to realise these interests, the EU has sought to upgrade its strategic engagement in the High 
North. The EU has formalised its interests and proposals for action in the EU Commission 
Communication ‘The European Union and the Arctic Region’ COM (2008)763/4, as the first stage in 
the development of a cohesive and sustainable EU Arctic Policy.172 The development of this policy 
has been widely supported across the EU institutions, with a number of conclusions, 
communications, and resolutions emerging from the European Parliament, European Commission, 
and Council of the European Union, over the last few years. These include, 2008 Commission 
resolution on ‘Arctic governance’173; December 2009 ‘Council conclusions on Arctic Issues’174; January 
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2011 European Parliament resolution ‘A sustainable EU policy for the High North’.175 However, as yet 
there is no standalone formal EU Arctic Policy.  
 
These documents outline the internal and external political implications of the EU’s policies and 
activities relating to the Arctic, and attempt to identify actions for a more coordinated approach for 
its engagement in the High North, centred on three main objectives – “preserving the Arctic in 
unison with its population, promoting the sustainable use of its resources, and contributing to 
enhanced multilateral governance”.176 To realise these objectives, the EU has actively sought to 
upgrade its participatory role in the Arctic Council, “as the central international and 
intergovernmental organisation of the region”, and the institution which sets formal Arctic 
agenda.177  
 
Established in 1996, the Arctic Council is a high level intergovernmental forum for the promotion of 
cooperation, coordination and interaction amongst the Arctic rim states, sustainable development 
and environmental protection of the Arctic.178 The EU’s mixed competence on environmental issues 
has afforded it ad hoc Observer status at various Arctic Council committee meetings and working 
groups in the past, but the EU’s formal application to upgrade its role to Permanent Observer has 
not yet been realised.179 
 
Canada, Denmark (Greenland) and Norway have taken particular issue with the EU’s banned 
importation of seal products, a traditional practice of their indigenous peoples. While these states 
insist their sealing practices are sustainable and not cruel to animals, and the EU’s legislation has an 
exemption for traditional sealing, indigenous groups maintain the ban will significantly impact the 
market for their seal products.180 As energy security is a major factor for the EU’s further 
involvement in the region, Norway supports the EU’s bid for an upgraded role in the Arctic Council 
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despite opposition to the EU seal product importation ban. One of Norway’s incentives is to secure a 
key and reliable market for its Arctic oil and gas reserves.181 However, the EU’s application remains 
stalled, with the 2011 Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting agreeing to continue to discuss the 
entrance of new permanent observers in the Arctic Council, while adopting new criteria for 
evaluating pending applicants.182 
 
To strengthen its negotiating position for an upgraded role in Arctic agenda setting and sustainable 
development, the EU has actively sought to increase its engagement with key stakeholders in the 
region, in addition to the Arctic states. This approach intends to demonstrate that the EU is 
committed to contributing to common responses on the challenges facing the Arctic region, within 
already existing cooperation frameworks.183 The EU has sought to deepen its engagement with a 
number of regional actors, including the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council.184 And the European Parliament maintains that Iceland’s accession to the EU will provide a 
strategic opportunity to “further anchor the European presence in the Arctic Council”, while 
contributing towards enhanced multilateral governance and sustainable policy solutions for the 
region.185 
 
The EU is also in the process of reconstructing internal policies in sectors where it has Arctic-relevant 
activity, to further assert its presence in the Arctic in a targeted manner. Since 2008, this has most 
notably occurred in policies relating to research, environment, and maritime issues.186 The EU’s 
development of an Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), in particular, is an example of how EU internal 
policy changes begin to impinge on the Arctic and add to the external relations of the EU.187 Here, 
the EU aims to promote international solutions to ensure the protection of biodiversity, maritime 
safety and security, and marine research, which ensure sustainable activities in the Arctic marine 
environment.188  
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Sustainability is considered to be the EU’s paramount criterion for its action in the Arctic, as “marine 
ecosystems and economics transcend boundaries, adding an obvious external dimension”.189 With 
respect to potential new Arctic fisheries, the EU has encouraged the development of a precautionary 
approach to regional resource management, which would adopt a temporary ban on new fisheries in 
the Arctic high seas, so that a regulatory framework for an ecosystem management and 
conservation could be agreed upon.190 The EU has advocated for a mandate extension to existing 
management organisations, such as the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission’s (NEAFC), which 
could facilitate the development of such a regulatory framework.191 
 
The active reconstruction of the EU’s engagement in the High North are an attempt to illustrate how 
the EU aims to add value to Arctic political dialogue, as it can “bring its experience and political and 
economic weight.... in support of the search for internationally agreed solutions to Arctic-wide 
problems – such as adaptation to climate change, air and maritime pollution, [and] safety of 
maritime transport”.192  
 
Scientific research is the EU policy area in which the Arctic dimension is most visible,193 with the EU 
Commission Communication COM (2008) 763/4 emphasising the need to “maintain the Arctic as a 
priority area for research to close knowledge gaps, and assess future anthropogenic impacts, 
especially in the area of climate change”.194 The EU’s proposals for policy action for Arctic research, 
stress the need for coordinated efforts which strengthen international cooperation at the EU and 
international levels, optimise the use of resources, and ensure the broad dissemination of 
information.195 This research investment is designed to contribute to the formulation of EU policies 
in the region, in the same way that the EU utilises it research investment to support its normative 
policy prescriptions in the climate change regime.  
 
The EU and its member states are major contributors to Arctic scientific research, including over 50 
Arctic-related research projects supported by the EU Commission’s Fifth and Sixth Framework 
Programmes for Research and Technology (FPs).196 The European Commission estimates it has 
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invested some €200 million in Arctic research projects over the past decade alone, “to seek 
research-friendly solutions that require a firm basis in fact provided research”.197 FP7 also provides 
for major scientific research investment in the Arctic, specifically support for infrastructural 
investment. One such project that will be examined further in Chapter Four is the Aurora Borealis 
research icebreaker project; the completion of which was specifically identified as a proposed policy 
action in the 2008 Commission Communication.198    
 
 
3.3 An Antarctic route for the EU’s Arctic agenda?  
 
 
As the EU is increasingly active in its construction of an international environmental identity for 
upgraded actorness in international relations, this has formed the basis for its pursuit for a 
permanent role in the Arctic. This dissertation argues the same role construction can provide the EU 
with the capability to pursue not only an upgraded role in the Arctic to further its global political 
agenda, but would also extent to the Antarctic.  
 
In this instance science research remains a premise for active engagement, as the EU and EU ATCP’s 
seek to take advantage of opportunity structures for their own strategic agenda in the region, where 
the value of science and environmental protection remain a critical diplomatic tool for each. The 
EU’s increased scientific engagement in the Antarctic is likely to derive in significant part from the 
objectives already outlined from its active polar research to date; as a means to scientifically 
legitimise its authority as a political actor in global environmental discourse. As Jessica M. Shadian 
noted in 2009:  
 
“Political institutions such as the European Union (EU) and World Wildlife Foundation, for 
example, have become pivotal intermediaries for translating the discourse of scientific research 
into particular policy recommendations and prescriptions. While this relationship between 
science and policy is not a new phenomenon....in the sphere where climate change debates are 
taking place, whose scientific knowledge is considered legitimate, and how and what shape the 
results are turned into political action mark a significant shift in the classical assumptions 
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regarding state sovereignty and resource development and the way in which international law 
traditionally proceeds”.199  
 
The EU Commission’s initial attempt for permanent role in the Arctic Council coincided with debate 
in the European Parliament which examined the possibility of negotiations for an Arctic Treaty that 
could be modelled on some of the conceptual elements and prescriptions of the Antarctic Treaty; 
namely those relating to peace through demilitarisation, and the promotion of international 
cooperation for scientific research.200 However, this proposal contributed to misunderstandings on 
Europe’s views for the future of Arctic political engagement (specifically regarding the issue on 
abeyance of sovereign claims), which has since required the EU and its member states to visibly 
recalibrate their views with an emphasis on sovereign rights and interests of Arctic states.201  
 
Despite similarities between both polar environments, Arctic multilateral governance is inherently 
different from that of the Antarctic. The Arctic’s sovereignty disputes are a result of contested 
border delimitations of the actual states themselves; and areas beyond national jurisdiction – 
namely the Arctic Ocean – are not under a specific regional treaty regime like the Antarctic. Instead, 
jurisdiction over the region’s high seas and seabed falls under the international legal framework of 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), for which the EU, all its member states, and all 
Arctic states except the United States are Contracting Parties.202 
 
Furthermore, the Arctic region is not a legal-political vacuum as some assume, as it also protected by 
a number of bilateral national, regional and international agreements, many of which the EU is a 
Contracting Party to. These include the UNFCCC; the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007); legal instruments of the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO); the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention); the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
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Pollutants.203 Given the comprehensive overlap of the various multilateral agreements, proposals for 
a treaty for Arctic governance modelled on the Antarctic Treaty have been deemed inappropriate for 
the Northern Polar Region, as the challenges of climate change and increasing economic 
development in the region can be addressed by further developing, strengthening, and 
implementing already existing legal frameworks.204 
 
In the period since the concept of an Arctic Treaty was dismissed by Arctic States as being 
inappropriate, there has been no visible comparison regarding the application of any prescriptions of 
the ATS that could be directed at addressing similar Arctic issues.  Despite the differences between 
the Polar Regions from a legal and political perspective, there remain genuine common issue areas 
such as the environment and science, which have genuine relevance between the two regions.205 
One key concept that has given the ATS its reputation as a regime for “long-standing high-quality 
environmental protection,” is the precautionary approach to environmental management.206  
 
As noted previously, the EU already sought to champion calls for a precautionary approach to Arctic 
environmental management and sustainable development, exemplified in its support for mandate 
extension of NEAFC, which advocates for precautionary approach to marine ecosystem management 
and sustainable fisheries in the Arctic. However, the EU does not make any visible comparison to its 
direct role within the Antarctic fisheries mechanism CCAMLR, which was the first Regional Fisheries 
Organisation (RFO) to develop regional marine living resource harvesting activities based on a 
‘precautionary principle’ and ecosystem management approach.207 This research argues that the EU 
could further legitimise its credibility for a permanent role in the Arctic Council, by making a direct 
and visible comparison to its active (and for the most part, positively regarded) engagement in 
CCAMLR.  
 
However, it seems as though the EU has a stigma surrounding any potential direct comparison of its 
engagement within the ATS, which would suggest the adoption of prescriptions from Antarctic legal 
instruments for the Arctic region, especially after the misinterpretation of its early support for an 
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Arctic Treaty. This could be problematic should the EU decide to actively pursue any upgraded 
political engagement in the Antarctic, as a means to further its global strategic agenda. A statement 
supported by one former official from the ATS, that noted during an interview that the EU would be 
more likely to succeed in convincing ATCPs that it could accede to the Antarctic Treaty and the 
Environmental Protocol, after it had already achieved Permanent Observer status in the Arctic 
Council, in addition to its Enhanced Observer status in the UNGA.208  
 
 
 
3.4 The Antarctic Treaty System 
   
 
Despite its size, and repeated feature within mythology of ancient times, Antarctica’s existence was 
merely speculated until the 1800s. Even though Historic Era exploration in the 1900s paved the way 
for human (and scientific) activities on the continent, and legitimised later territorial claims, the 
extreme conditions on the continent meant that much of its composition was still unknown until the 
1950s.209 Antarctica has never experienced war, and with no permanent population, sovereign, or 
decision-making government, these unique characteristics have “provided an arena for one of the 
most ambitious (and some would suggest successful) experiments in regional governance”.210 In 
short, the territory and economic resources of Antarctica are under the competence of a non-
sovereign international treaty regime, known as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).211 
 
The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is a set of legal, institutional and participatory components 
designed to effectively manage human activities within the Antarctic (including resource activities) 
by regulating the conduct of signatory parties in areas of self-determined competence (see Figure 1). 
At its centre lies the Antarctic Treaty (1959) which establishes the Consultative Meeting (ATCM) as a 
forum for discussion, debate, and the creation of measures, decisions, resolutions and 
recommendations on issues that have also been delineated in the systems later supplementary 
accords. As the sole legislative mechanism of the ATS, the ATCM is the only arena where the 
participating signatories, permanent observers, and invited experts may meet annually to reach 
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consensus on Antarctic issues. There are also Special Antarctic Treaty Meetings, and Meetings of 
Experts which meet at ad hoc intervals to discuss issues at a greater depth than what can be 
achieved during regular ATCMs.212 
 
The simplicity of the Antarctic Treaty has meant that challenges to its founding principles have been 
effectively addressed by the adoption of new legal instruments and increased participation of 
relevant actors, avoiding amendment to the founding document or transfer of competence to a 
separate international body. The original regime has evolved into a regional governance mechanism 
that has successfully revised its functional elements to accommodate these new challenges, proving 
the ATS has emerged as a system with a collective value greater than the sum of its individual 
parts.213  
 
However, contemporary research indicates that despite the success from previous challenges to the 
system over resource competition, an emerging challenge is likely to form from external governance 
regimes whose competence will encroach into the self-determined jurisdiction of the ATS, and its 
associated legal instruments.214 These clashes of competence have increasingly been referred to as 
forming the next challenge for the ATS to overcome.215  
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Figure 1: The Antarctic Treaty System 
 
The Antarctic Treaty is a legal instrument which was created to (a) diffuse the threat of global 
political instability, caused by tensions between seven Antarctic territorial claimants, and two Cold 
War superpowers which perceived a potential military value in Antarctica; and (b) to continue the 
success of international scientific cooperation initiated by the polar research activities of the 
International Geophysical Year 1957-1958.216 
 
To achieve this diffusion, signatories to the Antarctic Treaty agreed that it is: 
 
“In the interests of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used 
exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of 
international discord” and “that the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and 
the continuance of international harmony will further the purposes and principles 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations”.217   
 
To achieve this goal the Antarctic Treaty prohibits: 
 
 “any measures of military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and 
fortifications, the carrying out of manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of 
weapons”, but does not exclude “the use of military personnel or equipment for 
scientific research or for any other peaceful activity”.218  
 
The Antarctic Treaty, in effect, puts to one side the issue of territorial sovereignty by maintaining the 
status quo on the legal positions taken by claimant and non-claimant states as they were in 1959, 
asserting that:  
 
“No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a 
basis for asserting, supporting, or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or an 
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enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be 
asserted while the present Treaty is in force”. Article IV(2), Antarctic Treaty (1959).  
 
Scholars have credited this “unique device of de-coupling the task of management from the problem 
of sovereignty” 219, as the creation of a treaty system with the flexibility to successfully function 
during periods of international conflict. It has allowed the consensus approach of Antarctic 
governance to flourish even under the pressures of the Cold War, and has also been attributed in 
preventing the 1982 Falkland Island/ Malvinas War from moving further south to encompass the 
contested Antarctic territorial claims of the United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile, in the Antarctic 
Peninsula region.220  
 
This flexibility is an inherent characteristic visible throughout the development of the system as it 
exists today. The original proponents of what we now know as the ATS, intentionally dismissed 
proposals for permanent institutions, instead focusing on providing a forum for intergovernmental 
cooperation.221   
 
In the 1990s Sir Arthur Watts, and later Olav Schram Stokke and Davor Vidas, examined to what 
extent these instruments “together constitute a comprehensive regime for the area with a collective 
value greater than the sum of its various parts”.222 Systemic analysis emerged in the early 1990s, as 
the scope and complexity of Antarctic activities had grown over the previous two decades, 
particularly through the development of new legal instruments. This growth in areas of self-
determined competence arose from challenges to the principles of the Antarctic Treaty, triggering 
an extension of membership and the participation of new institutions and experts. The most recent 
of these institutional changes has led to the creation of the permanent Secretariat of the Antarctic 
Treaty.223 
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Participating Signatories 
 
 
Under Antarctic Treaty Article XIII, (1)(2), the Antarctic Treaty is open for accession:  
 
“by any State which is a Member of the United Nations, or by any other State which 
may be invited to accede to the Treaty with the consent of all the Contracting Parties 
whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under 
Article IX of the Treaty. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty shall be 
effected by each State in accordance with its constitutional processes.” 
 
Signatories can attain Antarctic Treaty Consultative status, which allows them to participate and 
vote in the decision-making process; or they are Non-Consultative Parties (ATNCP) that participate in 
the deliberation process, but do not vote. As per Antarctic Treaty Article IX:2, Consultative Party 
status is granted to those signatories that demonstrate their interest in Antarctica by “conducting 
substantial research activity there”. This is typically achieved by maintaining a scientific presence in 
Antarctica or by undertaking a national expedition through an active National Antarctic Programme.  
 
As at 2012, there are twenty-eight ATCPs and twenty-one ATNCPs (Figure 2).   
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Figure 2224 
Parties to the Antarctic Treaty (1959) 
*indicates territorial claimants 
 
Original Signatories –  
 
Permanent Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties  
(ATCPs)  
Later Signatories –  
 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Parties  
(ATCPs)  
Later Signatories –  
 
Antarctic Treaty Non-
Consultative Parties 
(ATNCPs) 
EU Member State 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Parties  
(EU ATCPs) 
 
(date indicates accession; 
consultative status granted) 
EU Member State 
Antarctic Treaty Non-Consultative 
Parties  
(ATNCPs)  
 
(date indicates accession) 
Argentina* Brazil  Austria Belgium (1961; 1961) Austria (1987) 
Australia* Bulgaria Belarus Bulgaria (1978; 1998) Czech Republic (1962) 
Belgium China Canada Finland (1984; 1989) Denmark (1965) 
Chile* Ecuador Columbia France* (1961; 1961) Estonia (2001) 
France* Finland Cuba Germany (1974; 1981) Greece (1987) 
Japan Germany Czech Republic Italy (1981; 1987) Hungary (1984) 
Norway* India Denmark  The Netherlands (1967; 1990) Romania (1971) 
New Zealand* Italy Estonia Poland (1961; 1977) Slovakia (1993) 
Russian Federation (formerly USSR) Netherlands Greece Spain (1982; 1988)  
United Kingdom* Peru Guatemala Sweden (1984; 1988)  
United States Poland Hungry  United Kingdom*(1961; 1961)  
 South Korea North Korea   
 Spain Malaysia    
 Sweden  Monaco   
 Ukraine Papua New Guinea    
  Portugal    
  Romania   
  Slovakia    
  Switzerland   
  Turkey   
  Venezuela   
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It is important to note that the seven Antarctic territorial claimant states, and the other five states 
that constitute the twelve original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty, will always permanently retain 
their Consultative Party status, should they choose to do so. They can, however, withdraw from the 
Antarctic Treaty at any time, but in practice no state has ever done so.   
 
From the early 1970s, the debate over minerals extraction in the Antarctic caused a significant period 
of change for the ATCM. It not only proved to be a tipping point for the further inclusion of various 
new actors. The normative challenge also resulted in a numerous functional and structural 
amendments, ultimately forming the system that constitutes the ATS structure seen today. 225 For 
example, the original ATCM Rules of Procedure provided no provision for upgrading the status of a 
Non-Consultative Party to a Consultative Party, yet by the mid-1970s it had become apparent that 
this would be necessary.  
 
A proposed Antarctic minerals regime, in part, led to an exponential increase in states acceding to 
the Antarctic Treaty, with many of these new signatories establishing a scientific programme in 
Antarctica as a basis for a strengthened national participation. In 1977, Poland was to be the first in a 
succession of states to upgrade to Consultative Party status, although this upgraded role cannot be 
attributed to being driven by the minerals regime as Poland had acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in 
1961.226 
 
Those states that gained Consultative Party status after 1961, may technically only retain their 
subsequent voting powers so long as they continue to demonstrate an interest in Antarctica (and the 
principles of the Antarctic Treaty), by maintaining active scientific research programme within the 
Treaty Area.227 However, in practice it would require an ATCP to formally question the actions of the 
‘inactive’ ATCP in the ATCM plenary if their voting powers were to be revoked; something that is not 
ever likely to occur given the highly politicised nature of such a question.228 Just as there was no 
provision for upgrading to Consultative Party status, ATNCP’s were not eligible to be observers at 
ATCMs until a Revised Rules of Procedure granted participation by invitation from 1983.229 
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The 1980s also led to questions regarding the legitimacy of the ATS within the international 
community. The ‘Question of Antarctica’, which was to be a regular UN agenda from 1983 until 2005, 
critiqued the perceived exclusionary nature of the ATS as a whole, with particular reference to the 
negotiations over the proposed Antarctic minerals regime.230 Formally initiated by Malaysia, 
proponents claimed that the territory and resources of Antarctica should be regarded as “the 
common heritage of mankind”, like the deep seabed, and that the ATCM’s strictly limited 
participation meant that the negotiations lacked consultation with significant number of UN member 
states, particularly the developing nations.231 Additionally, the proposed Antarctic minerals regime 
would not allow for the universally equitable distribution of benefits gained from the extraction of a 
common good, provided for under Article XI of the UNCLOS.232  
 
Proponents of this argument advocated for bringing Antarctic governance under the UN mechanism, 
to establish a more universal regime in place of the ATS that would allow for greater consultation 
with third parties.233 However, over the next decade significant legal and institutional developments 
within the ATS (as outlined further below), and the accession to the Antarctic Treaty of some of the 
more vocal third parties within this debate, led the UN General Assembly to adopt a resolution in 
2006, which no longer scheduled a return of the ‘Question of Antarctica’ in UN agenda.234 Thus, the 
international community signalled its support to the effective functioning of the ATS as a whole.235  
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Legal Instruments 
 
 
In addition to the Antarctic Treaty, several subsequent international conventions contribute to the 
legal structure of the ATS as it exists today. These are, the Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Seals (CCAS, 1972); the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources (CCAMLR, 1980); and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
(Environmental Protocol, 1991). CCAMLR provided provisions for the creation of a Commission and 
Scientific Committee for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, and as participating 
institutions of the ATS they are permanent observers to ATCMs.236  
 
Other legal instruments have been negotiated, but remain unratified and therefore not in force. 
Specifically, the Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Minerals Resource Activities (CRAMRA), 
which would have allowed for minerals resource extraction. Despite this fact, CRAMRA is considered 
“the most sophisticated institutional provision of all the Antarctic legal instruments to date,”237 
providing provisions for the creation of a Commission, two Scientific Committees, a Secretariat, and 
an Arbitrary Tribunal. The CRAMRA regime is recognised to be a mechanism that can be taken ‘off 
the shelf’, should ATCP’s decide to change provisions relating to the ban on minerals extraction 
under the Environmental Protocol by requesting a review meeting in 2048.238  
 
The Environmental Protocol was a necessary and vital addition to the legal instruments of the ATS, 
and one that highlights the effectiveness of a system that can build upon itself strict provisions which 
complement, widen and strengthen those already outlined in the Antarctic Treaty without the need 
for amendment. The Protocol has created a Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP), whose 
annual meeting sits alongside the ATCM, and six technical annexes (five of which are in force) that 
outline a comprehensive set of basic principles and detailed mandatory rules for human activity in 
Antarctica.239  
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 Permanent Observers 
 
 
There are four permanent observers to the ATCM, which are institutions that have a varying degree 
of integration within the legal instruments of ATS. The oldest of these, and the least (formally) 
entwined in the ATS itself, is the Scientific Committee of Antarctic Research (SCAR). Created in 1958, 
SCAR is a non-governmental body whose members are the national scientific academies or research 
councils, which are (or plan to be) active in Antarctic research.  Its independence is due to the fact 
that it is a multidisciplinary committee of the International Council for Science (ICSU), meaning that 
SCAR membership is also open to ICSU Scientific Union Members and Associate Members with a 
varying degree of interest in Antarctic scientific research.240  
 
SCAR’s specific mission is “to be the leading independent organisation for facilitating and 
coordinating Antarctic research, and for identifying issues emerging from greater scientific 
understanding of the region that should be brought to the attention of policy makers. Because SCAR 
was created before the drafting of the Antarctic Treaty, independent institutions have been in 
attendance at ATCMs since the inception of this deliberative arena in 1961.241 While the other 
institutions mentioned above were created at later dates and in varied circumstances, SCARs 
effective participation set a precedent for their acceptance as permanent observers within the 
ATCM, and their inclusion provides a key example of the adaptability of the ATS as a whole.   
 
Another of these permanent observers is the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs 
(COMNAP), which formed from a SCAR Working Group in 1988. COMNAP’s membership consists of 
National Antarctic Programmes (NAPs) of states that have Consultative status. As its name would 
suggest, COMNAP delegates are the managers of these NAPs, who meet annually to “develop and 
promote best practice in managing the support of scientific research in Antarctica”.242  
 
The final two institutions are the Commission and Scientific Committee of CCAMLR. These are the 
two permanent observers that have the strongest ties to the ATS, since Parties created these 
institutions directly through the ATCM plenary when establishing the CCAMLR Convention in 1980. 
As discussed earlier, the CCAMLR mechanism is responsible for the management and protection of 
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Antarctic marine living resources, with the greater part of its mandate concentrating on Antarctic 
fisheries resources. The CCAMLR Commission gives effect to the CCAMLR Convention’s objectives 
and principles, and the Scientific Committee advises the Commission on measures developed 
through consultation and advanced scientific techniques.243  
 
Membership to both of these institutions is open to any state or REIO with an interest in research or 
harvesting activities of Antarctic marine living resources, and demonstrates that interest by ratifying 
the CCAMLR Convention.244 The REIO provision allows for the EU’s membership of the CCAMLR 
Commission and Scientific Committee. This participation constitutes the main extent of the EU’s 
direct permanent participation in the ATS to date, and will be investigated in more thorough detail 
later in this chapter. Furthermore, CCAMLR Articles III, IV, and V, repeat the understanding of 
Antarctic Treaty Article IV, regarding the issue of sovereignty in the Antarctic region and the conduct 
of activities within the Antarctic Treaty area.245 Meaning CCAMLR Parties assume responsibility for 
Antarctic environmental protection codified within the Antarctic Treaty and the Environmental 
Protocol without being direct Contracting Parties to these legal instruments, in accordance with their 
contractual obligation to CCAMLR.246     
 
 
Invited Experts 
 
 
Since the inception of the ATCM, specialist experts have also been invited to observe and present 
technical information to aid in development of measures, decisions and resolutions of the plenary. 
These invited experts are not permanent attendants to ATCMs. Instead, their participation is based 
on an invitation for expert advice dependent on the annual ATCM agenda. Given this ad hoc 
participation, the invited experts as a comparative group of actors, represent a varied mix of 
intergovernmental and non-governmental actors.  
 
Initially, invited experts primarily consisted of intergovernmental institutions, particularly UN 
specialised agencies and programmes such as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the 
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), and the United Nations Environment Programme 
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(UNEP). Other intergovernmental invited experts were the International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN), and more recently the Secretariat for the Agreement on the Conservation of 
Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP). 
 
Non-governmental experts invited to participate in early ATCMs include the International Council for 
Science (ICSU), and the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO). However, as the scope and 
depth of ATCM agenda items expanded in the 1980s and 1990s, so too did the range of new experts 
called upon to advise on emerging challenges to the principles of the Antarctic Treaty. Newer 
participants tend to consist of non-governmental invited experts, including the Antarctic and 
Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) and the International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators 
(IAATO).  
 
 
Science as Currency 
 
 
 Inherently relevant to the analysis of all Antarctic engagement, is the notion that “science is 
currency” in the ATS.247 As mentioned earlier, national strategic presence on the Antarctic continent 
is maintained by active scientific research programmes, which in turn provide political legitimacy for 
active participation in the ATCM. The high expense of operations and logistics for Antarctic research 
has dictated that asserting and maintaining an active national presence on Antarctica is, for the most 
part inherently collaborative, as evident from the outset of the heroic era of exploration through to 
the present day. Antarctic scientific research therefore, has become a diplomatic tool for peace and 
stability in the region, that allows for “monitoring, reporting and verification needed to maintain 
trust in international cooperation” in the ATS.248  
 
In a critical literature review that investigated the Antarctic’s environmental regime within 
international relations theory, Cornelis van der Lugt identified a number of common principles and 
norms of the ATS commonly referred to within the literature. The common principles are intended to 
maintain the norms of the ATS, and include political accommodation regarding the abeyance of 
Antarctic sovereignty that prevents new territorial claims and allows for the ATS to operate under 
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consensus; privileged control of decision-making with an activity criterion; acting in the interest all 
humankind by protecting Antarctica’s usage to peaceful purposes and scientific research.249 The ATS 
operates under shared norms to uphold these principles and protect the values of the Antarctic. 
These norms are provided by the prescriptive elements of the Antarctic Treaty previously introduced 
in this chapter.    
 
The order preference or hierarchy of values between academic opinions differ dependent on when 
the research was undertaken in relation to developments within the ATS and observations of 
particular aspects of the system itself, but van der Lugt noted that each reflected a paralleled 
distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics of a neorealist perspective despite the visible regime 
change in the 1980s.250 The values of political and security concerns often trumped economic and 
environmental concerns, even after prescriptions were included for the participation of new actors 
and additional legal instruments, designed to ensure enhanced legitimacy of the ATS.251 This 
Rationalist perception has been reflected in the following analysis of this thesis research, which 
identifies that the EU’s normative contribution as a global actor is unlikely to garner enough support 
for an upgraded direct role in Antarctic political deliberation alone, without providing a political or 
security opportunity structure for its member states to take advantage of.        
 
 
3.5 The European Union in the Antarctic Treaty System 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the CCAMLR mechanism acts as a set of institutions within the ATS, but aside 
from the Antarctic Treaty itself. CCAMLR is the only forum in the ATS where the EU’s direct 
participation is permanent. However, there have also been extraordinary cases where the EU has 
been granted ad hoc participation in the ATCM. As these cases relate to the EU’s direct participation 
in the ATCM relating to the development of the Environmental Protocol, they are introduced first.   
The EU’s engagement in CCAMLR provides an overview on what characterises its permanent role for 
actorness in the ATS. This has included how this actorness is perceived by non-EU CCAMLR 
Commission Members that provides important contextualisation for analysis in chapter four, which 
explores how the EU could pursue an upgrade to its actorness in the ATS.   
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EU ‘Actorness’ in the ATCM 
 
 
The EU’s direct presence in the politics of the ATS to date has been limited to four instances where 
European Commission representatives have been granted Observer status at the ATCM. The first 
formal EU ATCM role occurred in the early 1990s, as the Commission of the European Communities 
was granted an invitation to participate as an Observer in all four sessions of the XI Special Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meetings (SATCM) that drafted the Environmental Protocol.252  
 
An EC representative was present for SATCM XI-1 Viña del Mar (Nov-Dec 1990), and the three Madrid 
sessions SATCM XI-2 (April 1991), XI-3 (June 1991), and XI-4 (October 1991) in which the final draft 
was adopted.253 The opening statement by the Commission of the European Communities to the 
SATCM XV-I (1990) plenary (Annex I) further reinforces the Communities interest in the Antarctic, 
expressly noting that, 
  
“the Community and the Member States are determined to play a leading role in the action 
needed to protect the world’s environment and will continue to strive for an effective 
international response particularly to the ever growing threats of the natural environment.... In 
this context we have taken a great interest in the development of a Convention on Global Climate 
Change.... The environmental problems which are beginning to show themselves in Antarctica are 
of great concern to the European Communities.... Furthermore when the Heads of State and 
Governments met in Dublin this year.... they specifically drew the attention to the Antarctica and 
states that the Antarctica deserves special promotion as the last great unspoiled wilderness 
*sic+”.254  
 
Noting the terminology projected in this opening statement, Community concerns over the 
environment during this time were dominated by calls for the advancement of “international efforts 
to solve global problems and to promote sustainable development and respect for the global 
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commons”255; rhetoric which directly reflects the EU’s active identity construction for actorness in 
global environmental diplomacy that we continue to observe in contemporary IR. While France was 
able to utilise its active engagement for Antarctic environmental management to further strategic 
agenda in both the ATS and the EU, the EU also sought to take advantage of this opportunity 
structure to further a strategic agenda for recognition as a leading actor in global environmental 
politics.  
 
Because the environmental regime was developed as a Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, it is only 
open to accession by states. Therefore despite the EC’s participation during development, in addition 
to already possessing formal membership to CCAMLR as an REIO, the EC was unable to accede to the 
Environmental Protocol when it opened for signature. 
 
Despite the EC itself already being party to the CCAMLR mechanism by the 1990s, this is the first 
formal instance where it was invited to observe an ATCM session. The EC was never invited to 
participate in the 1979 ATCM X (Washington) which negotiated the development of CCAMLR, 
because EC executive competence over fisheries was granted to the Community after its Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) entered into force in 1983, a year after CCAMLR had already entered into 
force.256 The EC was however, invited to participate as an Observer in the 1980 Conference on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, which was hosted by the newly formed 
Commission of CCAMLR.257  
 
This was because the Community did already possess some competences under the EC Treaty 
regarding fisheries (Article 43), trade policy (Article 113), and environmental matters (Article 130R), 
which allowed for an EC delegation of seven.258 The EC’s presence at this meeting eventually 
translated into formal capability for permanent EC membership in CCAMLR, from an official mandate 
from the Council of the European Communities under Council Decision 81/691/EEC 4th September 
1981.259  
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In addition to the above instances where the EC possessed a formal role for political engagement in 
the ATCM in the 1990s, an EU presence was “felt to be muscling its way into the ATS” at the 2005 
ATCM XXVIII-CEPVIII (Stockholm) which finalised negotiations for the Annex on Liability Arising from 
Environmental Emergencies to the Environmental Protocol.260 This perception arose amongst ATCPs 
in 2004, when EU members present at the ATCM XXVII-CEPVII (Cape Town) introduced Working 
Paper 034 “EU ATCP”, which requested a disconnection clause be added as a provision to the Liability 
Annex in order to address a clash over jurisdiction of arbitration with existing EU law pertaining to 
liability.261   
 
This disconnection clause, which read: “States Parties which are members of the European 
Community shall not apply the provisions of this Article insofar as Community rules of jurisdiction in 
civil and commercial matters apply”, was discussed further intersessionally, as its potential inclusion 
would have made the Annex too complex for non-EU ATCP’s to domestically ratify due to their 
limited understanding of European Community law.262 EU member states that were also ATCP’s were 
instructed “to ensure that the relevant Community rules continue to apply” during negotiations at 
Stockholm, as requested by the Council of the European Union.263 While this caused some anxiety 
amongst non-EU ATCP’s, general consensus was finally achieved after a clarification over terminology 
of pursuant, in conjunction with the resolution of a technical legal issue within the EU that no longer 
necessitated the inclusion of the disconnection clause.264 
 
Given that Australia and France were key proponents in the development of a comprehensive regime 
for Antarctic environmental protection, opportunity for EU actorness in the ATCM to date can in 
effect be attributed to their leading role in shelving CRAMRA.265 This example also serves to illustrate 
how clashes of competence can allow the inclusion of different actors into the deliberation process 
of the ATCM, despite normative restrictions which prevent their permanent participation.  
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EU ‘Actorness’ in CCAMLR  
 
 
The EU’s permanent direct participation in the ATS is limited to its membership in the CCAMLR 
Commission and Scientific Committee. The European Community (EC) was authorised by Council 
Decision 81/61/EEC, to sign CCAMLR due to the new European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP, 1981) 
effectively transferring the regulation of fisheries activities of its member-states to the EC, as the 
legal personality of the EEC.266 This accession was provided for under CCAMLR Article VII, on the basis 
of allowing entry to ‘Regional Economic Integration Organisations’.267 Even after the Lisbon Treaty’s 
functional amendments, it is a European Commission representative which maintains this EU 
presence in the CCAMLR mechanism.   
  
From a European policy perspective, the CFP affords the EU actor capability, as it mandates the EU 
Commission with defending community interests by taking part in CCAMLR as a Regional Fisheries 
Organisation (RFO). Typically, EU member states are not allowed to also be a member of the 
respective RFO, however there are exceptions. Firstly, when the territory of the EU does not coincide 
with the territories under control of the member states; and secondly, when the RFO also focuses on 
issues other than just fisheries.268 Since CCAMLR’s jurisdiction does include both the overseas 
Antarctic territories of the United Kingdom and France (in addition to their uncontested claims to 
several sub-Antarctic islands), these EU member states are able to join the RFO on behalf of their 
overseas territories, and maintain a degree of independence from the CFP in relation to fisheries 
activities within that region.  
 
Secondly, CCAMLR’s mandate goes beyond just fisheries activities. As it is a conservation convention, 
CCAMLR also includes provisions for the protection of the marine environment, meaning the EU has 
executive and not exclusive competence in terms of representation of its member states. Given this 
provision, EU member states without overseas Antarctic territories are also entitled to membership 
in the CCAMLR Commission and Scientific Committee, so long as they conduct research or harvesting 
activities within the Convention Area. Belgium, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and Sweden exercise 
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this option.269 Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Finland, and Greece are also Parties to CCAMLR, but they 
are not members of the Commission or Scientific Committee.270   
 
In terms of voting rights of the EU and these member states, the CCAMLR Rules of Procedure 
prescribe:  
 
“In Commission consideration of any item requiring a decision, it shall be made clear whether 
a regional economic integration organisation will participate in the taking of the decision and, 
if so, whether any of its Member States will also participate. The number of Contracting 
Parties so participating shall not exceed the number of Member States of the regional 
economic integration organisation which are Members of the Commission”.271  
 
This provision means that both the EU and its member states that are also Parties to CCAMLR, do not 
have the right to vote all at the same time. When matters relate to fisheries, and are therefore within 
the EU's exclusive competence, the EU votes on behalf of its member states. When competence is 
shared, one of the EU member states will cede its vote to the EU.272 In practice, the EU is treated as a 
state in the CCAMLR Commission.273  
 
 
Perceptions of EU ‘Actorness’ in CCAMLR 
 
 
Perceptions of the EU’s engagement in the CCAMLR mechanism reflect recurring themes of critique 
on the EU’s actorness in international relations in general. What characterises the EU’s engagement 
in CCAMLR, and how this actorness is perceived, provides a valuable insight into what issues might 
plague or complement any potential upgraded EU role in the politics of the ATS. Therefore, empirical 
analysis of the EU’s engagement in the ATS under the auspices of the CCAMLR mechanism provides a 
critical contribution to this dissertation.  
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Criticisms of the EU’s engagement in CCAMLR are threefold, and directly reflect confusion over the 
clarity of EU external relations often noted regarding its engagement in other international fora. 
Specifically, perceptions of the EU as an hard negotiating actor; problems concerning the EU’s 
effective representation of non-Parties to CCAMLR; and confusion where liability lies after mixed 
negotiating competences between the EU and its member states on the differing scope of issues 
under the jurisdiction of CCAMLR.  
 
Perceptions of the EU as a hard negotiating actor in CCAMLR, inflexible on its policy position, and 
tough in its pursuit of bargaining gains, are almost wholly a result of its internal processes. At its 
worst in the 1980s, in part due to the “street-fighter”274 style of negotiating by the EC’s then head of 
delegation, the EC was often viewed to be “very obstructive, very debilitating, and very 
unconstructive”275 to the deliberative process of CCAMLR Commission meetings. This was particularly 
visible in relation to policy positions of the USSR (which was also considered very obstructive), when 
there was even the slightest implication of “holding off”276 on Antarctic fisheries the EC had an 
interest in – predominantly those around South Georgia, for which the UK maintains sovereignty. In 
these instances, the EC would obstruct debate until a “backdoor deal had been done on the South 
Georgia fishery”.277 Only then was the EC more accommodating to negotiations. However, more than 
anything else, the EC was perceived to act in a hard approach within an expected role relating to its 
conferred executive competence, for protecting the interest of one of its member states.278 
 
While the EU’s negotiating hardness is no longer considered debilitating to the process of debate in 
CCAMLR as it was in the 1980s, the EU’s maintenance of a firm policy stance remains a characteristic 
perception of its actorness in this forum to date. Furthermore, this perception would likely extend to 
any permanent EU role for participation in the ATCM. As the EU reaffirms strong policy cohesion 
under the Lisbon Treaty to ensure clear external representation in its international relations, and 
because this cohesive policy is achieved from internal negotiations where member states make most 
of their concessions before arriving at the respective international forum, the EU’s negotiating 
behaviour is likely to remain firm to ensure clarity for its external representation.    
 
The EU as a firm negotiating actor is also positively perceived on certain policy issues. The EU has 
been repeatedly commended for the stringent execution of its executive competence in CCAMLR, 
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regarding measures to combat Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported (IUU) fishing within the 
jurisdiction of the CCAMLR convention area. At consecutive CCAMLR Commission Meetings from 
2006 to 2011, the EU has strongly advocated that CCAMLR Commission members adopt a market-
related conservation measure to promote compliance regarding Antarctic Toothfish fisheries, 
reiterating that its own markets “would be closed to IUU catches of all species from 1 January 
2010”.279  
 
Once again perceived to be acting within its conferred negotiating role, the EU’s the initial tabling of 
the conservation measure coincided with new internal regulations within the EU designed to combat 
IUU fisheries, and was consequently perceived to ensure CCAMLR’s provisions for compliance were 
consistent with the EU’s internal market provisions.280 Irrespective of the EU’s rational, its continued 
proposition for tougher conservation measures within CCAMLR is considered “progressive”281, “very 
helpful, focused, and complementary to the objectives of CCAMLR’s work by other members”.282  
 
The most recurring concern raised during interviews on the perception of the EU’s actorness in 
CCAMLR, was the criticism regarding the EU’s effective representation of its member states that are 
not Parties to CCAMLR, and the subsequent lack of clarity regarding issues of liability (also noted 
previously with the 2004 Environmental Protocol Liability Annex). This is a particularly sensitive issue, 
and was considered to be the biggest challenge regarding any potential pursuit on the EU’s part for a 
permanent role in the ATCM. This problem formally materialised in the CCAMLR Commission during 
its annual meeting in 1999, after the EU submitted a notification (CCAMLR-XXVIII/21) on behalf of 
Portugal, notifying CCAMLR members that this non-Party was conducting a new and exploratory 
fishery under the jurisdiction of CCAMLR.283  
 
The EU maintained that its executive competence to negotiate on behalf of the Community in RFOs, 
allowed the EU to grant any of its member states access to conduct exploratory fisheries within 
CCAMLR’s jurisdiction, regardless of that states direct accession to CCAMLR or not.284 Furthermore, 
the EU asserted that as a consequence of this transfer of competence for fisheries to the Community 
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level, “all EU Member States, and all Community vessels, are bound by CCAMLR’s conservation and 
control measures, irrespective of whether those Member States are Members of CCAMLR or not”.285  
 
Non-EU CCAMLR Commission members were “visibly furious”286 as they viewed Portugal’s 
exploratory fisheries to be in direct contravention with CCAMLR.287 They asserted that if Portugal 
wanted to conduct fisheries activities within the Convention area, then it should become a Party to 
CCAMLR in its own right, and the EU should strongly encourage this accession.288 The CCAMLR 
Commission adopted Conservation Measure 65/XII for the 1999/2000 Season, which recognised 
fisheries shall be conducted by European Community (Portuguese-flagged) vessels within CCAMLR’s 
jurisdiction; notably, without Portugal’s accession to CCAMLR.289 However, pressure from non-EU 
CCAMLR members led the EU to later suspend Portugal’s exploratory fisheries.290  
 
The wider implications of allowing Portugal to enter into Antarctic fisheries activities without being a 
direct Party to the Convention, was the fear that this would “act as a tipping-point” and set a 
precedent for places where the CCAMLR Commission would not have any direct contact with a State 
that was undertaking activities within CCAMLR’s jurisdiction.291 This was particularly pertaining to 
issues on clarity of liability for the assumption of contractual responsibilities for ecosystem 
management and the environment, and the legal and political context of sovereignty within the ATS 
under CCAMLR Articles III, IV, and V. Non-EU CCAMLR Members asserted that regardless of the EU’s 
executive competence, “only Flag States can take on these obligations.....and all these obligations 
require that activities in the Convention Area can only be conducted by State Parties to the 
Convention that become Members of the Commission”.292    
 
The issue of liability in particular, documented twice in relation to the EU’s direct engagement within 
the ATS, illustrates a wider problem for the EU in international relations. It exemplifies how 
recognition of the EU as a global actor are ultimately influenced by perceptions and misconceptions 
of non-EU states that do not clearly understand where the range of negotiating competences and 
responsibilities for liability lie between the level of the EU and the national level of its member 
states.  
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However, despite non-EU member states outwardly strict structural conceptions of state actors 
within the ATS, the EU has shown that is capable of acting just as a state when its own constitutional 
processes afford it the capability to do so. This includes conforming to customary prescriptions of 
acceptable conduct, as shown by the suspension of Portugal’s exploratory fisheries within the 
jurisdiction of CCAMLR, after a constructive deliberative process with non-EU CCAMLR members. 
Irrespective of the EU’s state-like actorness in the ATS to date, issues emerging from confusion over 
negotiation competence and ascendancy of liability emerging from the institutional evolution of the 
EU,  would likely feature prominently in any deliberation over the EU’s potential for any permanent 
role in the ATCM by pursuing accession to the Antarctic Treaty and the Environmental Protocol.  
 
  
3.6 Conclusion  
 
 
In moving analysis beyond theoretical explanations for EU actorness in international relations by 
examining empirical evidence for EU actorness in the Polar Regions, this chapter has explored three 
sub-questions. In illustrating how the EU has exhibited qualities of actorness in global environmental 
discourse, with reference to its leadership role in the global climate change regime, this chapter 
demonstrated that the EU’s active pursuit of normative engagement in this area has afforded it with 
the capability to challenge structural conceptions of actors in international relations. This normative 
agenda has in turn provided the EU with the opportunity to pursue increased direct engagement in 
areas which align with strategic agenda for recognition as a global actor, in addition to resource 
security.  
 
This chapter has also illustrated the EU’s utilisation of rhetoric touting a normative agenda for a 
permanent role in the Arctic Council, intended to provide the EU with a direct input into the forum 
that sets sustainable development agenda in the Arctic. This example further serves to illustrate that 
the EU’s internal processes allow for actor capability to be constructed or reconstructed to take 
advantage of opportunities for increased direct presence as a political actor in its own right. This 
chapter then posited that the EU could also follow a similar approach and actively purse upgraded 
political engagement in the ATS, which could further serve to complement its recognition as a global 
actor and support its normative prescriptions for sustainable development and environmental 
protection in the Arctic.  
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Before the realities of this question are analysed in Chapter Four, the remainder of Chapter Three 
examined what has characterised the EU’s direct political engagement in the ATS to date, including 
how the EU has exhibited qualities of actorness in the ATCM and CCAMLR institutional arrangements. 
Examination of this engagement has illustrated that the ATS remains centred on Rationalist 
assumptions of the international system where political and security concerns trump economic and 
environmental concerns. This is likely to be challenging should the EU decide to upgrade its direct 
political engagement in the ATS, and is examined further in Chapter Four.   
 
 Perceptions of the EU’s actorness in CCAMLR were explored to incorporate issues which have 
highlighted both the positive and negative aspects of direct EU engagement in the ATS to date. 
Criticisms of the EU’s engagement in CCAMLR reflect confusion over the clarity of EU external 
relations often noted regarding its engagement in other international fora, and for which the Lisbon 
Treaty was designed to address.   
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Chapter Four:  
Upgrading the EU’s Antarctic Engagement 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
 
 
Because the EU’s direct participation in the ATCM to date has been limited to several ad hoc 
instances regarding the development of the Environmental Protocol, an EU normative influence in 
Antarctic political deliberation has been visible through the Europeanisation of its member states 
foreign policies on specific Antarctic issues. This influence has provided for an indirect EU presence in 
the politics of the ATS, and has been visible during France’s role in the development of the 
Environmental Protocol. Furthermore, the process of Europeanisation illustrates how the EU and EU 
ATCP’s have sought to take advantage of opportunity structures for deepened political engagement, 
based on Antarctic environmental management and scientific research. In turn, this Antarctic 
political engagement has been utilised by the EU and its member states in an attempt to fulfil 
objectives within their respective wider strategic agendas.   
 
Therefore, this chapter investigates what evidence there is of Europeanisation in the ATCM, to show 
how the EU and EU ATCP’s have sought to deepen their respective roles in Antarctic scientific and 
political engagement, to further their own wider strategic agendas. As these roles for actorness in 
Antarctic political deliberation have also been closely tied to opportunities, presence and capability 
to conduct active scientific research in Antarctica, this chapter also investigates several case studies 
outlining collaborative European infrastructure agreements and large scale scientific research 
projects in Antarctica supported by EU funding. This incorporates how the EU and its member states 
seek to take advantage of opportunity structures afforded by their respective EU membership and 
Antarctic engagement.  
 
This chapter closes with an analysis of how the EU could actively seek to upgrade this scientific and 
political engagement to further its recognition as a global political actor. This analysis explores the 
possibility that the EU could construct for itself a permanent role in the ATS, as a Contracting Party to 
the Antarctic Treaty and its Environmental Protocol, based on its normative influence and limited 
direct presence in the ATS to date, further complemented by its financial support of collaborative 
Antarctic scientific research.  
 
 87 | P a g e  
 
 
4.2 Strategic interest in Antarctica  
 
 
Antarctic social scientist Dr Alan Hemmings notes that environmental management in the Antarctic is 
often used to serve strategic national interests, rather than environmental interests.293 Hemmings 
posits that active engagement based on Antarctic environmental protection is a diplomatic method 
for strategic national values to be pursued under the cover of environmental rationale, and 
environmental management responses can be denied if they compete with strategic national 
valuation.294 Building on this notion, this dissertation argues that it is not only national actors that 
strategically benefit from attempting to utilise Antarctic environmental management to further a 
wider political agenda. Much as the EU has pursued increased political engagement in the Arctic 
based on environmental protection and active scientific research in the region, it could also apply the 
same rationale to increase its direct engagement in the politics of the ATS.  
 
From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, there is evidence of the EU’s attempt to increase its direct 
political engagement with the ATS, based on the issue of environmental management.  Furthermore, 
a number of circumstances led France to become a leader in the development of the Environmental 
Protocol in order to fulfil objectives of its own wider political agenda. This ultimately provided the EU 
with the opportunity for its direct presence in the ATCM to date, as an ad hoc Observer to the 
SATCM sessions that negotiated this ATS legal instrument.  
 
Research into the development of the Environmental Protocol uncovered a supplementary 
phenomenon, relevant to the EU’s potential for future Antarctic engagement. The utilisation of 
opportunity structures provided by the development of the Environmental Protocol, is evident at 
both the national and Community levels, and allowed for these actors to construct for themselves 
roles for deepened political engagement in the ATCM. Incentivised by wider strategic objectives, the 
dual utilisation of the opportunity for deepened political engagement, in effect facilitated a 
normative influence in the politics of the ATS and the policies of these actors, in a process called 
Europeanisation.   
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Development of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
 
 
The development of the Environmental Protocol emerged from critical debate following the ATCM’s 
adoption of CRAMRA in 1988. The Environmental Protocol met demands from officials, domestic 
publics, and pressure groups, for a new comprehensive regime for Antarctic environmental 
protection, which critics argued could not be ensured through CRAMRA, despite the mechanisms 
advanced environmental provisions.295  
 
A number of international factors contributed to the initiation of ATCM XV (Paris, 1989) 
Recommendation XV-1, which called upon ATCPs to consider the merits of enhanced provisions for 
the conservation of the Antarctic environment, and afforded Australia and France the opportunity 
for a combined leadership role in the development of the Environmental Protocol.296 This included a 
series of environmental disasters occurring in polar waters in early 1989, including the accidental 
groundings of Bahia Paraiso, Endurance, Humbolt, Exxon Valdez, and a significant oil spill at the US 
South Pole Station. The alarm provoked by these incidents generated massive public pressure to 
protect that Antarctic environment, which was facilitated by the famous ocean explorer Commander 
Jacques-Yves Cousteau.297  
 
On the domestic level, governments were not only motivated into action to appease their 
constituent demands for Antarctic environmental protection. CRAMRA’s ratification was perceived 
by the claimant states to be softening their sovereignty over their respective Antarctic territorial 
claims, as the minerals regime provided no preferential royalties for these states regardless of 
whether potential mining operations would extract resources from within their nationalised sectors 
or not.298 
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In May 1989, the Australian Government was the first state to formerly denounce its support for 
CRAMRA, in part because of the Hawke Government’s realisation that its success in the upcoming 
1990 Federal election necessitated support from a coalition of environment groups which held the 
balance of power after recent local elections.299 However, as Australia maintains the largest Antarctic 
sector claim, its most critical consideration came from Treasury’s view that ratification of CRAMRA 
would in effect concede Australia’s economic claims to Antarctic mineral wealth, and be perceived as 
a sacrifice of administrative control and sovereignty of its Antarctic territory.300   
 
Public pressure generated by Cousteau’s petition movement, and the prominent rise of green politics 
in France, led the French Government to also declare in June 1989 that it would no longer ratify 
CRAMRA. By August 1989, Australia and France had officially joint forces for a leading role in the 
development of a comprehensive framework for Antarctic environmental protection. In October, 
they jointly submitted two Working Papers to ATCM XV (Paris, 1989), formally outlining a proposal 
for comprehensive measures.301 At SATCM X-1 (Viña del Mar, 1990) Australia and France were joined 
by Italy and Belgium, for the joint submission of Working Paper SATCM/WP/01, which outlined an 
indicative draft convention to establish a comprehensive environment protection regime for the 
Antarctic.302  
 
 
 
 French role in the development of the Environmental Protocol  
 
 
Prior to the 1990s, France had rarely been regarded as ‘green leader’ state within the EU, aside from 
one notable exception.  In the early 1970s, “France seized the opportunity of her EC Presidency to 
bring about the decision to establish the First Environmental Action Programme on the Environment 
at the 1972 Paris Summit in Versailles”, which sought to take advantage of emerging sensitivities 
towards environmental protection.303 France’s leadership role in the development of the 
Environmental Protocol in the 1990s, again utilised emerging sensitivities on environmental 
protection, to further its strategic agenda at the domestic, regional, and global levels.   
 
                                                          
299
 Joyner, C (1996), 164.  
300
 Templeton, Malcolm,  Protecting Antarctica: The Development of the Treaty System. (New Zealand Institute 
of International Affairs: Wellington, 2002), 33. And, Joyner, C (1996), 164.   
301
 ATCM XV, ATCM/WP/02 (Paris: 1989). And, ATCM XV, ATCM/WP/03 (Paris:1989).  
302
 SATCM X-1, SATCM/WP/01 (Viña del Mar: 1990).  
303
 Hildebrand, Philip.M; “The European Community‟s Environmental Policy, 1957 to „1992‟: From Incidental 
Measures to an International Regime”, in Environmental Policy in the European Union: Actors, Institutions, and 
Processes. Edited by Jordan, Andrew. 2
nd
 Edition (London: Earthscan, 2005), 27.  
 90 | P a g e  
 
Recalling Hemmings, during the development of the Environmental Protocol, France was able to 
utilise environmental management as a diplomatic method for its engagement in both the EU and 
the ATS. France’s active engagement in this global environmental discourse, afforded it the 
opportunity to further its national strategic interests in both political arenas. This in turn resulted in 
the ‘greening’ of French foreign policy during this time. The consequent influence of the EU on the 
French policy substance and process was visible as the Europeanisation of French foreign policy 
towards the Antarctic, which exhibited evidence of national convergence, national projection, and 
identity reconstruction.  
 
As both a founding state in the process of European integration, and an original ATCP with an 
Antarctic territorial claim, France maintains a prominent role in both the EU and ATS. Yet its 
leadership role in the development of the Environmental Protocol is largely characterised in the 
literature as ‘hanging on to the skirt-tails’ of Australia, in order to achieve a political agenda further 
removed from benevolent objectives for Antarctic environmental protection than the French Senate 
maintains.304 Like Australia, domestic political considerations factored significantly in the French 
Government’s decision to push for the Environmental Protocol, and there are three identifiable 
elements which worked interchangeably to influence this position.  
 
First, a number of international environmental disasters led to the prominent rise of popular green 
politics domestically, regionally, and globally in the 1970s and 1980s. The Chernobyl nuclear disaster, 
controversial nuclear testing in the Pacific, and the French role in the bombing of the Greenpeace 
vessel Rainbow Warrior, gave rise to a global anti-nuclear movement that put significant pressure on 
French foreign policy in particular.305 Second, these events prompted environmentalist groups like 
those led by Cousteau, to build on domestic anti-nuclear sentiments to garner significant public 
favour within France for the abandonment of CRAMRA.306 Third, France held two very prominent 
institutional roles within the EU at that time. These were, the rotating Presidency of the Council of 
the European Communities (between June – December 1989); and former French Finance Minister 
Jacques Delores was President of the European Commission (from 1985-1995). During this period, 
the EU was experiencing a new scope of actor capacity for external relations in global environmental 
diplomacy (afforded by the SEA (1987)), which also coincided with progress for deepening European 
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integration to encompass a broad new range of political (rather than solely economic) competencies 
under the Treaty of the European Union (TEU/Maastricht Treaty, 1991).These prominent institutional 
roles ultimately served to put further pressure on French foreign policy.  
 
Known then as “one of the least conservationist of the [Antarctic] Treaty parties,” the French 
Government’s decision to disbandon CRAMRA and join Australia for a leading role in the 
development of the Environmental Protocol, was unlikely to have been based on benevolent intent 
for Antarctic environmental protection.307 Rather, this approach was a means to quieten the French 
public and reduce the power of the green vote domestically, and improve France’s environmental 
image both within the EU and the international community.308 Furthermore, France’s utilisation of 
Antarctic environmental management could be attributed as an attempt to retain prominence in 
Antarctic political deliberation (and sovereignty over French Antarctic territory), at a time when a 
number of new Parties were acceding to the Antarctic Treaty.  
 
A wholly unanalysed dynamic in academic literature regarding France’s role in the development of 
the Environmental Protocol, is the consideration of the EU’s institutional influence. Known as the 
process of Europeanisation, this influence is relevant given France’s prominent roles within the EU at 
this time. Official EU documents provide evidence for a visible Europeanisation influence on French 
foreign policy towards the Antarctic, in addition to France’s utilisation of its institutional role in the 
EU to further promote the Environmental Protocol. Furthermore, the process of Europeanisation can 
be attributed to resulting in a normative influence the ATCM, for an indirect presence that 
supplemented the EU’s Observer role previously introduced in Chapter Three.  
 
 
 
4.3 Europeanisation in the ATCM 
 
 
Despite the necessity to restrict the scope of this research, limited analysis of Europeanisation 
phenomenon has been justified because its observation within the ATS has been wholly absent from 
academic literature, though Europeanisation is a widely researched process that has been examined 
across many different state-actors, policy areas, and political arenas. Additionally, the 
Europeanisation of foreign policy actions of EU member-states with respect to Antarctic issues also 
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impacts upon the foremost hypothesis of this thesis, which is to examine the potential for the EU to 
upgrade its actorness in the ATCM to further its global political agenda.  
 
Therefore, while the documentation of this phenomenon is considered a supplementary strain of 
analysis, even its brief inclusion provides a substantive addition to final conclusions and 
recommendations of this thesis. As research has indicated that given current structural perceptions 
of the ATS, any upgrade to the EU’s political engagement in the ATCM is likely to be indirect, and 
limited to a normative institutional influence resulting from process of Europeanisation, in which the 
EU facilitates deepened policy cohesion between its member states for issues on Antarctic political 
agenda.  
 
Contextualising Wong’s operational theory of foreign policy Europeanisation to this research topic 
provides the following three key questions, for a brief analysis into the Europeanisation of French 
foreign policy towards the Antarctic during the development of the Environmental Protocol.  1) Has 
national convergence and/or adaptation of national policy to EU norms and directives taken place 
during development of the Environmental Protocol? (national convergence); 2) Has France benefited 
from the ‘cover’ of the EU during this period? (national projection); 3) What kinds of European norms 
have arisen among French officials? And, how do they apply to French Antarctic foreign policy during 
this period? (identity reconstruction)”.309    
 
 
 
Debate within the European Community for Antarctic environmental protection 
  
 
 A number of debates on Antarctic environmental protection in the European Parliament were held 
across the 1980s within the context of the developing CRAMRA minerals regime. As early as 1984, 
Members of the European Parliament (MEP’s) were referring motions Doc. 2-1677/84 and Doc. 2-
1477/84 for resolution, across two different Parliamentary Committees. These documents called for 
reports to be drawn up “on the legal and economic framework and extent of Member State and 
Community involvement in the Antarctic to date”310, considering it essential that Member States of 
the Community “call on the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to adopt a uniform 
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standpoint with regard to the future status of the Antarctic”311 and “a common approach to the 
future economic exploitation of the Antarctic”.312   
 
By February 1985, these working documents resulted in the drafting of European Parliament Report 
Document A2-101/87 (Moorhouse Report, tabled 25 June 1987) “on the economic significance of 
Antarctica and the Antarctic Ocean”, within the Committee on External Economic Relations.313 During 
the drafting of this report, the European Parliament Committee on the Environment, Public Health 
and Consumer Protection, began simultaneously drafting its own Report “on the protection of the 
environment and wildlife in Antarctica” Document A2-57/87 (Muntingh Report, tabled 25 May 
1987)314, after MEP’s considered a motion for resolution Doc. B2-653/86, tabled in 1986.315 
 
At the European Parliament plenary session 18 September 1987, MEP’s simultaneously adopted 
Resolution Doc.A2-101/87 and Resolution Doc.A2-57/87, as recommended within these Committee 
reports.316 While these Resolutions deviated slightly in their rational for supporting the principle of 
CRAMRA negotiations317, both agreed that “any exploration or exploitation of minerals would 
adversely affect the unique values of the Antarctic environment”318, and that “if current negotiations 
for a minerals regime result in the acceptance and installation of such a regime or convention, this 
should be made conditional on the negotiation and acceptance of an Antarctic Conservation 
Strategy”.319 
 
Moreover, both Resolutions introduced the view that “the EC should participate in its own right in 
the decision-making concerning Antarctica”320, including “welcoming the Community’s accession to 
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the Antarctic Treaty....considering it necessary that the Commission should be allowed to take part in 
minerals regime negotiations as an observer and would welcome the Community’s accession to this 
arrangement as well, particularly in the view of the Community’s legal responsibilities in the area of 
international trade”.321 Furthermore, the European Parliament echoed rhetoric which is strikingly 
similar to the EU’s current rationale for deepened political engagement in the Arctic Council, as 
introduced in Chapter Three. In adopting these Resolutions, the Parliament noted that it: 
 
1. “Accepts that the importance of the Antarctic to Europe lies as much in having 
knowledge of it and of its global effects as it does in its potential as a source of mineral 
and protein wealth; 
2. Calls on all Member States of the EC to ensure that the EC has the possibility of acceding 
to the Antarctic Treaty; 
3. Urges those Member States of the EC which have not already done so to accede to the 
Antarctic Treaty; 
4. Urges all the Member States therefore to undertake and coordinate research activities in 
the Antarctic and to cooperate with regard to the creation and use of the necessary 
logistical infrastructure”322  
5. “Urges EC members that are parties to the Antarctic Treaty to promote strongly an 
‘Antarctic Conservation Strategy’ in all fora of the Antarctic Treaty System; 
6. Calls on the Commission to investigate how the expertise of the EC can best contribute to 
Antarctic decision making, especially concerning environmental protection, based on the 
principle of such an ‘Antarctic Conservation Strategy, and to take action accordingly. This 
could include: 
(a) In the short term: obtaining observer status at the Consultative Meetings, Special 
Consultative Meetings, and particularly at the minerals negotiations; 
(b) In the longer term: timely preparation of a review of the Treaty providing for full 
membership to be granted to the EEC; 
7. Urges all EC members that are parties to the Antarctic Treaty to set an example by 
putting the principles of an ‘Antarctic Conservation Strategy’ in practice in their own 
activities in Antarctica”.323 
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In noting the Community’s recognition as an legal entity in the international community, MEP’s 
believed that the EC’s economic and political influence as an acceding Party to the Antarctic Treaty 
would ensure a “substantially greater” influence for Antarctic environmental protection than if only 
some of its member states were Parties “without necessarily taking concerted action”.324 Rapportuer 
Muntingh of Resolution A2-57/87, noted that it was “high time for the European Community to 
adopt a much more severe attitude in this respect and not always leave it to the United States to pull 
the hot chestnuts out of the fire”.325 A somewhat prophetic comment, as US abdication of 
negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol was to later provide the EU its opportunity for actorness as a 
leader in the construction of the global climate change regime.326     
 
In reference to the Parliament’s calls for direct EC ascendancy to the Antarctic Treaty and the 
proposed Antarctic minerals convention, Commissioner Clinton Davis clarified that irrespective of the 
Community’s current level of competence for international trade relations and in the field of 
commercial policy, “the *Antarctic+ Treaty in its present form would not permit Community 
membership as such”.327 After this debate, there is no formal documentation available from any EU 
institution to suggest that discussion continued on potential direct Community accession to the 
Antarctic Treaty, nor in the period since. Therefore, because the EU is not actively pursuing 
opportunities for increased political engagement in the Antarctic, this means that the EU lacks the 
actor capability (a formal mandate) necessary to construct for itself a permanent role in the ATCM, 
an acceding Party to the Antarctic Treaty and Environmental Protocol. 
 
However, Commissioner Davis noted “the Commission did share the view that there are good 
reasons to think further about some kind of Community participation”, agreeing on the need to 
develop an Antarctic conservation strategy.328 This comment was in specific reference to Community 
developments for external representation in the area of environment conservation, as the European 
Commission had played a leading role for negotiations in the UN Environment Programme’s 
Montreal Protocol (regarding reduction in CFCs emissions), that had successfully concluded just the 
day before.329  
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From this point forward, there is evidence the EC actively pursued a normative influence for Antarctic 
environmental protection, well before any French renunciation of support for CRAMRA. It is likely 
that this influence undoubtedly contributed to the EU’s ad hoc inclusion into the SATCM sessions 
that negotiated the Environmental Protocol. Furthermore, from this point on European 
Parliamentary debates reflect of flurry of action within the EC, pertaining to Antarctic environmental 
protection.  
 
As late as January 1989, a motion for Urgent Resolution B2-1299/88 was debated in the European 
Parliament “regarding the French Air Base Construction in Antarctica”.330 This motion brought French 
environmental credibility further into contention, as the construction of an airstrip at Dumont 
d’Urville in Antarctica required “the blowing up of six islands inhabited by thousands of penguins and 
other sea birds”, threatening to wipe out several large breeding colonies.331 This apparent disregard 
for the Antarctic environment was particularly condemning, as France was preparing to take over the 
rotating Council Presidency in July 1989.332  
 
Three further European Parliament resolutions were tabled in quick succession at the closing of 
1988. These were debated in the early 1989, arguing for urgent Antarctic environmental protection 
and highlighting emerging threats to fragile marine ecosystem after a number of recent accidents in 
polar waters. European Parliament Resolution Doc.B2-1347/88, “on the dangers of the destruction of 
the Antarctic ecosystem”, debated on 9th February 1989, and adopted on 16th February 1989, called 
for further delays to the ratification of CRAMRA.333 The proposed motion for Resolution Doc.2-
1389/88 “on serious threats to the Antarctic ecosystem”, was the first to ask the Member States of 
the European Community’s not to ratify CRAMRA, and instead favour a proposal from Greenpeace 
for an Antarctic world park.334  
 
This proposal was jointly tabled by a number of MEP’s that were Members of the European 
Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, that drafted 
the EC’s first Report Doc.A2-57/87 “on the protection of the environment and wildlife in 
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Antarctica”.335 A second motion for urgent resolution Doc.B2-1393/89 “on pollution in the Antarctic”, 
also denounced CRAMRA and urged Member States to initiate or participate in a UN initiative aimed 
at the preservation of the Antarctic environment.336   
 
It is unclear if either of these last two motions for resolution is later referred to as “The French 
Proposal”337 in subsequent Parliamentary session documents, and therefore it is difficult to judge at 
what point France made its change of position clear within the European Parliament. But considering 
the lack of French involvement in early Parliamentary debate for Antarctic environmental projection 
(particularly active proponents tended to be from Germany and Belgium), coupled with the open 
critique of French environmental credentials in its Antarctic activities into early 1989, it is unlikely 
that France was the initiator of debate within the Community for the abandonment of CRAMRA in 
favour of the Environmental Protocol.   
 
Furthermore, it was still evident from motion for resolution Doc.B3-1910/90 “on the Antarctic”, 
debated on 8 November 1990, that the construction of the French airstrip in the Antarctic was still a 
cause of concern for pollution in the Antarctic338, despite efforts on the part of French officials to 
appear to be ‘greening’ their foreign policy during this period.     
 
 
 
Utilising opportunity structures afforded by Europeanisation of Antarctic foreign policy  
 
 
As introduced in Chapter Two, EU member states and their policies ultimately influence and are 
influenced by the work of the institution that they created, through a process of Europeanisation 
which leaves even pre-existing national environmental policies no longer political or legally separate 
from EU environmental policy.339 Andrew Jordan summarises,  
 
“Member States have created an institutional entity to perform certain tasks which has, in turn, 
deeply affected the way they perceive and act against environmental problems. The relationship 
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between the main level – international and national – of this unique system of multilevel 
environmental governance, has been and remains genuinely two-way, creating new opportunities 
and constraints for the various state and non-state actors involved”.340   
 
Studies have shown that a ‘socialisation effect’ on EU officials is strong in the EU institutions where 
elites are involved in the intergovernmental bargaining process for European Political Cooperation 
(EPC)/ Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and this has led to “surprising signs of 
internalising supranational norms and interests, feeding these back to national capitals”.341 As 
Europeanisation preserves the authority and legitimacy of the national level, more so than 
federalism or neo-functionalism, this process emphasises a re-organisational logic for national 
politics and policy-making, suggesting that overtime these become reactive and permeated by inputs 
from the Community level.342 Therefore, officials at both the EU and national levels, seek to take 
advantage of opportunity structures afforded by their respective interconnectedness, to further their 
own strategic agendas.  
 
As actorness in global environmental politics has proven to be “a fruitful arena for EU institution 
building”, where “the Community has been able to increase its stature, its international reach, and its 
effectiveness within international organisations”, the rotating Council Presidency has been identified 
as “a key Community institution in the foreign environmental affairs of the Community”.343 As noted 
earlier, France is known for its opportunist utilisation of environment management during prominent 
EU institutional roles in the past.344 
 
Despite uncertainties over the timing of the French contribution to active European Parliamentary 
debate, the EC was beginning to express interest in the Antarctic as an area to further strengthen its 
external relations. This is documented within the 1989 Programme of the Commission of the 
European Communities, presented by Commission President Jacques Delores to the European 
Parliament in February of that year. It noted that the Commission “will pursue involvement in major 
world issues, [including] active participation in European political cooperation, [for] continued effort 
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to improve the respect for the Community’s external powers (FAO, GATT, WIPO, WTO, ILO, ICAO, 
Antarctic, etc)”.345   
 
Moreover, this evidence indicates that Antarctic environmental management as a diplomatic tool 
was beginning to be discussed at the wider Community level (and not limited to the Parliamentary 
debate), even before France officially withdrew its support of CRAMRA in August 1989. By February 
1990, the European Council had specifically referenced protection of the Antarctic environment as a 
Community objective at its Heads of State and Government Summit in Dublin, noting: 
 
“The Community and its Member States have a special responsibility to encourage and 
participate in international action to combat global environmental problems. Their capacity 
to provide leadership in this sphere is enormous. The Community must use more effectively 
its position of moral, economic and political authority to advance international efforts to 
solve global problems and to promote sustainable development and respect for the global 
commons. In particular, the Antarctic deserves special protection as the last great unspoiled 
wilderness. The Community should also support efforts to build into international structures 
the capacity to respond more effectively to global problems”.346 
 
While France may not have initiated the debate on a comprehensive regime for Antarctic 
environmental protection within the EU, the process of Europeanisation provided France the 
opportunity to benefit threefold from a perceived ‘greening’ of its foreign policy at that time. First, 
the ‘cover’ of the EU during this period, allowed French officials to project national agenda on 
Antarctic environmental management to the Community’s external level, before France had officially 
denounced CRAMRA (national projection). Second, there is a visible adaptation of French foreign 
policy to EU environmental norms, evident by Parliamentary debate. This can be attributed to an 
internally promoted normative environmental agenda, after the SEA (1987) legally conferred the 
Community with competence for external representation on issues of the environment (national 
convergence). Third, national projection and national convergence in turn facilitated the adoption of 
EU environmental norms among French officials during their prominent institutional roles during this 
period, as France attempted to change perceptions on the environmental credentials of its foreign 
policy towards the Antarctic (identity reconstruction).  
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Furthermore, upgrading the EU’s political engagement in the Antarctic as a means to further 
legitimise the EU as a global political actor would be as applicable today as in the early 1990s, despite 
the fact that currently the EU is only actively seeking to increase its polar-oriented political 
engagement in the Arctic. Upgraded EU actorness in the Antarctic could be particularly useful in the 
context of the EU’s apparent loss of normative impact in the climate regime, as the BRICS hard 
sovereignty approach to multilateralism continues to challenge efforts to create a binding 
multilateral agreement to secede the Kyoto Protocol.   
 
As science is currency in the ATS, scientific engagement is critical to support any bid on the EU’s part 
for an upgraded EU role in Antarctic political deliberation.  Like the Arctic, the opportunity for 
upgraded EU actorness could be afforded by its active scientific research on the continent – 
particularly through large collaborative European research projects which examine the impact of 
climate change in the Antarctic region. This scientific presence also acts to support the political 
agenda of the EU, as the results of Polar research are often used to legitimise its policy 
recommendations and prescriptions for global environmental diplomacy.347 The following chapter 
segment illustrates a way in which the EU can rationalise and strengthen its collective diplomacy 
within the specific institutional arrangement of the ATS, namely through a presence on the Antarctic 
continent through its financial support of collaborative Antarctic scientific research.   
 
 
 
4.4 Strategic Scientific Engagement in Antarctica – Case Studies  
 
 
 
Strategic scientific engagement is a key element of Antarctic politics. As noted earlier ‘science is 
currency’348 for political engagement in the ATCM, and is often utilised as a diplomatic tool for 
strengthening bilateral relations between states beyond their direct Antarctic collaboration.349 
Recalling Shadian’s comments regarding the EU’s success at being able to translate scientific research 
into policy recommendations and prescriptions350, and as a tool for challenging classical assumptions 
regarding state sovereignty, the EU’s contribution to Antarctic science research is a critical 
consideration for this research.    
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The introduction of strategic scientific engagement also highlights the EU ATCP’s use of EU 
opportunity structures to strengthen national positions regarding their own engagement in the 
Antarctic region. Furthermore, encouraged and deepened EU scientific engagement in the Antarctic, 
could afford it the opportunity to challenge prescriptions of actors in the ATS in the future. Meaning 
the EU’s direct presence in the Antarctic through its support of scientific research, could also afford it 
the opportunity for upgraded political engagement in the ATCM, in much the same way it has 
perused this engagement in the Arctic.  
 
EU member states with National Antarctic Programmes have been strategically opportunistic in their 
recent development of three large preliminary stage European projects, which seek to take 
advantage EU opportunity structures in the form of additional funding support to address their 
budgetary shortfalls. While these projects have been initiated at the domestic level and are not a 
result of any formal EU mandate for active role construction for increased political engagement in 
the Antarctic, they do fall into Polar research areas the EU has specifically targeted for research 
investment under its FPs, designed to complement its policy recommendations and engagement in 
the Arctic, and support its leadership role in wider global environmental discourse. Before these 
projects are examined, two bilateral infrastructural arrangements are introduced to illustrate the 
differing scope of international cooperation for Antarctic logistics and scientific research.  
 
 
 
European collaborative infrastructural arrangements   
 
 
A number of bilateral collaborative infrastructural and logistical arrangements exist between EU 
member states on the Antarctic continent. While the nature of operations in the Antarctic mean that 
cooperative arrangements on the continent are by no means limited to the relations between 
European National Antarctic Programmes, a long history of European collaboration for polar 
exploration and scientific research (facilitated in part by collaborative research organising bodies, 
such as the European Science Foundation(ESF)) has shown that the European states do tend to 
reflect more instances of joint arrangements for shared infrastructure and logistics facilities.351  
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This can also be attributed to the close proximity and concentration of European research activities 
around the Antarctic Peninsula and Dronning Maud Land, Antarctica, as a legacy of historic era 
activities on the Antarctic continent. While there are a number of bilateral relations relating to 
exchange of scientists between national polar programmes, and collaborative research programmes 
between members not facilitated by the ESF, this segment introduces three collaborative 
infrastructural arrangements to provide an overview of the differing scope of bilateral arrangements 
on the Antarctic continent.     
 
Since 1995, there has been a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom, for shared use of facilities at Rothera Research Station, Adelaide Island, 
Antarctica.352 The nature of this relationship developed because the Netherlands Polar Programme 
maintains a Dutch Government policy, to conduct scientific research in Antarctica without building its 
own national station. Therefore, the NPP’s science research is heavily dependent on the logistical 
support of other ATCPs, and they consider collaboration with the UK as being one of the most 
important partners for Antarctic research.353 In 2011, the NPP and the British Antarctic Survey (BAS), 
announced their extension and intensification of collaboration with the construction of a Dutch 
Science Facility (consisting of mobile laboratories) at Rothera Station, operational in December 
2012.354   
 
The Dronning Maud Land Air Network (DROMLAN) acts as “a Gateway to Antarctica for Research and 
Logistics”, and is a relatively new air network that facilitates communication and transportation of 
scientists between Cape Town and Antarctica, and between scientific research stations and field 
camps within Dronning Maud Land, Antarctica.355 This network was formerly established as an 
international project at the XIV COMNAP Meeting in Shanghai 2002, and is available as logistical 
support for any science-related activities of any member state of COMNAP (ATCPs) or SCAR 
(although consists significant356 The founding members of DROMLAN are Belgium, Finland, Germany, 
India, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.357    
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 European Polar Board  
 
 
Since 1974, many large European multinational scientific projects have been coordinated through the 
European Science Foundation (ESF), which consists of 78 member organisations across 30 countries 
“as an independent, non-governmental organisation dedicated to pan-European scientific 
networking and collaboration”.358 The ESF was intended to dictate the direction of the European 
Research Area (ERA) to garner greater leverage over the research budget of the EU. However, it was 
increasingly perceived as a “toothless tiger” amongst the research community, as the EU Commission 
has assumed this leading role (with advice from the European Heads of Research Councils - 
EUROHORC) through the considerable funding influence of the EU Commission Framework 
Programmes for Research and Technological Development (FPs).359 
 
The European Polar Board (EPB) was created in 1995 as a strategic advisory board of the ESF, with 
the intention of “facilitating cooperation and coordination between Directors and managers of 
national funded Polar Programmes with the aim of identifying and prioritising issues of Polar Science 
Strategy of common European interest and which add clear strategic value to the efforts of national 
programmes”.360 Like the ESF, the EPB is not limited to EU member states (unlike EUROHORC) and its 
main mission area is to “influence European Institutions (European Commission Services, European 
Parliament and important supranational actors) in regard to research investment and strategies in 
the Polar Regions..... and to facilit[ate] mechanisms for European level coordinated policy advice on 
research in the Polar Regions especially in relation to the European Commission”.361 
 
The value of science research for legitimising the EU’s normative role in global environmental 
discourse could be an incentive for the EU to deepen its strategic scientific engagement in the 
Antarctic. The 1987 European Parliament’s Report Doc.A2-101/87 “on the economic significance of 
Antarctica and the Antarctic Ocean”, implied that the ESF, in its attempts “to create a specifically 
European network for the exchange of scientific information from the Antarctic and the eventual 
conduct of scientific research projects”, could contribute to a Community accession to the Antarctic 
Treaty, and “urges all the Member States therefore to undertake and coordinate research activities 
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in the Antarctic and to cooperate with regard to the creation and use of the necessary logistical 
infrastructure”.362 As a consequence of the ESF’s active facilitation of European science research, and 
the ‘golden carrot’ of additional funding it affords participants, European Antarctic research 
programmes have arguably the greatest level of collaboration of all those programmes operative in 
Antarctica.363 
 
In keeping with this mission statement, the ESF and the EPB have facilitated several major polar 
projects with significant EU funding support, as outlined in further detail below. The EU’s strategic 
agenda towards the Arctic means that the Antarctic projects are typically designed to strengthen 
Polar research already carried out at the high North, but with the intention of contributing to 
increasing visibility and understanding on globally significant phenomenon such as anthropogenic 
climate change.  
 
 
European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica (EPICA) 
 
 
One of the ESF’s most successful and longest running Research Networking Programmes is the 
European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica (EPICA 1996-2006), coordinated under the EPB, and 
awarded the EU’s 2008 Descartes Prize for Collaborative, Transnational Research.364 EPICA was 
“motivated primarily by the urgent need to predict more accurately how global climate is likely to 
respond to increased emissions of greenhouse gases as a result of human activities”, and sought to 
achieve this by determining the nature and mechanisms of climate variability from analysing a full 
climate record of two Antarctic ice cores, which were then compared to earlier findings of Arctic ice 
cores taken from Greenland.365     
 
The project was considered one of the biggest tests of the ability for European researchers to 
cooperate in a large complex project, and was viewed as “an opportunity for them to consolidate this 
as a basis for an emerging European network for Antarctic and Arctic activities”.366 More than forty 
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percent of the project was funded from the EU Commission’s Fourth Framework Programme, and 
supplemented by national contributions from the participant institutions of Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.367  
 
The project even resulted in the construction of shared French-Italian Antarctic base, Concordia 
Station, which provided logistical support to the EPICA scientists, and is an element of the EPB’s 
continued “high-level European Strategic framework for science and operational capabilities in the 
Polar Regions”.368   
 
 
EUROPOLAR ERA-NET / European Polar Consortium (EPC) 
 
 
The EUROPOLAR ERA-NET / European Polar Consortium (2005-2009), was a 4-year project 
established under the EPB as a French Institut Polaire Paul Emile Victor (IPEV) initiated and 
coordinated high-level European strategic framework for collaborative science and operational 
capabilities in the Polar Regions.369 The €2.48 million Consortium was funded from the EU 
Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme (FP6), under its indentified key polar research activities, 
to achieve coherence between European polar research activities that would improve the use of the 
national polar research infrastructures and human, technological and financial resources.370 
 
The project is to date “the most significant coordination of the European management of polar 
research ever attempted”, as it brought together 25 ministries, funding agencies and national polar 
RTD authorities across 19 European countries, including non-EU member-states Norway and the 
Russian Federation.371 A key objective of the project was to deepen and strengthen interactions 
between European states with larger Polar programmes, and those states from central and south-
eastern Europe that are developing programmes, to encourage an exchange of experiences for best 
practice on management and financing logistics operations and infrastructure.372  
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The Consortium was intended to gradually integrate the national polar programmes of the 
participant states (simply noting support for closer relations with Russian programme managers), 
from an initial platform for collaborative research and information exchange to eventual operation of 
shared facilities and the “optimisation of a combined annual budget of around €500 million”.373 The 
ESF, the EPB, and the project’s French creators, hoped that in the long-term the Consortium would 
“act as the first phase of a European Polar Programme”.374 They hoped this project would develop 
into a European polar entity capable of acting as the main funding and decision-making forum for all 
European polar research, which would in turn “provide an important advisory role over the next 
decade for both national governments and European policy developers” on prioritised political 
agenda issues such as climate change.375   
 
While the Consortium project culminated in June 2009 by achieving a Joint Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) for a ‘European Polar Framework’ for closer research cooperation, the project 
will not achieve its long-term goal of further programme amalgamation, as larger national 
programmes are reluctant to compromise the independence of their own operations.376 Some 
national programme managers believe that further pooling funding resources is inefficient because 
the practice fails to incorporate any added value as resources largely come from national 
contributions, and additional overhead expenses resulting from the need for increased 
administration makes research unnecessarily expensive.377 As national programmes differ 
considerably in size and structure (for example, the German, Dutch and British programmes both 
employ their logistical support staff and scientists, but the French programme consist purely of 
logistical support staff and therefore command significantly smaller budgets by default of their 
operational mandates) resulting in disproportionate contribution to multinational projects based on 
the comparative budgets of each national programme.378  
 
This also means that during the process of programme integration, funding opportunities become 
disproportionately competitive for those scientists that rely on direct funding from within their 
national institutions.379 When this is coupled with extra administrative costs for funding distribution, 
competing national agendas for prioritised polar research, and the potential for a perceived loss of 
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legitimacy for political deliberation on polar issues, complete programme amalgamation under a 
European Polar Entity was an unpopular policy.380   
 
Critics believe that the long-term goals of the Consortium were not designed for the benefit of polar 
research, but instead based on a political agenda to ensure the continued relevance and funding 
support of the ESF and EPB when their existential mandates were under review in the late 2000’s.381  
This political agenda is also purportedly the reason for the preliminary development of two other 
significant European projects, ERICON AURORA BOREALIS and EuroANDRILL, which have also failed to 
garner enough national funding support to ensure their full implementation. A critical consideration 
for France’s push for EUROPOLAR ERA-NET, could in part be attributed to its will to keep the now 
defunct ESF (as a European institution) in Strassbourg, rather than losing another essentially EU 
institution to Brussels. 
 
Due to the declining relevance of the ESF, a new legal entity called Science Europe was formally 
founded on 21st October 2011 in Brussels, which merges the ESF and its Committees with 
EUROHORCs, to avoid unnecessary duplication of European science research and competition over 
funding.382 The ESF’s Boards are not automatically assumed into the structure of Science Europe, and 
since the EU Commission’s priorities for polar funding under FP8 are still under consideration, the 
future of European Polar Board and its collaborative projects have yet to be decided upon.383 The 
French strategy to create a European Polar Entity could have been an attempt to refocus EU polar 
research funding towards the Antarctic, at a time when Arctic research is prioritised.384 Furthermore, 
this might have also been a way for France not to lose another EU institution to Brussels, especially 
one that commands a research budget as significant as the EFS/EPB.   
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ERICON AURORA BOREALIS  
 
 
The €4.5 million European Polar Research Icebreaker Consortium ERICON AURORA BOREALIS (2008-
2012) is a coordination project for the development of a world-class European icebreaker vessel, 
capable of dedicated year-round research operations in the Arctic and Southern Oceans.385 The 
Aurora Borealis has been designed to be the most advanced research vessel in the world, and is 
considered to be vital marine infrastructure for polar research and a core element of Europe’s wider 
strategic research framework.386 The project is currently in the preparatory phase, with the EPB 
maintaining coordination of the financial, structural, legal and organisational framework between 16 
partner institutions across 10 European states including Germany, Finland, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, 
Italy, Romania, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Russia.387 
 
The earliest proposal and feasibility study undertaken for a European icebreaker research vessel 
actually originated from a German initiative in early 2000, and continued coordination towards vessel 
design was assumed by the EPB in 2005, in conjunction with Germany’s Alfred Wagner Institute for 
Polar and Marine Research (AWI).388 The ERICON AB project was then initiated at the European level 
with the EPB in 2008, with funding support for the preparatory phase provided as part of the 
implementation of the European Strategy Forum on Research Infrastructures (ESFRI) roadmap 
projects under FP7, as the proposed objectives aligned with the EU’s Commission’s key polar 
research activities.389  
 
The EPB maintains that construction of the Aurora Borealis will promote the strategic agenda of the 
European Research Area, and act for the continued achievement of the science policy objectives 
outlined from the EUROPOLAR ERA-NET MOU.390 The Aurora Borealis is specifically mentioned as a 
proposal for action in the EU Commission Communication Paper COM(2008)763 “The European 
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Union and the Arctic Region”, as a means to provide Europe with the capacity to launch autonomous 
scientific investigations on the Arctic environment, identified as an EU priority area for research that 
acts as a basis for further political engagement in the Arctic Council.391  
 
Despite the probability of continued EU funding support for operational costs under Horizon2020, 
the project is unlikely to move into the implementation phase due to shortfalls in construction 
funding contributions from national operators. Germany was willing to contribute 30% of the 
construction costs of the vessel, but in light of waning interest on the part of other ERICON AB 
participants, it has since recommitted this funding to updating its independent national research 
infrastructure by replacing the German research icebreaker PolarStern.392  
 
 
EuroANDRILL  
 
 
EuroANDRILL continues the ESF’s climate-themed Antarctic research as a coordinated project of the 
EPB, and “is a new initiative to create a European network with the goal to increase future 
involvement of European countries in the Antarctic Geological Drilling Programme (ANDRILL)”.393 The 
ANDRILL project itself was initially started as a multinational project consisting of 200 scientists, 
students and educators from Germany, Italy, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. EuroANDRILL’s implementation is also pending funding allocation under the EU’s developing 
Horizon2020 programme (2013-2020).  
 
EuroANDRILL aims to increase the participation of European scientists in the wider ANDRILL project, 
and provide strong European leadership and/or logistical support. It introduces scientists from seven 
additional European states, including Belgium, Finland, France, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and The 
Netherlands.394 The project provides a good example of how EU funding incentivises a deepened and 
coordinated European approach to scientific research in Antarctica. National scientists from the 
newer collaborative states could have negotiated to join the consortium on an individual basis, yet 
they found it more feasible to do so via a coordinated approach and resource support of the EU.  
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EuroANDRILL has a more positive outlook for inception, as it resonates with key European Research 
Area (ERA) objectives, in its aim to “establish Europe as a key player in future polar sediment and 
rock drilling”.395   
 
 
 
4.5 Upgrading the EU’s ‘actorness’ in the ATS  
 
 
Despite the contemporary international system challenging Westphalian structural conceptions of 
states as exclusive actors and subjects of international law from the mid-twentieth century 
onwards,396 Chapter Three’s examination of the ATS has shown that the treaty regime is still very 
much centred on perceived Westphalian assumptions of the international system. Remarkably, this 
perception remains irrespective of the EU’s direct membership in the CCAMLR fisheries mechanism, 
and after the EU usurped the EC’s legal personality with the Lisbon Treaty’s entrance into force. 
Therefore, despite the EU itself now possessing a single legal personality that allows for its 
ascendancy to a number of international conventions, the EU simply could not sign the Antarctic 
Treaty or its Environmental Protocol as it cannot strictly be defined or recognised as a state.     
 
However, as the Constructivist framework of this dissertation has shown, the EU does act in state-like 
manner in many aspects of its external relations, and continues to challenge structural conceptions 
of international relations. This segment explores the over-arching research question of this thesis, to 
illustrate how the EU can upgrade its role in ATS to further legitimise a strategic agenda for 
recognition as a global political actor. First, advantages and disadvantages of upgraded EU scientific 
and political engagement are explored.   
  
 
Advantages, disadvantages, and opportunities 
 
 
Any upgrade to the EU’s scientific and political engagement in the ATS would be characterised by 
advantages and disadvantages. National strategic agenda also utilises opportunity structures created 
by the EU’s active engagement in Antarctic science research. As noted in Chapter Three, the driving 
incentive for European states to dedicate significant time for coordination of large scale polar 
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research projects (to date facilitated by the EPB), is deemed a worthwhile task based primarily on the 
opportunity for significant amounts of supplementary funding.    
 
Non-EU ATCPs can also benefit from increased EU scientific engagement and associated funding. 
Large multi-national research projects like ANDRILL would not only benefit from additional scientific 
expertise that EUROANDRILL could contribute, but additional funding from the EU adds a security 
dimension to the project which could lessen the impact of sudden budgetary cuts to national 
research programmes. Deepened EU scientific engagement and the complementary increase in 
available research and logistics funding, could act as buffer for shortfalls in national contributions to 
operations and logistics during times of financial hardship. In the mid-2000s, Italy’s severe budget 
shortfalls for its Antarctic programme meant that it could not contribute its share of flights to the 
Ross Dependency, Antarctica, as part of its agreement within the United States-New Zealand-Italian 
logistics pool.397 To avoid significant disruption to ongoing scientific research programmes and base 
support, the US programme was required to fill the shortfall as New Zealand’s significantly smaller 
National Antarctic Programme was unable to proportionally increase its contribution.      
 
An increase in the number of European researchers on internationally collaborative projects, or an 
increase in the number of collaborative projects themselves, can also contribute to an increase the 
research validity and dissemination of information from Antarctic scientific research in general.  
Moreover, deepened research collaboration reduces costs by streamlining resource allocation, 
avoiding unnecessary duplication of research (that would otherwise be conducted independently at 
the national level) and limit disturbance to the Antarctic environment.   
 
An upgrade to the EU’s political engagement in the ATCM could also have positive and negative 
implications. An upgrade to the EU’s actorness in the ATS could be characterised as it has been 
praised and criticised for in CCAMLR. Disadvantages regarding the EU’s potential to become an ATCP, 
stem from criticisms over its competence for external representation in other international fora to 
date. The EU is often critiqued for lacking negotiating flexibility within international arenas, as most 
policy concessions have already been made by member states during rigorous internal negotiations 
intended to formulate a coherent EU approach on specific issues.  
 
As the ATS is a system that operates by consensus, this could be problematic during deliberation 
particularly for issues that need immediate attention, as stiff positions could prolong (or even 
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stagnate) the decision-making process.  Conversely, because policy-making concessions have been 
made prior to reaching the external arena, the EU and its member states come to the negotiating 
table with clear positions. This means non-EU Parties can prepare themselves of 
conforming/contesting rationales of member states by following internal EU negotiations through 
institutional information made publically available, and in part uncover the extent of the EU’s 
negotiating flexibility on specific issues.  
 
An EU ‘seat’, might serve to negatively politicise the Antarctic region or ‘water-down’ the 
effectiveness of the ATS, as those EU member states that are have no specific interest in the 
Antarctic would then have an indirect influence over the function and substance of political 
deliberation within the ATCM. Conversely, as the EU has shown with CCAMLR, the EU has the legal 
authority to ensure its member states confirm to the prescriptions and regulations of these legal 
instruments, without being direct Contracting Parties themselves. The EU’s influence over its 
member states can project the normative objectives of the ATS onto non-Parties, which ultimately 
serves to further legitimise the work of the ATS as a regional governance mechanism. Furthermore, it 
can encourage its member states that are currently non-Parties to accede to the Antarctic Treaty and 
Environmental Protocol in their own right.   
 
However, what would be the point of direct EU accession if member states are able to pass on the 
EU’s normative prescriptions indirectly, through the process of Europeanisation of Antarctic-related 
foreign policy? As exemplified during the development of the Environmental Protocol and the 
utilisation of scientific diplomacy, the EU and its member states could actively construct a role for the 
EU as an acceding Party in its own right, should they perceive an opportunity to advance their 
strategic interests in the region. The Falkland Islands/ Las Islas Malvinas issue exemplifies the use of a 
political opportunity structure that has drawn an EU political presence further south, which might act 
for deepened EU engagement in the region in the future.  
 
Despite the United Kingdom typically acting as a ‘laggard’ in the process of European integration,398 
in May 2010, the United Kingdom was the first EU member state to reference the EU’s ‘Mutual 
Solidarity Clause’ formalised in the Lisbon Treaty, to reassert a national sovereign right to access the 
resources of an Overseas Territory.399 The Falkland / Malvinas issue had become heated again as a 
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British Company Rockhopper Exploration “indicated an oil discovery” in the North Falkland Island 
Basin that resulted in urged calls from the Argentine President to reopen bilateral discussions over 
the sovereignty of the Islands.400 British Foreign Office Minister Jeremy Browne was quick to respond 
“that there cannot be negotiation on sovereignty unless and until the Falkland Islanders so wish. The 
Lisbon Treaty clearly reaffirms the EU position that the Falkland Islands is an Overseas Territory of 
the United Kingdom”.401  
 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, member states commit themselves to: 
 
 “act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the 
victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its 
disposal, including military resources made available by the Member States, to:  
 
- Prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; 
- Protect the democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;  
- Assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a 
terrorist attack.402 
 
If the Falkland Islands debate further escalates into another physical conflict involving armed 
aggression from Argentina, this provision in effect means that Argentina would be facing the 
combined defensive resources of all 27 EU member-states, not just those of the United Kingdom. 
While the administration of the Falkland Islands is now considered legally separate from the 
Antarctic, they did form part of the United Kingdom’s 1908 Letters Patent as the original registration 
of its claim to the British Antarctic Territory, along with the South Georgia and South Sandwich 
Islands.403 Therefore the holding of the Falkland, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, still form 
the legitimate basis of its Antarctic claim, as the British Antarctic Territory remains contested by the 
Antarctic claims of Argentina and Chile (albeit held in abeyance by the Antarctic Treaty).404 
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Should the Falkland Islands conflict reignite and potentially spill-over to UK-Argentine contested 
territory (and resources) in the Antarctic, the use of the mutual solidarity clause in the Falkland 
Islands might serve as a precedent for collective EU protection of the British Antarctic Territory and 
the scientists who are resident within it. Similarly, the same logic could be applied to the French 
Southern and Antarctic Territories (TAAF), which are also formally recognised alongside British 
Antarctic Territory and the Falkland Islands, as Overseas Countries and Territories of the European 
Union under Annex II of the Lisbon Treaty.405 
 
Furthermore, the mutual solidarity clause also acts for unified response to “assist a member state in 
its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made 
disaster”, and “The European Council shall regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to 
enable the Union and its Member States to take effective action”.406 This provision could provide the 
EU the opportunity to construct for itself an upgraded role for direct political engagement in the 
ATCM, if member states deem that action is required to combat threats identified inline the 
International Identity of the EU (EUII), for example the threat of climate change.407 This case 
exemplifies how the utilisation of opportunity structures afforded by EU membership and Antarctic 
engagement could further strategic interests of both the EU and its member states.      
 
 
How can an upgraded permanent role be achieved? 
 
 
Because the EU is not a state, and therefore was not able to enter into CRAMRA negotiations or 
accede to the Antarctic Treaty when the European Parliament expressed an interest on behalf of the 
Community to do so in the late 1980s, ATS officials perceive that the prescriptions of the ATS have 
been enough to deter a bid for EU accession in the past and will likely prevent it from doing so in the 
foreseeable future.408 Furthermore, the EU has expressed little interest in the economic resources of 
the Antarctic in the period since (aside from fisheries), leading ATCP’s to dismiss any potential EU 
interest in direct engagement in Antarctic governance, because under Rationalist assumptions there 
are few resources that the EU could want to pursue under the guise of direct accession.  
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These perceptions fail to account for the EU’s pursuit of upgraded normative political engagement in 
international relations, exemplified by its leadership role in global environmental discourse, which in 
turn has provided the EU the opportunity to also challenge the structural conceptions of 
international relations. As science diplomacy legitimises the EU’s prescriptive normative 
recommendations in the climate change regime, thus reinforcing its global actorness, the EU could 
pursue an upgraded direct role in the ATCM, incentivised by the notion that this membership would 
further support recognition of the EU as a global actor accepted for its normative influence in global 
environmental discourse.    
 
In 2008, Antarctic scholar Gianfranco Tamburelli aptly noted that while the EC’s exclusion may have 
been justified during adoption of the Environmental Protocol, it should now be reviewed as the EU’s 
supranational dimension is an important and increasing trend for scientific research funding and 
collaborative engagement between states involved in the Antarctic.409 Moreover, the EU now 
maintains mixed competence over a wide scope of policy areas which allow for its direct 
participation in an increasing number of international fora, particularly those relating to conservation 
and environmental protection.  
 
In keeping with this statement, this dissertation argues that if the EU’s legal structure and 
constitutional processes during the early 1990s did not allow for its accession to the Antarctic Treaty 
or the Environmental Protocol, institutional developments and changing negotiating competences 
within the EU in the period since, could be utilised by the EU to actively pursue permanent 
membership in the ATCM as a Contracting Party in its own right. However, any upgraded role with 
the aim of direct EU ascendency would require challenging the Westphalian structural conceptions of 
the ATS. 
 
Following the Contracting Party provisions under Antarctic Treaty Article XIII, the EU would need to 
fulfil a number of criteria for direct ascendency. First and foremost, the EU would need to be 
perceived to act like a state in international relations, to challenge the structural conceptions of the 
ATS. Second, the EU would need to be a Member of the United Nations; or be invited to accede to 
the Antarctic Treaty with the consent of all Contracting Parties that are ATCPs. Third, the EU would 
need to ensure it can ratify that international convention in accordance with its constitutional 
processes. Fourth, not directly prescribed by the Antarctic Treaty but inherently associated with 
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these criteria, is the unequivocal support the EU would require of its member states, especially those 
that are ATCPs. Under current conditions, the EU does not meet all of these criteria.  
 
Under Constructivist conceptions, the EU’s constitutional processes possess a number of 
characteristics which could allow for its accession to the Antarctic Treaty and the Environmental 
Protocol. The EU’s legal personality confers it with the competence to act like a state for its external 
relations, including detailed internal prescriptions for the clarification of mixed negotiating 
competences between the EU and its member states in their external representation, and provisions 
pertaining to responsibility for liability when the EU and its member states are both Contracting 
Parties to the respective international legal instrument.410 
 
As illustrated in Chapters Two and Three, the process of European integration has evolved the EU 
into an entity which has exemplified a capacity for actorness in international relations that continues 
to challenge normative and structural conceptions of the international system. Recently, this has 
allowed for the EU’s successful construction of a new non-state participatory category for an 
upgraded role in the process of global political deliberation as an Enhanced Observer in the UNGA, 
characterised by a unique complement of rights and privileges.411 The EU could attempt to upgrade 
its political engagement in the ATS, by lobbying for the construction of a new non-state participant 
category that could allow it the same participant rights and privileges as an ATNCP. This could be 
achieved through a revision in the ATCM Rules of Procedure, in a similar way to how the provisions 
for upgrading ATCNPs to ATCPs occurred in the 1970s, and how ATNCPs achieved ATCM participatory 
privileges in the 1980s.  
 
This approach would remove any controversial attempt to directly amend the Contracting Party 
provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, and would result in EU participation in the decision-making 
process and a normative influence in Antarctic political deliberation, without pursuing voting rights 
(that would likely be as problematic as a proposing a Treaty amendment). In this instance, the fact 
that ATCPs and ATCNPs are explicitly referred to as Contracting Parties, rather than Contracting 
States, could work in favour of such a proposal. The EU’s history of active scientific research in the 
Antarctic, and its (for the most part) positively regarded actorness in CCAMLR to date, could 
compliment an active pursuit for this role construction.     
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However, to what extent the EU might be successful at achieving a potential upgraded role is likely to 
remain limited, and dependent on the will of all EU member states and all ATCPs. Should the EU (via 
its member states) decide to pursue an upgraded role in the politics of the ATS, this pursuit would be 
completely dependent on the EU and its member states working together in a hybrid system for their 
external relations towards the Antarctic. This is necessary for several reasons.  
 
Before the EU could construct a proposal for direct accession, its member states would have to agree 
internally to grant the EU Commission the actor capability to commence negotiations and decision-
making on behalf of the EU. The EU Commission would require internal authorisation in the form of a 
Council mandate, which would grant it the authority to conduct negotiations and accede to the 
Antarctic Treaty and the Environmental Protocol on behalf of the EU.412 This mandate would also EU 
ATCPs to table a Working Paper to the ATCM (drafted by the EU Commission) formally proposing the 
EU’s accession, following the ATCM Rules of Procedure.  
 
The EU ATCPs would then be required to actively lobby for unanimous support of all ATCPs, so 
consensus could be reached in the ATCM to allow for the EU’s accession as a Contracting Party and 
the associated proposed revisions to the ATCM Rule of Procedure. Like the EU, the evolution of the 
ATS is also shaped by elite socialisation, as the restricted scale of Antarctic related activities results in 
repeated contact of diplomats and officials from states and observing institutions and organisations 
over a number of years, and as earlier career scientists prior to their official roles.413 Repeated 
engagement of elites would certainly serve to benefit any attempts of EU ATCPs to lobby on behalf of 
the EU.   
 
As there has been no internal debate within the EU illustrating an interest in upgrading its direct 
political engagement in the ATS, the EU’s actor capability for a direct participatory role in the ATS 
simply does not exist beyond the EU’s executive competence in CCAMLR. Meaning under current 
circumstances, the EU could not accede to the Antarctic Treaty or its Environmental Protocol, 
irrespective of its potential to challenge the structural conceptions of the ATS. Therefore, this 
research indicates that for the foreseeable future the EU’s presence in the ATCM is likely to remain 
limited indirect, as normative influence through the Europeanisation of its member states foreign 
policies regarding the Antarctic. A normative influence in the ATS from Europeanisation could 
provide the EU with the opportunity for upgraded direct political engagement in the ATCM in the 
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future. In this instance, evolving internal policy developments could confer the EU with the capability 
for a direct presence in the ATS, particularly on issues of the environment as this aligns with the EU’s 
active construction of its international identity.414 
 
Had EUROPOLAR ERA-NET and ERICON AROURA BOREALLIS been successful at garnering enough 
support to be implemented beyond their preparatory phases and develop into a European Polar 
Programme, this would have served to increase the EU’s presence on the Antarctic continent. 
Following ATS prescriptions, this could act as ‘science is currency’ and contribute to positive 
perceptions of the EU actorness in the region, which could also afford the EU the opportunity to 
construct for itself a permanent role in the ATCM. Should the EU actively choose to construct for 
itself a role in Antarctic political deliberation, it could challenge perceptions of actorness in the ATS. 
However, this would be dependent on the will of member states, and to what extent they might 
want to pursue opportunity structures afforded by upgraded EU scientific and political engagement 
in the Antarctic as a complement to their national strategic agenda for the region.  
 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has sought combine theoretical and empirical evidence provided by previous chapters, 
to examine how the EU could upgrade its role in the ATS to further legitimise a strategic agenda for 
recognition as a global political actor. It concludes that that irrespective of evidence supporting EU 
direct accession to the Antarctic Treaty and its Environmental Protocol based on the EU’s ability to 
challenge structural conceptions of international relations, the EU would not be able to achieve such 
a feat under current perceptions.  
 
Consequently, the EU’s influence in Antarctic political deliberation for the time being is likely to 
remain indirect and normative, through the Europeanisation of EU member-states foreign policies 
with respect to Antarctic issues. However, this does not exclude the future possibility that the EU 
could actively seek to construct for itself an upgraded role in the ATCM/CEP. The opportunity for an 
increased political presence could be afforded in instances where EU member states seek to take 
advantage of political opportunity structures provided by EU membership and Antarctic scientific and 
political engagement, to further their own strategic agendas. In this instance, policy areas in which 
the EU’s competence affords it external representation on matters under the jurisdiction of the ATS 
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(for example those where the EU is looking to construct an international identity, such as 
environmental issues), could be reconstructed to upgrade the EU’s political engagement in the ATS.  
 
For the time being, the EU’s continued facilitation of active scientific research in Antarctica can 
contribute to the fulfilment of the EU’s wider objective for further legitimising its actorness in the 
international community, based on its normative role in global environmental discourse. As this is 
achieved by the EU translating its support of polar science into policy prescriptions for global issues 
such as climate change, the EU is likely to deepen its Antarctic scientific engagement through 
increased funding for collaborate research in the region.  
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Chapter Five:  
Conclusion  
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
 
This thesis has aimed to address a gap in the academic literature on the EU as a global actor in 
international relations by investigating the EU’s scientific and political engagement in the Antarctic. It 
has primarily sought to examine how the EU could upgrade its direct engagement in the ATS, as a 
means to further legitimise an agenda for recognition as a global political actor based on an 
environmental international identity, which could further support the EU’s pending application for 
Permanent Observer status in the Arctic Council.      
 
To contextualise and support the overarching key research question, this thesis has also examined 
several sub-questions which were designed to complement the flow of analysis across the central 
hypothesis, and form the broader research themes of this research. This conclusion chapter revisits 
the development of research within this thesis, by reviewing the research question and sub-
questions in preparation for the final summation of findings. Finally, limitations are examined to 
comment on the adequacy of the theoretical framework of analysis, and recommendations for future 
research are outlined which could add to academic literature on the EU’s scientific and political 
engagement in the Antarctic.    
 
 
5.2 Research Questions  
 
 
Chapter Two of this thesis formed the Constructivist theoretical framework of analysis through the 
examination of two sub-questions. This literature review explored why institutional changes within 
the EU are changing the way that it participates in international relations, to form a broader research 
theme which outlined how the EU can be conceptualised as a global political actor. It was identified 
that the process of European integration is changing the way that the EU conducts its external 
relations, and has afforded the EU actor capacity (actorness) for direct political engagement in 
international relations, beyond its original presence as an REIO.    
 
Chapter Three sought to move beyond theoretical explanations for EU actorness in international 
relations by examining empirical evidence for EU actorness in the Polar Regions within three sub-
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questions. It began by illustrating how the EU has exhibited qualities of actorness in global 
environmental discourse, with reference to its leadership role in the global climate change regime. In 
doing so this chapter demonstrated that the EU’s active pursuit of normative engagement in this 
area has afforded the EU with the capability to challenge structural conceptions of actors in 
international relations. This normative agenda has in turn provided the EU with the opportunity to 
pursue increased direct engagement in areas which align with strategic agenda for recognition as a 
global actor, in addition to resource security.  
 
This summary was supported by evidence of the EU’s utilisation of rhetoric which touts a normative 
agenda for a permanent role in the Arctic Council, which would provide the EU with a direct input 
into the forum that sets sustainable development agenda in the Arctic. This example further served 
to illustrate that the EU’s internal processes allow for actor capability to be constructed or 
reconstructed to take advantage of opportunities for increased direct presence as a political actor in 
its own right. This chapter then posited that the EU could also utilise similar approach and actively 
purse upgraded political engagement in the ATS, which could further serve to complement its 
recognition as a global actor, and support its normative prescriptions for sustainable development 
and environmental protection in the Arctic.  
 
Before the realities of this question were analysed in Chapter Four, the remainder of Chapter Three 
examined what has characterised the EU’s direct political engagement in the ATS to date, including 
how the EU has exhibited qualities of actorness in the ATCM and CCAMLR institutional arrangements. 
Perceptions of the EU’s actorness in CCAMLR were explored, which were designed to incorporate 
issues which have highlighted both the positive and negative aspects of direct EU engagement in the 
ATS to date. The research process into the EU’s direct attendance at the SATCM series that 
developed the Environmental Protocol uncovered a phenomenon not included as part of the original 
design of this thesis.  
 
Chapter Four investigated two sub-questions regarding this phenomenon, which explored evidence 
of Europeanisation of foreign policy towards the Antarctic, and how the EU and its member states 
have utilised opportunity structures afforded by Antarctic scientific and political engagement to 
further their own strategic agendas. This analysis found that the internal processes of the EU (as a 
consequence of European integration) had an institutional influence over the foreign policies of its 
member states, which ultimately resulted in a normative contribution to the development of the 
Environmental Protocol and an indirect EU influence at that time.  
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Furthermore, the member states’ active pursuit of opportunity structures afforded by the Antarctic 
engagement and EU institutional membership, are still evident through the construction of large 
scale European collaborative research projects in Antarctica funded by EU Commission research 
framework programmes. While some of the more ambitious and recent projects are unlikely to move 
beyond their preparatory phases, should the EU direct more of its research funding towards the 
Antarctic, a physical presence from deepened scientific engagement could provide the EU an 
opportunity to construct for itself a role in Antarctic political deliberation. Finally, this chapter 
explored how the EU could seek to upgrade its role in the ATS as a Contracting Party to the Antarctic 
Treaty and the Environmental Protocol in its own right. 
  
 
5.3 Contribution to the literature  
 
 
This thesis research has uncovered four key findings from analysis into the EU’s scientific and political 
engagement in the Antarctic that contribute to academic literature on the EU as a global actor in 
international relations. Within these key findings, there was a recurring theme that emerged, which 
has typified perceptions of EU actorness in international relations emerging in literature, and for 
which the Lisbon Treaty was in part designed to address. This includes evidence that the external 
implications of European integration and the internal processes of the EU are misunderstood in 
relation to their potential relevance to the Antarctic, exemplified by EU-authorised Portuguese 
fishing within CCAMLR’s jurisdiction in Chapter Three. The disregard of any potential deepened EU 
engagement in the ATS could be the cause or effect of the significant gap of academic literature on 
the EU’s scientific and political engagement in the Antarctic, for which this thesis research has sought 
to address. The four key findings are as follows: 
 
 
(i) Conceptualised under a Constructivist framework, the EU could challenge structural conceptions of 
the ATS, should it actively decide to do so. 
 
Despite the EU’s new legal personality and diplomacy after the Lisbon Treaty’s entrance into force, 
the EU still cannot be defined as a state. Therefore, the EU cannot accede to the Antarctic Treaty or 
its Environmental Protocol, as it is simply cannot fulfil the Contractual Party requirement to be state. 
However, the EU’s newly imposed state-like legal personality does allow for the EU itself to become a 
contracting party to international treaties, particularly when these treaties converge with policy 
areas identified to be strategically important to the EU, such as environmental protection.   
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The EU has the legal personality and constitutional process which would allow for direct accession to 
the Antarctic Treaty, but it lacks any visible intention to pursue any upgrade to its Antarctic political 
engagement. Furthermore, its leadership role in the development of the climate change regime, its 
actorness in global environmental discourse, and its active role construction for upgraded 
participation in the UNGA and its (as yet unsuccessful) permanent role in the Arctic Council, support 
the argument for the EU being able to challenge structural conceptions of the ATS. Here, the EU has 
exemplified that it has the capacity to challenge the conception of actors in the international arena. 
 
However, the EU lacks an essential quality of actorness which is critical for the active construction of 
a permanent role for itself within the politics of the ATCM – actor capability. Therefore the EU is 
unlikely to be able to accede as a Contracting Party, despite having the potential to achieve this 
should it decide to do so. The EU’s pursuit would be completely dependent on the EU and its 
member states working together in a hybrid system in their external relations towards the Antarctic. 
 
 
(ii) Under current circumstances, the EU could not accede to the Antarctic Treaty or its Environmental 
Protocol, irrespective of its potential to challenge structural conceptions of the ATS.  
 
Upgrading the EU’s role in the ATS for increased political participation in the ATCM is unlikely to 
occur under current conditions despite the EU having the potential to challenge conceptions of 
actors in the ATS should it actively decide to do so. Analysis and direct observation of the ATS has 
indicated that the mechanism operates Rationalist assumptions, meaning structural conceptions of 
actors in this system remain wholly influenced by Westphalian constructions of state actors in 
international relations. This perception of the ATS underestimates the potential for the EU actorness 
in the ATS, as it fails to properly account for the EU’s developing political role in international 
relations resulting from deeper European integration.   
 
In the current climate, there is little room for challenging the structural perceptions of the ATS by 
proposing EU accession. However, this does not limit the fact that unforeseen circumstances might 
provide the EU and its member states with an opportunity to construct actor capability to pursue 
accession in the future. This opportunity could be afforded by the EU and its member states looking 
to utilise Antarctic scientific and political engagement for their own strategic agendas.  
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(iii) There is a visible history of both the EU and EU ATCPs utilising Antarctic engagement to achieve 
wider strategic agenda beyond Antarctic.  
 
 
Both the EU and EU ATCPs have a history of utilising opportunity structures afforded by their 
respective Antarctic engagement (scientific and political) for their own strategic agendas. This 
conclusion was supported by analysis into the development of the Environmental Protocol, and three 
large scale collaborative European research projects in Antarctica. As noted with the Falkland Islands 
example, the utilisation of these opportunities could provide the EU with the opportunity to 
construct for itself a role as a Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty and the Environmental 
Protocol in the future.  
 
 
(iv) For the time being, any upgrade to the EU’s engagement in the Antarctic is likely to remain 
indirect, through deepened scientific presence on the Antarctic continent and a normative political 
influence through the Europeanisation of its member states foreign policies within the ATCM.  
 
However, this does not exclude the future possibility that the EU could actively seek to construct for 
itself an upgraded role in the ATCM/CEP. The opportunity for an increased political presence could 
be afforded in instances where EU member states seek to take advantage of political opportunity 
structures provided by EU membership and Antarctic scientific and political engagement, to further 
their own strategic agendas. In this instance, policy areas in which the EU’s competence affords it 
external representation on matters under the jurisdiction of the ATS (for example those where the 
EU is looking to construct an international identity, such as environmental issues), could be 
reconstructed to upgrade the EU’s political engagement in the ATS.  
 
For the time being, the EU’s continued facilitation of active scientific research in Antarctica can 
contribute to the fulfilment of the EU’s wider objective for further legitimising its actorness in the 
international community, based on its normative role in global environmental discourse. As this is 
achieved by the EU translating its support of polar science into policy prescriptions for global issues 
such as climate change, the EU is likely to deepen its Antarctic scientific engagement through 
increased funding for collaborate research in the region.  
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5.3 Limitations and recommendations for future research 
 
 
The contemporary nature of this research topic has been a significant limitation which has ultimately 
impacted on the strength of conclusions within this thesis. Despite European Community’s direct 
engagement in the ATS from early 1980s within the CCAMLR fisheries mechanism, and literature 
examining the EU as a global actor emerging in the mid-1990s, the EU has only truly sought to 
upgrade its direct political participation in international fora in the period since 2009. Furthermore, 
the EU’s creation of a new participant category that upgraded its role in the UNGA for its 
representation to equal its competence was recently achieved in mid-2011, meaning this post-Lisbon 
upgrade for political actorness in a global forum was relatively new and not yet formalised during the 
interview stages of this research.  
 
A Constructivist theoretical framework was deemed adequate to examine the scope of EU actorness 
in international fora comparative to state actors, and to justify the EU’s potential accession to the 
Antarctic Treaty and the Environmental Protocol based on its ability to challenge structural 
conceptions of international relations. However, over the course of this research it became obvious 
from interviews and direct observations of the ATCM, that the formal political arena of the ATS 
remained highly politicised along national lines, with perceptions of actors firmly conceptualised 
within Positivist assumptions of state actors. 
 
Therefore, while the EU has gained for itself a legal personality and potential actor capacity in the 
form of a new type of EU diplomacy, the EU could only hope to challenge the Westphalian 
perceptions of the ATS in the future, as it would not be likely to garner full consensus of ATCPs 
necessary to accede to the Antarctic Treaty or its Environmental Protocol under contemporary 
perceptions. In this instance a Constructivist approach remained apt, as it has illustrated how little is 
understood about the wider implications of deepened European integration for international 
relations, and the potential impacts this has for scientific and political engagement in the Antarctic.  
 
This theoretical framework also allowed for the supplementary analysis of a phenomenon 
unaccounted for within the initial research design of this thesis. While the process of Europeanisation 
is not unique to the EU’s member states engagement regarding the Antarctic, foreign policy 
Europeanisation acts as an indirect or normative EU influence in the ATS. This normative influence 
could ultimately provide the EU the opportunity to challenge structural conceptions of the ATS, and 
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act as a precursor for increased direct presence in Antarctic political deliberation in a similar manner 
to its engagement in global environmental discourse, and the climate change regime.    
 
In working to address the gap in the literature on the EU as a global actor through the examination of 
its scientific and political engagement in the Antarctic, this research has uncovered a number of 
areas for future research which would further contribute to academic literature in this area. The elite 
socialisation effect and subsequent influence for foreign policy Europeanisation is typically examined 
through the analysis of voting trends of EU member states in the UNGA. Unlike the UNGA, the ATCM 
operates under total consensus, and therefore examination of voting trends would be difficult to 
distinguish for future research as they are not independently recorded in ATCM final reporting. 
However, it would be possible to undertake a comparative analysis of EU and the EU ATCPs policies 
on issues relating to the Antarctic, and then examine to what extent they converge or diverge on 
issues discussed within the agenda of the ATCM.  
 
For example, this could include comparative analysis into how the Environmental Protocol and its 
annexes directly reflect environmental policy developments within the EU, in the areas of marine 
pollution, waste disposal, environmental impact assessments, area protection management, liability 
for environmental emergencies. As ATCM/CEP final reporting does record the independent 
comments of states during the deliberation process, such research could determine to what extent 
EU norms have influenced the process and substance of Antarctic political deliberation beyond what 
limited detail could be incorporated within this thesis, due to restrictions on content scope and 
research time.  
 
Divergence from the original research design proved to be another limitation to this research, as it 
served to highlight that interviews could have provided more empirical data were they asked of the 
equivalent foreign ministerial representatives of national ATCP delegations, rather than remaining 
limited to interviews of Managers of National Antarctic Programmes (who were unable to answer 
questions pertaining to the influence of the EU on member states Antarctic related policy and 
national positions at ATCM’s). This limitation was unavoidable as direct access to ATCP delegations at 
an ATCM was originally unforeseen during the course of this research, and occurred at a point too far 
through the research process to be incorporated.  
 
A comprehensive analysis of elite socialisation phenomenon of these delegations could provide a 
valuable contribution to academic literature, by investigating (through interviews) to what extent 
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these officials and their national delegations ‘feel’ or act ‘European’ at ATCM’s as a consequence of 
their repeated interaction in preparatory meetings with other EU member states general held early 
mornings prior to international meeting session starts. Furthermore, this might be evident within 
facilitating institutions such as the ESF and EPB, and in their early careers as former research 
colleagues in Antarctica. Additionally, this analysis could provide complementary data for the 
comparative policy analysis suggested above. A future research agenda might also seek to 
comparatively examine levels of engagement and foreign policy Europeanisation of small EU ATCPs, 
such as Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania (as an ATNCP that maintains a shared-name base with 
Australia).  
 
Furthermore, during the end of this research negotiations were still taking place to determine the 
allocation of polar scientific research funding under the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 
Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020), and the newly created Science 
Europe institution had yet to assume an operational mandate for facilitating European Polar 
research. Accordingly, there is scope for future investigation of into new partnership agreements and 
collaborative European scientific Antarctic research projects in the coming years, to further develop 
literature on the EU’s scientific and political engagement in the Antarctic.  
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